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The respective roles of courts and arbitral tribunals is, in one form or another, the 
foundational, primal question around which our whole law of arbitration revolves.  True, 
there is nothing here that hasn’t been said often before (and often enough----although 
that can hardly be thought to make things any better---by me). The outlines should be 
abundantly familiar by now. But the endless downpour of cases, and the overgrowth of 
commentary (inevitable after heavy rains) suggest that it may still be necessary to clear 
away some brush.  It is somewhat easier for me to justify going over all this ground 
                                                          
*
 Mark G. & Judy G. Yudof Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin. 
 This piece was prepared for a presentation at the Institute for Transnational Arbitration/American 
Society of International Law program on “Gateway Issues in International Arbitration,” held on April 3, 
2013.  It builds on, updates, and (I would certainly like to believe) improves on, a number of my earlier 
articles, notably Alan Scott Rau, “The Arbitrability Question Itself,” 10 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 
287(1999)[hereinafter Rau, “Arbitrability”]; Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About 
“Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 1 (2003) [hereafter Rau, 
“Separability”]; Alan Scott Rau, “Consent” to Arbitral Jurisdiction: Disputes with Non-Signatories, in 
Belinda Macmahon (ed.), Multiple Party Actions in International Arbitration: Consent, Procedure and 
Enforcement 69 (OUP 2009)[hereinafter Rau, “Consent”]; Alan Scott Rau, Understanding (and 
Misunderstanding) “Primary Jurisdiction,” 21 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 46 (2010) [hereinafter Rau, 
“Jurisdiction”]; Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 Amer. Rev. 
of Int’l Arb. 436 (2011) [hereinafter Rau, “Trilogy”]. 
A word about the title:  I appreciate of course that the term “arbitrability” is highly fraught, and  
that our usage is completely at odds with the way the term is used in other legal systems; see  Jan 
Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in GERALD AKSEN (ED.), GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR 
OF ROBERT BRINER 601, 609 (2005)(our “persistent abuse” of this “vaporous locution” “has led to 
international disharmony, because elsewhere that word has an established meaning” referring to public 
policy limitations upon what it is legally permissible to arbitrate). I have in fact often suggested that the 
term “can easily be dispensed with,” Rau, “Separability” at 120. But the idiom is well-entrenched, and in 
the absence of anything with a clearly superior claim---and allowing for the allure of alliteration—I am led 
to believe it does no great harm.  I take “question of arbitrability” to mean, the question “whether there is 
‘a duty for the parties to arbitrate’ the dispute---whether the parties have consented to a final arbitral 
judgment on the issues---whether, in short, the arbitrators have ‘jurisdiction’ to decide,” Rau, “Consent” at 
71.   
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again, in this brief exercise, when I bear in mind Johnson’s admonition that “men more 
frequently require to be reminded than informed.”1  
 
I. The “Gateway Issue” 
 
It is one of the maxims of the civil law, that definitions are hazardous.
2
 
 It is quite common, in the case law3 and the secondary literature,4 to characterize 
the issue we are addressing here in terms of “gateway” or “threshold” challenges to the 
arbitration of a commercial dispute.  This frame has all the virtues of metaphor---as it 
reminds us with some vividness that we really have to be sure that it is proper to do so 
before subjecting an individual to the results of private adjudication. And it has all the 
dangers, as well---tempting us to mistake a vague image for some underlying reality. 
Like most metaphors it is rife with ambiguity:  After all the notion of a “gateway” may, 
purely as a semantic matter, direct us 
(1) to distinguish between issues that must be resolved before a party can be 
permitted to proceed and fully adjudicate the merits of the dispute---issues that 
may after all include such  things as the non-payment of fees, or the untimely 
making of an application---and those that need not be.5 
                                                          
1 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler No. 2 (March 24, 1750), in The Rambler 34 (1825 ed.). 
2
 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler No. 125 (May 28, 1751) in id. at 217. 
3 See, e.g., Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 n.2 (2003)(“If the contractual 
ambiguity could itself be characterized as raising a ‘gateway’ question of arbitrability, then it would be 
appropriate for a court to answer it in the first instance”); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 
444, 452 (2003)(“gateway matters, such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all 
or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy,” are presumed 
to be for the courts); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002) (a “question of 
arbitrability” refers to the “narrow circumstance where contracting parties would likely have expected a 
court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought that they had agreed 
that an arbitrator would do so, and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court 
avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate”; 
consequently “a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises 
a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court to decide”). 
 Cf. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 647 
(1986)(“the threshold question of arbitrability”); United Steelworkers of America v. American 
Manufacturing Co., 463 U.S. 564, 569 (1960)(“it might be argued that a dispute as to the meaning” of a 
“standard” arbitration clause---calling for the arbitration of “any disputes. . . as to the meaning, 
interpretation, and application” of the agreement---is for the arbitrator; “but the Court rejects this position, 
saying that the threshold question, the meaning of the arbitration clause itself, is for the judge unless the 
parties clearly state to the contrary”)”(Brennan, J., concurring). 
4
 Cf. George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 37 Yale J. Int’l 
L. 1, 3 (2012)(the task of “demarcating ‘gateway’ issues (i.e., issues that a court entertains at the 
threshold to ensure that the entire process has a foundation in party consent) from ‘non-gateway’ issues 
(i.e., issues that arbitral tribunals, not courts, must be allowed to address initially”). 
5
  Cf.  Howsam,, supra n.3, 537 U.S. at 84 (“[T]he Court has found the phrase ‘question of arbitrability’ not 
applicable in [certain] kinds of general circumstance where parties would likely expect that an arbitrator 
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Or alternatively, it may ask us to distinguish between issues that must be resolved 
before a party may even invoke arbitral jurisdiction---and those that may instead be left 
to the arbitrators themselves.  And here there are layers upon layers of ambiguity---for 
even within this second category, it is still frequently unclear whether: 
(2) the metaphor of a “gateway” is being used to evoke what is a logically prior 
prerequisite to arbitral jurisdiction—asking us, that is, to distinguish between 
those issues that (whenever raised) will condition the ultimate validity of an 
award---and those that do not; or whether 
 
(3)  the term is being used, instead, to evoke what is merely chronologically prior to 
arbitral proceedings-----asking us, that is, to distinguish between  those issues 
that (whoever will have the final word on the subject) must be resolved before a 
party is permitted even to have access to the arbitral tribunal, or to initiate a 
proceeding---and those that need not be. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would decide the gateway matter”).  The term does indeed appear to be occasionally used in this sense--- 
for example, in a muddled comment to the effect that “the critical distinction remains between questions of 
arbitrability and ‘gateway’ issues,” cf. 17 (11) World  Arb. & Med. Rep., at 349 (Nov. 2006)(discussing a 
Florida case holding that whether a claim was barred by the statute of limitations was a matter for the 
arbitrators, notwithstanding a contractual provision to the effect that “in no event shall  the demand for 
arbitration be made after the date” that the claim would be time- barred if brought in court). 
So here it may well be the arbitral tribunal, just as easily as the court, which stands at the 
“threshold” and serves as the guardian of the adjudicative process. The fact that a claim has been 
asserted only when it is “too late,” may indeed “keep the arbitration from going forward,” but---precisely 
because the question falls for decision by the arbitrators themselves (as in Howsam)--- it should not be 
viewed as “jurisdictional” in any sense.  See also Rau, “Consent,” at 136-37(“I have already written at 
some length about why assertions like these should not really implicate the ‘jurisdiction’ of the arbitrators”; 
“the parties should not have to run the risk of seeing a rule of liability converted into a rule of 
‘arbitrability”); JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION  ch. 3 (forthcoming 2013)(a respondent’s 
assertion that (a) “it never consented to give the supposed arbitrator any authority whatsoever,” and its 
assertion that (b) “claims should be dismissed without substantive examination because liability is in any 
event barred by some legal or contractual impediment,” are both “threshold issues in the sense that they 
deflect consideration of the claim,” but the first is a “jurisdictional challenge” and the second is not). 
For that matter, a private-law tribunal may deem the existence of an “investment” (or perhaps the 
claimant’s status as an “investor”) as “jurisdictional,” in the limited sense that at a preliminary stage it will 
treat this “gateway” issue as separate from---and logically prior to---any determination ultimately made 
with  respect to the substantive conduct of the respondent state (“the merits”). See Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 466 (2010) (“the existence 
of an investment is a necessary condition of the tribunal’s jurisdiction,” and tribunals “typically discuss this 
as an issue of jurisdiction ratione materiae”); Christopher F. Dugan et al., Investor-State Arbitration 147-
153 (2008)(“common practice for arbitral tribunals . . . to separate the proceedings into two phases, such 
that a claimant must first overcome jurisdictional objections before presenting the heart of its case”).  But 
it hardly follows that on a motion to vacate, a court at the seat must treat these questions as 
“jurisdictional” in the more interesting sense that it is entitled to refuse deference to the tribunal’s finding 
and perform a de novo review.  See the discussion at text accompanying nn. 169-71 infra. 
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These last two questions are often conflated, but ought best be kept distinct.6 Only 
the former, I think (that is, # 2 above), is truly challenging---or at least (I know this is not 
the same thing), only the former will be the principal focus of this paper. It is perhaps 
unfortunate that American procedure has tended to treat as simply axiomatic the 
proposition that 
 
 if a question will  ultimately be one for judicial determination, then 
 it may immediately be one for judicial determination.7 
 
                                                          
6
 The Supreme Court regularly uses the term when it poses questions framed as in # (2) above; see the 
cases in note 3 supra. See also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Case Comment, Republic of Argentina v. BG Group 
PLC, 27 ICSID Rev. 4, 5 (2012): In discussing the Republic of Argentina case---in which the D.C. Circuit 
ordered that a BIT award be vacated because “a precondition to arbitration of an investor’s claim” had not 
been satisfied---Professor Bjorklund suggests that the terms in which the court’s opinion is framed may be 
“confusing at the outset as it invoked the term ‘gateway’ even though Argentina did not seek intervention 
at the commencement of the arbitration”:  “Yet,” she reminds us, “determining to whom parties have 
referred certain gateway questions has an effect on the back end of the arbitration, too.” 
7
 That is to say, our assumption has been that a judicial determination with respect to the duty to arbitrate 
is possible----not only on review after an award has been rendered---but also before any proceedings at 
all have commenced, by a motion to stay litigation or to compel arbitration under §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA.  
American legislation thus “allows an objecting party to seek judicial determination of the scope of consent 
either before, during, or after an arbitration,” Grad v. Wetherhold Galleries, 550 A.2d 903, 908 (D.C. 
1995)(Uniform Arbitration Act). In this country, then, “the doctrine of compétence/compétence--rather than 
the corollary of natural law that it is frequently assumed to be--takes on instead the air of a local solution 
with little or no relevance elsewhere,” Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the 
Lessons of ADR, 40 Tex. Int'l L.J. 449, 462 (2005). 
So I find quite puzzling the suggestion that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence “must be understood” 
as holding that if challenges are made both to the underlying contract and to the arbitration agreement -- 
challenges which might therefore impeach the arbitration agreement itself---- then such a challenge must 
“preliminarily” and “in the first instance” be resolved by the arbitrators, and only subsequently addressed 
by a court in a proceeding to vacate. See 1 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 942-43, 958 (2009)(a result ironically “very similar” to the “prima facie standard applied in 
France and elsewhere”). However desirable as a normative matter, U.S. courts have never in fact done 
anything remotely like this; see Alan Scott Rau, Separability in the United States Supreme Court, 2006:1 
Stockholm International Arbitration Review 1 (2006).  Nor is it easy to grasp how any such notion of an 
“interim allocation” could possibly be thought consistent with the mandate of FAA § 4 that a court first 
actually be “satisfied” that an agreement to arbitrate not be “in issue.”  See also Rau, “Trilogy”, at 492 fn. 
197(where there is no “continuing contractual obligation on the part of one party that constrains  him to 
submit to arbitration,” then a court “has no business compelling arbitration under § 4”). 
All this is made quite explicit, if it were necessary to do so, in Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171 
(2
nd
 Cir. 2003):  Here arbitration had been initiated with the NASD, and the respondent/broker sought to 
enjoin it---on the ground that “none of the [claimants] was ever his customer.”  The district court refused 
relief, finding that the allegations by the putative customer were “sufficient, on the present sparse record, 
to support sending the matter to arbitration (without prejudice to any subsequent determination the 
arbitrators my make, on a fuller record, as to their jurisdiction).”  The court of appeals inevitably reversed--
-reminding the lower court that before anything else happened, it was the court’s duty to itself “render a 
final decision on [the broker's] claim that the investors had no right to arbitrate their claims against him.” 
Material issues of fact---e.g., whether the broker intended to deceive the investors into believing they had 
accounts with him---remained, and had to be determined by a court “before a final decision on arbitrability 
is reached”; the arbitration was to be stayed pending resolution of these issues.  
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Such a view is hardly inevitable.  It is, as we shall see in a moment, quite eminently 
defensible in prudential and instrumental terms.  But it is flawed in eliding the 
cost/benefit analysis that other legal regimes---including the inevitably more 
sophisticated Gallic version—have the virtue of addressing somewhat more directly and 
explicitly.  Perhaps this question of timing may, then, deserve a brief discussion before 
we turn to the main event.  
 
 
II. The Question of Timing 
 
Now it is well known that certain arbitration regimes choose to severely limit any 
possibility of judicial control over arbitral jurisdiction at any time before the proceedings 
are terminated by an award.  The paradigm case is France---where a court, presented 
with the objection that a dispute before it is the subject of an agreement to arbitrate, 
must by statute refuse to proceed any further.8  Once put into play, the logic of this 
system is not merely robust, but characteristically relentless:   As has often been 
pointed out, even a claimant who does not believe that he is bound by an arbitration 
agreement has no alternative but to first institute an arbitral proceeding -- and 
participate in the selection of the tribunal -- all for the sole purpose of asking the 
arbitrators to declare that they may not hear the case.9  In addition, it seems to follow 
ineluctably that a French court must consider itself barred from adjudicating a matter 
even where the courts of the agreed seat -- say, New York -- have already held the 
arbitration clause to be invalid under the lex arbitri.10  (Quaere whether such a result 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bensadoun arose in the context of a respondent’s motion to enjoin a threatened arbitration.  By 
contrast, with respect to a claimant’s motion to compel arbitration under § 4, I readily concede that where 
the arbitration agreement allows him to proceed ex parte, the claimant’s ability to obtain an initial judicial 
determination  of the duty to arbitrate may in some courts be somewhat problematical. But holdings to the 
effect that such claimants are not truly “aggrieved” within the meaning of the Act are simply misguided. Cf.  
Rau, “Jurisdiction,” at 116 fn. 180. 
8
 A court must in all cases declare itself to be without “jurisdiction” whenever a dispute subject to an 
arbitration agreement  has already been submitted to an arbitral tribunal (that is, whenever the arbitral 
tribunal has been formed [constitué]  and the tribunal is thus “seized” of the dispute [saisi]).   And it must 
do precisely the same thing even where the dispute has not yet been brought before the arbitral tribunal--
-at least as long as the arbitration agreement is not “clearly void” [manifestement nulle] or “clearly 
inapplicable.” Decree No. 2011-48 of Jan. 13, 2011, arts. 1448, 1456, 1506.  None of this, of course, 
prevents a later judicial challenge, on the canonical grounds, after an award has been rendered, see id. 
arts. 1492 (domestic arbitration), 1520 (international arbitration subject to French arbitration law, whether 
because the seat is in France or otherwise):  Hence the court exercises a “gateway” function as the term 
is used in the text at #2 (but not as it is used in  #3) above.  
9 E.g., Peter Schlosser, The Competence of Arbitrators and of Courts, 8 ARB. INT'L 189, 201, 204 (1992). 
10
 Cf. Copropriété Maritime Jules Verne v. American Bureau of Shipping, 2006 REV. ARB. 945 (Cour de 
Cassation, June 7, 2006) (New York arbitration; held, French courts may not review the arbitration clause 
“in a substantive and in-depth manner, whatever the place or seat of the arbitral tribunal,” until the time an 
award has been rendered); compare Legal Department du Ministère de la Justice de la République d'Irak 
v. Sociétés Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani, 2007 REV. ARB. 87 (Cour d'Appel de Paris, 2006) (French 
arbitration; held, Italian court ruling to the effect that an arbitration clause was “inoperative” by virtue of a 
U.N. embargo “cannot be honored and enforced in France,” since a state court “must decline jurisdiction 
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could possibly make any sense in cases where the courts of New York had not only 
refused to compel arbitration, but -- as is their right -- had gone further and also 
enjoined the parties from continuing the arbitration there?).11 
 
Now it would surely be vulgarly reductionist to make too much of the fact -- generally 
understood but rarely acknowledged -- that the French regime just happens to be 
closely congruent with the self-interest of the arbitration community; the ability to 
conduct arbitral proceedings----even where no valid agreement to arbitrate can later be 
found---might in fact be viewed as a sort of guild protection, suitable for a net exporter of 
arbitration services.  Jobs for the boys is thus certainly a happy side effect of this model.  
But it can't be the engine driving the machine -- can it?12    A more benign view is that 
the choice among various procedural regimes comes down, at bottom, to nothing more 
than the usual prudential questions imposed by a cost/benefit analysis.13 That is:  
 
 Is it best---as we have tended to assume in the United States and England---that 
the question of arbitral jurisdiction be resolved with finality as soon as possible, 
thereby obviating an extended and costly procedure that might turn out in the end 
to have been simply pointless?  After all, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unless a summary examination justifies the conclusion that the arbitration clause was manifestly void or 
inapplicable”); see also id. at 90, 93 (note Sylvain Bollée; the purpose of Article 1458 of the CPC “is not 
so much to silence the French judge as to give the first word to the arbitrator,” and this can only be 
accomplished if we make sure that motions to a court, “in any country whatever,” cannot “serve to torpedo 
the priority that must be accorded the arbitrators”).  
In the case given in the text, French deference to a putative New York arbitral proceeding would 
presumably envisage that the arbitration go forward there.  If any award is ultimately rendered, the courts 
in New York would inevitably go on to annul it---but of course, that fact too would be equally irrelevant in 
Paris. 
11
 Cf. Dominique Hascher, Injunctions in Favor of and Against Arbitration,  21 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb.  
189, 192 (2010)(where a lawsuit is brought on the underlying cause of action in France, “an American 
injunction against an arbitration situated in the U.S.” would “not be effective because the [American 
Bureau of Shipping case, supra note 10] made it clear that [the French rule giving priority to the 
arbitrators] applies regardless of the seat of the arbitral tribunal”). 
12
 Cf. Symposium, La clause compromissoire, in Perspectives d'évolution du droit francais de l'arbitrage, 
1992 REV. ARB. 285 (discussion; intervention of Pierre Bellet): “What interests us, is not the financial 
advantages that arbitration can have for arbitrators, but the advantages that the development of 
arbitration can have for France.” 
13
 An explicit and highly nuanced attempt to set out the cost/benefit considerations appears in BORN, 
supra n.7 at 971-81 (instead of trying to “adopt clear-cut legal categories,” it would be better, in deciding 
whether interlocutory judicial consideration should be available, to instead accord “decisive weight . . . to 
a case-by –case assessment of questions of efficiency, fairness and institutional competence.”).  Such 
“case-by-case assessment” may evoke individualized efficiency and fairness concerns that are not 
internalized in either the French or U.S. models, see, e.g., id. at 979 (“How advanced is the arbitration?” 
Was the jurisdictional challenge made “at the 11
th
 hour?” Are “foreign legal issues,” as to which the 
arbitral tribunal may have greater competence, involved in the jurisdictional determination?)  
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 for the moving party, a judicial imprimatur along the lines of FAA § 4 will 
foreclose post-award assertions by the respondent that the arbitration was a 
nullity; and by the same token,  
 
 early judicial resolution may relieve the resisting party of the need to put on 
any defense on the merits -- and eliminate the risk, if he chooses instead to 
stay out, that any such defense will be deemed waived.14   
 
The force of  these considerations is strongest where --- as is quite often the 
case --- the states most willing to entertain pre-arbitration motions to police 
abusive proceedings happen, at the same time, to be among those most willing 
to move the motion to the head of the queue, and to provide a summary method 
of disposition.15  
 Or alternatively, might it perhaps be preferable---as French law provides--- to 
allow the arbitration to proceed, honoring the parties' original bargain to get in 
and out of arbitration in the most expeditious manner? 
 
 An extreme and inflexible rule of compétence/compétence may well 
reflect a suspicion (unverifiable, of course, but commonly an article of 
faith in the arbitration establishment) that “more often than not” a 
challenge to arbitral jurisdiction is frivolous -- nothing but a delaying 
and obstructive  tactic by the recalcitrant party, who “is in bad faith and 
only trying to gain time.”16  
 
                                                          
14
 See Schlosser, supra note 9 at 193 (it is “deplorable” that parties must often “invest large amounts of 
money and time-consuming, cumbersome work in the arbitration before they are allowed in the 
forthcoming challenge or enforcement proceeding to seek the court's review as to the legality of the 
arbitration proceedings”). Cf. ADAM SAMUEL, JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 189 (1989)(legislation in some states that only permits a court to make a 
binding ruling on jurisdiction where “there is no prima facie arbitral agreement applicable to the dispute” 
“seems to produce the worst of all possible solutions,” as the challenge to arbitral jurisdiction may have to 
be “presented three times”). 
15
 See MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 782 (2nd ed. 1989) (if a party tells the arbitrator that “he is about to apply 
for declaratory relief,” the arbitrator should “suspend the reference until the court has arrived at a 
decision”; if he feels that this will involve undue delay, “there is no reason why he should not say so, in 
which case the Court will no doubt take his remarks into account when fixing a date for the hearing of the 
declaratory action”); cf. Kelly v. Hinson, 387 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. App. 2012)(trial court erred “by failing to 
rule on [defendant’s] motion to compel arbitration prior to granting summary judgment for [plaintiff]”; “a 
trial court should rule expeditiously on a motion to compel arbitration,” and had “a ministerial duty to set 
[defendant’s] motion for a hearing and to rule on it”). 
16
 See, e.g., Antonias Dimolitsa, Autonomie et “Kompetenz-Kompetenz,” 1998 REV. ARB. 305, 325; 
Emmanuel Gaillard, Note [to Soc. Coprodag v. Bohin (Cour de Cassation, May 10, 1995)], 1995 REV. 
ARB. 618, 620-21 (situations where the claim of a lack of arbitral jurisdiction is well-founded will be 
“statistically rare,” and so the rule is necessary to discourage litigants from schemes aimed at 
“destabilizing” or disturbing the orderly conduct of an arbitration). 
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 This choice does after all permit -- indeed encourage -- the tribunal 
itself to render a preliminary award on the jurisdictional issue alone -- 
something it is likely to do in the normal course of events, and which 
can expedite matters by making the question ripe for immediate 
review.17  
 
 Nor can one be blind to the fact that where (by contrast) the arbitration 
does proceed to a final award, in a good percentage of cases the party 
who has challenged arbitral jurisdiction will prevail anyway -- making 
the question entirely moot. (Where there is risk neutrality and a 
relatively equal access to information, this should in fact be true 
roughly half the time).18  And in the last resort (that is, even where on 
                                                          
17
 See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 739 
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (an arbitral decision on jurisdiction “is a final decision on 
one aspect of the dispute” and “should therefore be considered as an award, against which an immediate 
action to set aside can be brought”); John J. Barceló, Who Decides the Arbitrators' Jurisdiction? 
Separability and Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
1115, 1125-26 (2003) (“Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the arbitral process will go forward, but parties 
with a legitimate basis for objecting to the arbitrators' jurisdiction will have an opportunity, after only 
moderate delay, to make their case to a judge”). This will not be true of course where the arbitrator has 
refused to formalize his decision on jurisdiction before rendering a final award -- whether in the interest of 
prolonging his mandate, or in the interest of forestalling a challenge he deems abusive; see SAMUEL, 
supra note 14, at 212-24.  
Immediate review should equally be available in cases – not exactly an everyday occurrence -- 
where the arbitrator has concluded that he lacks jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. It may be 
embarrassingly difficult to squeeze such a case into the architecture of the relevant statute; nevertheless 
as a practical matter most everyone readily recognizes the need for an immediate and definitive judicial 
declaration that the dispute is indeed “arbitrable.” Doubtless the same arbitrator cannot be compelled to 
take up the task that he has already declined: see Sigvard Jarvin, Note [to Uzinexportimport Romanian 
Co. v. Attock Cement Co., Cour d'appel de Paris, July 7, 1994], 1995 REV. ARB. 115, 119 (“You can't 
make a bird sing”). Still, a substitute can always be named: and this time there must be no more 
provisional decisions, no compétence/compétence, no more shopping around; basta. See generally Jean-
Baptiste Racine, La sentence d’incompétence, 2010 REV. ARB. 729, 740, 765 (“it is rational and logical” 
that if judicial review is possible when the arbitrators have held that they had jurisdiction, it should equally 
be the case when they have held that they didn’t; “the symmetry is perfect”); see also id. at 775 (any new 
arbitrator “should deem the question of his jurisdiction to be settled and refuse to consider [déclarer 
irrecevable] any new challenge to it”).   But cf. Vincent Chantebout, Note [to Soc. Papillon Group Corp. v. 
République Arabe de Syrie, Cour d’appel de Paris, March 9, 2009], 2010 REV. ARB. 525, 533 (a 
symmetrical treatment of these two questions “may nevertheless give rise to fears that judicial review has 
become the instrument of a forcible or coercive arbitration”; perhaps, given the “liberalism with which 
arbitrators usually tend to assess their own jurisdiction,” the award should deemed a “threshold” that a 
court on review ---which ought not in this respect to be “more Catholic than the Pope” [plus royaliste que 
le roi]---should refrain from crossing). 
18
 The seminal piece here is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5, 19 (1984) (“where the gains or losses from litigation are equal to the parties, 
the individual maximizing decisions of the parties will create a strong bias toward a rate of success for 
plaintiffs at trial ... of 50 % regardless of the substantive standard of law”; “as the parties' error [in 
estimating the outcome] diminishes, the 50% proportion of victories will be approached more closely”). 
See also Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1965 (2009) 
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review a  “second look” at jurisdiction proves necessary), a national 
court should be able to learn something from an initial reasoned award 
-- perhaps from a tribunal with the comparative advantage of having 
been instructed in the facts, or possessing some particular insight into 
an applicable foreign law.19  
 
Although the social interest in the reduction of systemic costs is critical, the result 
of any balancing process must be somewhat indeterminate.20  For a long time my own 
reading of the French literature had made me intensely skeptical as to whether the 
game being played there could possibly be worth the candle: For I had always assumed 
that the statutory exception for clauses that were “manifestly” void would as a practical 
matter lead to the impossibility of cabining any preliminary inquiry -- thereby inevitably, 
fatally, muddling whatever practical benefits the doctrine seeks to attain.21 In retrospect, 
however, that attitude may have reflected nothing more than the mentality of someone 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(“the set of adjudged cases” is “a universe dominated by close cases,” and these unsettled close cases 
will “fall more or less equally on either side” of the applicable decisional criterion). 
19
 I am grateful to Gary Born for suggesting this point to me in a private communication. See also Azov 
Shipping Co v. Baltic Shipping Co (No.1), [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 68 (QBD (Comm.)) (“I can quite see that 
there is an interest in encouraging parties to put their arguments on jurisdiction before the arbitrator 
himself,” for “in many cases, and perhaps in the ordinary and normal case of such a challenge, where, for 
instance, there is simply an issue as to the width of an arbitration clause and no issue as to whether a 
party is bound to the relevant contract in the first place, the arbitrator's view may be accepted”). 
20
 Throughout the litigation in First Options, it was taken for granted that a court injunction against 
arbitration would always be available to any party who resists the initiation of an arbitration to which he 
claims he was not bound. The respondent, however, had chosen not to do this, but instead to argue to 
the arbitrators that they had no jurisdiction -- and the claimant asserted that if he were permitted to do 
that---“without being bound by the result”---this would encourage “delay and waste in the resolution of 
disputes.” Justice Breyer, however, found this point “inconclusive” -- “for factual circumstances vary too 
greatly to permit a confident conclusion about whether allowing the arbitrator to make an initial (but 
independently reviewable) arbitrability determination would, in general, slow down the dispute resolution 
process.” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 946-47 (1995). 
21 It should not be surprising in the least that the statutory standard could not be cabined solely as an 
inquiry into whether a clause is “manifestly nulle” but would shade readily into the related inquiry as to 
whether it is “manifestly inapplicable” -- thereby posing not only the issues of existence and formation, but 
also those going to the scope of the clause, whether the clause still exists, whether a third party can be 
bound by or take advantage of the clause, and so forth and so on. See Decree No. 2011-48 of Jan. 13, 
2011, art. 1448; Francois-Xavier Train, Note [to Soc. Champion supermarche France (CSF) v. Soc. 
Recape (Cour de Cassation, July 4, 2006)], 2006 REV. ARB. 961 (“if he limited himself solely to the 
manifest ‘invalidity’ of the clause, a judge could catch only a tiny fraction of all the cases where the clause 
is inoperative”; for example, when a clause linking a bankrupt debtor to his franchisor is asserted against 
a trustee acting in the collective interest of creditors, its inapplicability is “obvious”).  
Nor does it seem likely that one can really demarcate with any exactitude the precise line between 
what is -- on the one hand -- supposed to be a perfunctory examination, intended merely to allow the 
arbitration to proceed, and -- on the other -- an in-depth scrutiny; see SAMUEL, supra n.15 at 191 (“It is 
difficult to know how void an arbitral clause must be to be ‘manifestement nulle’”);  Ibrahim Fadlallah, 
Priorité a l'arbitrage: entre quelles parties?, LES CAHIERS DE L'ARBITRAGE ¶13 (Gaz. Pal. 2002/1) (do 
judicial decisions dealing with the extension of arbitration clauses to third parties “simply represent the 
chronological priority due to provisional arbitral decisions, or do they resolve once and for all [trancher 
dans le vif] the very question of arbitral jurisdiction?”).  
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trained in the common law: It honestly had not occurred to me that the French 
legislative scheme was designed to function instead as the subtlest of Cartesian traps: 
For not only is “voidness” or “inapplicability” impossible to demonstrate -- but the more 
the resisting party tries to do so, the more, apparently, he is demonstrating at the same 
time that whatever flaws there may be are not “manifest” -- -the more, that is, he's fatally 
caught up in the web, all his struggles telling against him.22  
As this whole question of chronological priority is---or anyway, ought to be---
exclusively responsive to prudential and instrumental concerns (with a priori claims of 
logic or ideology playing little role),23 it is not surprising that infinite variations are 
                                                          
22
 See, e.g., Francois-Xavier Train, Note [to Soc. Laviosa Chimica Mineraria v. Soc. Afitex (Cour de 
Cassation, Feb. 11, 2009)], 2009 REV. ARB. 156, 157: When you think you are demonstrating that an 
arbitration clause is void, you are instead -- and necessarily -- proving “one thing and one thing only -- 
that it is not manifestly void, for what is ‘manifest’ has no need to be proven, only to be noticed 
[constaté].” (And as far as the judge is concerned, “even a willingness to look into the argument [entrer en 
matière] means that he has already stepped over the line”). 
23
 But cf. Emmanuel Gaillard, La reconnaissance, en droit suisse, de la second moitié du principe d'effet 
négative de la compétence-compétence, in GERALD AKSEN (ED.), GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR 
OF ROBERT BRINER 311, 313-16 (2005):  Arbitrators, as Professor Gaillard points out, are universally 
accorded the authority to rule on the validity and scope of the arbitration clause. [But of course all this 
means---nothing more---is that they are not thought to be somehow obligated to pack up their papers and 
turn out the lights, as soon as one of the putative parties sends them a note objecting to their jurisdiction]. 
If this is the case, argues Professor Gaillard, then such authority “is only real,”  can “only have any true 
impact,” if pending their decision, state courts are required to “abstain from undertaking an in-depth 
inquiry into the same questions”; “general acceptance” of the first proposition “should logically lead” to this 
conclusion”). 
 For the precisely opposite view---although, poignantly, one that is equally presented as an 
exercise in deductive reasoning--- cf. Stavros Brekoulakis, The Negative Effect of Competence-
Competence: The Verdict Has to be Negative, 2009 AUSTRIAN ARB. Y.B. 238-258. This paper (whose 
title neatly summarizes its thesis) argues that to “confer exclusive jurisdiction on a forum whose validity is 
at stake, defies not only logic but also any principle of legitimacy,” for parties “cannot” be obliged “to 
exclusively submit to arbitration proceedings [merely] on the basis of prima facie evidence.”  
By contrast, I had always supposed that legal rules exist only to serve some instrumental function 
-- and thus that there can be no “logical” a priori “impossibilities.” If there are deemed to be systemic 
advantages from making litigants jump through certain hoops before they are allowed to present their 
arguments before a state court, why, then, this seems perfectly legitimate as long as their ultimate “day in 
court” is not unduly burdened. One illustration: In many American jurisdictions, courts may not hear a 
case at all unless the parties first go through a non-binding ADR process -- usually mediation, but in many 
cases, a form of “court-annexed” or “non-binding” arbitration. Now in such cases, of course, there is no 
evidence of “consent” or “agreement,” prima facie or otherwise, on the part of the litigants at all -- that is 
deemed quite irrelevant and the question is not even asked. But the preliminary hurdle is imposed as a 
condition to the court's willingness to hear the case, in the expectation that this will increase the chances 
of settlement and thus reduce the judicial workload; if the arbitrators' decision is unacceptable to either 
party, then the court will hear the case de novo. See generally ALAN SCOTT RAU et al, PROCESSES 
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 534-43, 571-86 (4
th
 ed. 2006); cf. id. at 649-50 (required “medical review 
panels” in malpractice cases). No more than with respect to the French model, a sustained argument 
here may not plausibly invoke lack of “due process” or “legitimacy.” 
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available.  Legislative regulations24 and proposals in the secondary literature25 abound 
that draw the balance somewhat differently; sitting somewhere in the middle between 
                                                          
24
 The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration provides--at least where a party 
“has initiated arbitration proceedings before any resort is had to a court” – that a court’s ruling on the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction shall be “stayed” until an award is rendered, unless the court has “good and 
substantial reasons to the contrary” (Art. VI(3)).  This limitation seems to swim in the same current of 
thought as that which underlies the frequently-advanced notion of a “prima facie examination.” See 
Gaillard, supra n.23 at 325 n.40 (2005).  Similarly, with respect to Switzerland, see BORN, supra n.7 at 
904-907.   
 A strong body of authority asserts that the UNCITRAL Model Law, too, should be read in this way -- 
that is, that Article 8(1) of the Law must also be construed as “calling for [only] prima facie [rather than 
immediate and plenary] control of arbitral jurisdiction,” see Frédéric Bachand, Does Article 8 of the Model 
Law Call for Full or Prima Facie Review of the Arbitral Tribunal's Jurisdiction?, 22 ARB. INT'L 463, 473 
(2006). To that effect, see Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] SCC 34 (Sup. Ct. 
Can.) ¶¶ 77, 84-86 (“as a general rule” “a challenge to the arbitrator's jurisdiction must be resolved first by 
the arbitrator,” and a court should depart from this “rule of systematic referral” only where the challenge is 
“based solely on a question of law” and only where it is “satisfied” that the challenge “ will not unduly 
impair the conduct of the arbitration proceeding”; “the prima facie analysis test is gaining acceptance and 
has the support of many authors”). Despite Dell Computer, Gary Born reads the Canadian cases as 
“generally” applying a full judicial review standard where there has been a prior challenge to the existence 
or validity of an arbitration agreement---where there is a dispute as to “whether an arbitral tribunal can 
validity do anything at all”---and reserving a prima facie approach only for circumstances where the 
parties have at least committed themselves to arbitrate “some category of disputes” but where the scope 
of the duty to arbitrate is in question. See BORN, supra n.7 at 886-94. I am entirely agnostic as to the 
content of Canadian law, but I have suggested that a similar approach might help us in construing the 
parties’ agreement where we are trying to discover how far arbitrators should be presumed to have the 
authority to determine---this time, with finality---their own jurisdiction; see Rau, “Consent,” at 95-102.   
In any event I would assume that the notion of a “prima facie examination”---however summary in 
theory---must in practice require a considerably more searching inquiry into the facts underlying arbitral 
jurisdiction than does the absolute self-abnegation required of French courts: See Yves Strickler, La 
jurisprudence de la Cour de cassation en matière d’effet négative de la compétence-compétence, [2011] 
REV. ARB. 192, 198 (French law imposes restrictions that  go “well beyond” those implied by a “prima 
facie” examination” and asks instead  whether the requisite “nullity” or “inapplicability” of  the agreement 
to arbitrate is “blindingly obvious”) (creve les yeux); but cf. 1 BORN, supra n.7 at 906 fn.276. 
25 Professor Bermann, for example, has suggested that it is “only prior to the start of the arbitration”---that 
is, only before “the moment when the arbitral tribunal is fully constituted”---that a party resisting arbitration 
should “be permitted to bring a gateway issue to court.”  See Bermann, supra n. 4 at 9 (although “United 
States law does not do that”). In thus leaving at least some scope for a judicial role, this proposal seems 
to track the structure of the European Convention.  Both solutions share the virtue of sparing a reluctant 
claimant the need to participate in setting up a tribunal solely for the purpose of challenging its 
jurisdiction--- the rather curious result of the French regime.  In addition, where a tribunal has in fact been 
named, a court that has later been seized with the merits could readily justify staying its hand, in reliance 
perhaps 
 on the fact that some vetting function has already been exercised by an administering institution 
[The ICC, for example, will be  willing to order that an “arbitration shall proceed”  only “if and to  
the extent [that the ICC Court] “is prima facie satisfied” that an arbitration agreement “may exist,” 
R.6(4)];  
 or alternatively, on a similar vetting function that may have been exercised by some competent 
(even if complaisant, or officious) court which has presumed to name an arbitrator.  There is even 
some mild American authority to the effect that a court’s decision to do this---as opposed to 
granting a motion to compel---should be governed by “a somewhat less stringent standard”----so 
Arbitrating “Arbitrability” 
Friday, March 29, 2013 
Page 12 of 61 
 
 
the rather extreme French and American models, they may restrict potentially intrusive 
judicial intervention to a greater extent than the latter, while contemplating progressively 
greater roles for the courts at the outset than the former. 
There remains, however, a far more fundamental point: Any “rule” can only 
derive meaning and legitimacy from the context in which it operates.  For example:  
Although lofty and grandiloquent claims are often advanced for the French model as the 
embodiment of universal principles, 26 in reality the French structure of judicial 
enforcement and supervision of awards is harnessed to certain contingent preferences 
with respect to the organization of that state's judiciary.  In particular, it rests on a 
preference that the functions of “review” and “enforcement” of arbitral awards be 
concentrated in the courts of appeal -- primarily, as a practical matter, the Cour d'appel 
de Paris. This “centralizing spirit” of French law reflects its characteristic striving for 
“Coherence” and “Rationality”;27  in particular, to allocate exclusive jurisdiction to the 
courts of appeal is thought essential to avoid any “unhealthy competition” with other 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that a court is not required to make a final determination with respect to the actual “existence” or 
“validity” of an arbitration agreement “before proceeding with the appointment of an arbitrator,” 
ACEquip Ltd. v. American Engineering Corp., 315, F.3d 151, 156-57 (2
nd
 Cir. 2003)(after all, if a 
court merely appoints an arbitrator, the “ opposing party need not participate in arbitration” and 
would thus “retain the right to challenge the validity of the contract or its arbitration clause after 
the arbitration is complete”).  Cf. Rau, “Consent” at 128 fn.177 (“this is hard to take very 
seriously”; “the requisite intention to arbitrate” should be the predicate in all cases). 
 But by contrast:  Suppose the applicable law or putative agreement permits one party to act 
unilaterally (should his opponent prove recalcitrant) in “constituting” an arbitral tribunal all by 
himself; see, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 571 (7
th
 
Cir. 2007)(“if either party refuses or neglects to appoint an arbitrator . . . the requesting party may 
nominate two arbitrators, who shall choose the third”); General Motors Corp. v. Pamela Equities 
Corp., 146 f.3D 242 (5th Cir. 1998)(if a party fails to appoint an arbitrator he “shall be bound by 
the determination of the arbitrator appointed by the party demanding arbitration”).  If courts were 
obliged to treat his doing so as a conclusive bar to pre-arbitral judicial intervention, surely strong 
incentives indeed would be created for an unseemly race to the favored forum. 
26 See Emmanuel Gaillard, Aspects philosphiques du droit de l’arbitrage international 126-28 (2008). Cf. 
also Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, in 
COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION (ICCA Congress 
Series No. 3) 257, 300-301 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987) (“the question may arise whether the so-called 
principle of compétence-compétence of the arbitrator has not become (notwithstanding a certain 
reluctance of some national systems, influenced by the Anglo-American tradition) a fundamental principle 
of transnational public policy, especially now that it has been recognized by various international 
instruments”); Matthias Scherer & Teresa Giovannini, Anti-Arbitration and Anti-Suit Injunctions in 
International Arbitration, 2005: 3 STOCKHOLM INT'L L. REV. 201, 205 (“most arbitration practitioners will 
undoubtedly share” the view that an injunction against an arbitration proceeding “would clearly violate the 
internationally recognized principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz”). 
27
 See Emmanuel Gaillard, L'effet négatif de la compétence-compétence, in  JACQUES HALDY ET AL., 
(EDS.), ÉTUDES DE PROCÉDURE ET D'ARBITRAGE EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN-FRANÇOIS 
POUDRET 387, 400 (1999) (“le génie centralisateur”); Gaillard, supra note 16, at 620-21 (“a keystone of 
the recent reforms of French arbitration law ... has been to rationalize the means of challenging awards 
by unifying all litigation on the subject in the courts of appeal”); Gaillard, supra note 23, at 318 (evoking, in 
the case of both France and Switzerland, a concern for the “coherence” of the state's judicial structure). 
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judges who might otherwise be approached  for purely tactical reasons -- litigants 
should hardly be free to approach “any judge whatever.”28  
The consequences of this preference reverberate throughout the entire legal 
regime.29  It is of course a reasonable and even an enviable choice: It makes possible, 
for example, a bench of arbitration mavens, fully at home with the interrelated pieces of 
the system, mindful of what is necessary to further the interests of users, and committed 
to doing so. The plausible corollary of their profound familiarity with the needs of the 
system is that other magistrates must be barred from anything other than the most 
perfunctory glance at any arbitration question.   
 
But that choice has not been ours. Where, for example, a district court has plenary 
power both to compel arbitration and to vacate awards, and---in the absence of any duty 
to arbitrate---to itself adjudicate the underlying cause of action, none of the learning 
developed to buttress the French system can have much purchase.  
 
If we are to work within the premises of our own system---to write on the slate we’ve 
been handed---the first entry is First Options. The starting point laid down there by 
Justice Breyer calls for the trial judge first to find, and then construe, some agreement 
between the parties.30 (As a matter of fact this is equally the end point.).  An 
                                                          
28
 Gaillard, supra note 23, at 318 (“chaos” would result if a party could file a case in any court which would 
have jurisdiction over the substantive dispute in the absence of an arbitration clause -- “or even worse, 
before any judge whatever [un juge quelconque]”). See also Sophie Crépin, Le contrôle des sentences 
arbitrates par la cour d'appel de Paris depuis les réformes de 1980 et 1981, 1991 REV. ARB. 521, 528 
(“motivated at all times by the desire to clarify and simplify the mechanisms for challenging arbitral 
awards, the legislature decided to entrust all of the litigation on this subject to a single jurisdiction, the 
court of appeal”). 
29
 Here’s one more example:  It seems to be taken quite for granted under French law that the parties 
have no power to contract for review of arbitral “errors of law.”  See, e.g., Laurence Franc, Contractual 
Modification of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: The French Position, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 215, 
217-18  (1999) (“the grounds enumerated in the statute cannot be extended, nor reduced; they are 
exclusive,” and “this exclusivity is based on the plain language of the French text”).  Note, though, that 
“review” of awards in the usual fashion is under French law restricted to the courts of appeal -- while of 
course, by contrast, in the absence of any arbitration agreement at all, the merits of any contract claim 
would be heard in the usual court of first instance. Given this architecture -- which necessarily imposes 
the strictest of separations between, on the one hand, the work of “review” for arbitral error, and on the 
other, the work of retail adjudication -- conceptual purity in fitting cases into the appropriate pigeonholes is 
absolutely critical. But under the FAA, by contrast, “review” of arbitral awards is carried out by the very 
same district courts that would in the first instance proceed to adjudicate disputes where (or to the extent 
that) the parties had made them “non arbitrable” -- or that would, to the extent an award has been 
understood to be non-binding, proceed to adjudicate the entire case de novo. So “on this side of the 
Atlantic, it shouldn't matter very much what you call it -- nor how you pronounce it.” Cf. Alan Scott Rau, 
Fear of Freedom, 17 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 469, 477-78 (2006). 
30
 This is likely to prove challenging, the search for the probable expectation of the parties invariably 
requiring liberal recourse to a default rule methodology .  The Supreme Court’s difficulties in dealing with 
this need to deploy default rules to construe arbitration agreements is the subject of Rau, “Trilogy,” at  
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understanding with respect to arbitral jurisdiction has the same force and effect---no 
more and no less---as any agreement with respect to the quality of delivered widgets: 
“So the question, ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what the 
parties agreed about that matter.” 31  
 In the absence of any understanding that such issues would be submitted to an 
arbitral tribunal, a court has no reason to stay its hand at all.32  So, for example---
as the author of First Options wrote when still a mere judge on the court of 
appeals---“to enjoin a party from arbitrating where an agreement to arbitrate is 
absent is the concomitant of the power to compel arbitration where it is 
present.”33  
 
 By contrast, in the presence of such an agreement, why, a court must honor it by 
deferring to the right of the arbitral tribunal to decide its jurisdiction---and must 
defer, absolutely without distinction, both prospectively on motions to stay or 
compel under §§ 3 and 4, and after the fact on motions to confirm or 
vacate under §§ 9 and 10. 
 
There is thus not the slightest warrant to believe that there is anything, in the First 
Options framework, that mandates multiple stages of litigation, or that contemplates 
distinctions between judicial actions taken prior to or subsequent to an arbitration. I can 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
436-87 (“silence” in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 17578 (2010)).  But this at 
least defines the judicial task. And it is the subject of the discussion that follows below. 
31
 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).  
“Primary” in this context cannot mean anything more than “overriding,” “hierarchically superior,” 
that is, “final.” See generally  Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 364 (“the question, after all . . . is just whose decision 
the parties were willing to submit to, and just whose interpretation they had bargained for”)(italics in 
original).   
I appreciate of course that as it reached the Court, First Options only directly posed the question 
of “the standard of review applied to an arbitrator’s decision about arbitrability,” 514 U.S. at 942.  But the 
structure of the FAA, and above all cases like Rent-A-Center, strongly suggest that precisely the same 
analysis should govern proceedings over motions made prior to the arbitration.  On the structure of the 
FAA, see n. 7 supra; see also Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 
(2010)(employee opposed the employer’s motion to stay litigation and to compel arbitration on the ground 
that the arbitration agreement was “unconscionable”; “an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues [or “a 
gateway issue”] concerning the arbitration agreement . . . is simply an additional, antecedent agreement 
the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional 
arbitration agreement just as it does on any other”).  
32
 “If . . . the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration, then the court 
should decide that question just as it would decide any other question that the parties did not submit to 
arbitration, namely independently.” First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 943.  
33
 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Raytheon European Management & Systems Co., 643 F.2d 
863, 868 (1
st
 Cir. 1981)(Breyer, J.)(injunction was sought and granted “under Massachusetts law,” the 
court holding that while the FAA “applies to this dispute,” an injunction would interfere with “neither the 
letter nor the spirit” of federal law.”   
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identify no trace of this in our jurisprudence---no black swans at all. 34  As an illustration, 
consider the recent protracted litigation in the Second Circuit in Telenor:35 
 As I have just noted, courts may well on occasion find it appropriate to enjoin an 
arbitration:  Naturally they will be prone to do so when they are convinced that no 
consent to arbitration has ever been given---but they may also issue an injunction 
in order to preserve an ultimate judicial determination---that is, pending any 
adjudication by a competent court of the issue of the duty to arbitrate.36 
 
 Now suppose that a court manifests some reluctance to issue an injunction in 
these circumstances: In the flurry of litigation preceding the final award, this is 
precisely what happened in Telenor. Do we take this to be a sign of some sort of 
deference to the arbitral tribunal, suggesting that the court sees its authority as 
dependent upon the stage of the proceedings---on whether the arbitral tribunal 
has acted?  Hardly: Judicial reticence reflects nothing more than our familiar 
understanding with respect to preliminary injunctions---that whether to issue or 
to withhold relief is the result of a discretionary exercise in “weighing the 
equities”---and in this calculus there will figure (and, given the policy of our 
statute, will figure powerfully) an assessment of the likelihood of success on the 
merits.37   
                                                          
34
 But cf. Bermann, supra n.4 at 38 (U.S. courts “sometimes” refer parties to arbitration “as long as the 
clause may plausibly be thought to cover the dispute”; when they thus “confine themselves to a mere 
screening function at the threshold, they require only a prima facie showing that the dispute falls within 
the scope of the arbitration clause” and “to this extent . . . do something not unlike what French courts 
do”); see also Thai-Lao Lignite v. Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc at *8 (2
nd
 Cir., July 27, 2012)(“the purpose of arbitration . . . would be frustrated” if 
parties could “routinely seek a preliminary ruling on arbitral jurisdiction from a court”  “prior to arbitral 
proceedings even getting underway”). 
 There are indeed “countervailing considerations” with respect to the “scope of an agreement to 
arbitrate,” see the discussion in Bermann, supra n.4 at 37-38; however, I believe---rather than leading to a 
conclusion that there should be a prima facie screening at “the threshold”---they lead to a conclusion that 
there should be-- at any stage---a merely perfunctory screening to identify some “clear and unmistakable” 
intention to entrust such matters to arbitrators for a final determination. Cf. n. 24 supra; see also text 
accompanying nn. 71-73 infra. 
35
 Storm LLC v. Telenor Mobile Communications AS, 2006 WL 3735657 (S.D.N.Y.)(Lynch, J.); Telenor 
Mobile Communications AS v. Storm LLC, 524 F.Supp.2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)(Lynch, J.), aff’d, 584 F.3d 
396 (2
nd
 Cir. 2009).  
36 In the Matter of the Application of Lakah, 602 F. Supp. 2d 497, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). (petitioners were 
either non-signatories to the applicable arbitration agreements or claimed not to have signed in their 
personal capacity; held, “respondents are enjoined from participating in any arbitration proceeding on the 
question of whether [petitioners] are bound by the arbitration agreements ... until I have determined” the 
issue); McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 105 F.3d 1192 (8
th
 Cir. 1997)( (“the order 
the court issued here, briefly freezing the parties' dispute resolution activities until it determines 
arbitrability, is surely appropriate”). 
37
 See Storm LLC, supra n. 36, 2006 WL 3735657 at *3 (despite an interlocutory arbitral order in which the 
tribunal upheld its own jurisdiction, the respondent moved to enjoin the arbitration from continuing;  the 
federal district court denied preliminary relief, “holding that the Court could not review an interlocutory 
order of an arbitral panel, and to the extent [respondent] relied on the general equitable power of the 
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 Or suppose---as also happened in Telenor---that a preliminary injunction is 
issued, “in aid of arbitration,” to halt foreign litigation. This is nothing but the 
other side of the same coin, properly responsive to the same concerns: A court 
might be impelled to act, after weighing the likelihood of success and the risk of 
imminent and irreparable harm threatened by “vexatious” litigation---perhaps in 
the interest of preserving the efficacy of an ultimate arbitral proceeding, but more 
often---and more fundamentally---in the interest of protecting its own right to 
determine whether the arbitration should go forward.  Far from being 
inconsistent with a court’s immediate and plenary adjudication of a motion to 
stay or to compel, an injunction buttresses the court’s ability to perform that 
task.38 
 
  The later stages of the Telenor litigation played out in the context of competing 
motions to compel and to vacate the resulting award. The arbitral tribunal had 
issued a “Partial Award” affirming that it had jurisdiction over the dispute. After 
the final award was rendered, the court conducted an independent inquiry into 
whether the respondent had indeed “actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute”:  It 
refused, in other words, to defer to any jurisdictional determination on the part of 
the tribunal, and concluded that the dispute was indeed “arbitrable,” the 
respondents’ General Director having had actual authority to bind the 
respondent to the agreement. The fact that the UNCITRAL Rules had been 
incorporated into the parties’ contract was deemed irrelevant to the court’s duty 
to make a de novo determination.  In language that could certainly have been 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Court, it was insufficiently likely to prevail on the merits, given the likely correctness of the arbitrators’’ 
ruling”); see also id. at *7 fn. 3 ; see  generally Rau, “Jurisdiction,” at 118 (“the standard for deciding to 
issue a preliminary injunction against an arbitration---in that respect quite unlike a decision on a stay 
under § 3, or a motion to compel under § 4 or § 206---will traditionally require at least some nod in the 
direction of ‘balancing the equities,’ and in particular some sort of finding as to the likelihood of the 
movant’s success on the merits”). 
38  See Storm LLC, supra n. 36, 2006 WL 3735657 at *9 (“The Ukrainian litigation seeks to ‘sidestep’ not 
merely the arbitration, but this Court’s ruling” denying a preliminary injunction against the arbitration).  
See also Rau, “Jurisdiction,” at 131 (“the remedy becomes routine  to the extent the local courts 
have already taken steps in the exercise of their “supervisory” authority over the arbitration -- thus 
enabling them to make a claim to be protecting their own judgments”);  SG Avipro Finance Ltd. v. 
Cameroon Airlines, 2005 WL 1353955 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2005) (“the enjoining forum's strong public policy 
in favor of arbitration . . .  would be threatened if [respondent] were permitted to continue to pursue the 
Cameroon Action, particularly in light of the Court's decision herein granting [claimant's] motion to compel 
arbitration”).   
In Telenor, too,  it appears that Judge Lynch might in fact have been  able and willing simply to 
compel arbitration outright---and the only explanation for his reluctance to do so appears to have been his 
concern that such an order may not have been “procedurally appropriate where both parties have already 
submitted to arbitration,” Storm LLC, supra n. 36, 2006 WL 3735657 at *8 (in any event any doubts with 
respect to the motion to compel had “nothing to do with the validity of the arbitration clause”).  To similar 
effect, see LAIF X SPRL v. Axtel, S.A. de C.V., 390 F.3d 194 (2nd Cir. 2004)(district court’s refusal to 
compel arbitration was reviewed de novo and affirmed---since here, too,  both parties were already 
participating in the arbitration and so there had been no “refusal” to arbitrate).    
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tighter---surely it is best to avoid alien formulations whenever possible?39---
Judge Lynch wrote: 
 
[The respondent’s] concession that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine its own 
jurisdiction, under the doctrine of “competence-competence,” which in turn is the basis for 
the UNCITRAL rules, did not restrict its ability to later request that this Court 
independently review the Tribunal’s arbitrability decision. Instead, under the competence-
competence doctrine, “the arbitrators’ jurisdictional decision is subject to judicial review at 
any time before, after, or during arbitration proceedings.”
40
 
. 
But note: 
 
1. The fact that an arbitral tribunal is permitted to make a ruling with respect to its 
own jurisdiction (that it possesses, in other words, what is often called “positive 
compétence-compétence”)---is, after all, about as anodyne a principle as one 
can imagine.41  A “concession” to that effect should hardly have been 
necessary in the first place; a stipulation to that effect must in no way be 
confused with a distinct, and highly doubtful assertion---that the parties had 
adopted by contract the more absolute, Gallic, “negative” version of the 
doctrine. That would be a non sequitur---and would be, even if the parties could 
somehow be said to have the power, by contract, to bar a court from exercising 
its usual statutory and equitable authority.42 
 
2. In consequence, the interest of Telenor lies not at all in anything relating to 
chronology or the timing of review---which is not really a subject of controversy 
or compelling interest on this side of the Atlantic.43  The only question of 
                                                          
39
 “At the end of the day nothing obligates us to find the European terminology particularly relevant to 
American procedure.” Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 307 fn. 55.  
40
 Telenor Mobile Communications AS, 524 F.Supp.2d at 351. 
41
 See n. 23 supra; see also, e.g., Banus v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 2010 WL 1643780 
(S.D.N.Y.)(plaintiffs argued that “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing an adjournment that 
would have permitted a determination by this Court as to whether this case may proceed as a class 
action “ as permitted by FINRA rules; held, “the arbitrators did not exceed the capacious bounds of their 
discretion in denying the adjournment”; “the arbitrators were not required, particularly at that late hour, to 
adjourn it to allow” plaintiff to file a class action “in a transparent attempt to oust FINRA of its authority to 
proceed with the case”). 
42
 I guess I would concede that with a sufficient degree of explicitness and skilled drafting, the parties 
could make participation in an arbitral proceeding---stipulated to be in some degree “non binding”---a 
condition precedent to plenary adjudication. See n.23 supra.  But I see no warrant in legislative history or 
common understanding for the proposition that this is what the UNCITRAL Rules were intended to 
accomplish. 
43
 Cf. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra n.34 at *3, *5 (“All the courts that have used the competence-
competence clause in rules of arbitral procedure . . . have done so only in the context of actions to 
compel arbitration” rather than in actions for post-award relief; the ”key distinction” is between “”pre- 
arbitration actions, on the one hand,” and “post-award actions, on the other”); see also n.34 supra. 
I have been struck by the fact that whenever I (slyly) suggest to someone that his/her views 
amount to an attempt to slip French legislation into the architecture of our statute---merely because that 
seems normatively desirable---they stoutly (even indignantly) deny it. But any rule of chronological priority 
Arbitrating “Arbitrability” 
Friday, March 29, 2013 
Page 18 of 61 
 
 
interest in the case---or anywhere---lies in whether the parties, in their contract, 
have assented to a grant to the arbitrators of final decision-making power. 44  
That, we remember, is the inquiry mandated by First Options---the issue of the 
allocation of authority. This, we remember, is the sense of the “gateway” 
metaphor I mentioned earlier---properly seeking to identify issues that are 
“logically prior prerequisites to arbitrable jurisdiction,” or that “condition the 
ultimate validity of an award.”45 
 
By incorporating the UNCITRAL Rules (or other similar bodies of rules) in their 
contract, should the parties be taken to have expressed assent to arbitral 
determination of such issues?  This is a fraught question. It was what Telenor 
was all about. And, as we shall see, the Second Circuit has faced it in a number 
of cases in recent years---and with uneven results. I turn to this below.    
 
III. The Allocation of Decisionmaking Power 
 
A recurring problem in any legal system is the need---in deciding whether to 
subject parties to binding arbitration---to mark off the respective roles of courts and 
arbitrators.  When we come to this critical issue, concerns of efficiency---the cost/benefit 
engine that (as we have seen above) properly drives all discussions of chronological 
priority46---have little purchase.47  They necessary recede into insignificance once we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that would restrict judicial decisionmaking at any stage amounts precisely to a step in that direction, 
doesn’t it? 
44
  See PAULSSON,  supra n. 5  (the fact that “arbitrators may decide whether they have jurisdiction” does 
not mean that courts themselves cannot---for that matter, it does not even “mean that courts cannot 
consider the question until the arbitrator has disposed of it”); cf.  Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and 
the Dimensions of ‘Consent,” 24 ARB. INT’L 199, 219 (2008):  “Despite the patent ambiguity of the word 
‘decide,’ confusion of these two very different senses of the word [i.e,. the power to decide at all (including 
provisionally), and the power to decide finally] is common and fatal to intelligent argument.”   
Yet such incoherence persists:  Like the poor, it is always with us.  Cf. Jack M. Graves, Arbitration 
as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of Statutory Default Legal Rules, 2 
Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 227, 263 (2011)(although “the vast majority of modern arbitration laws grant 
arbitrators the authority to determine their own jurisdiction under the doctrine of competence-
competence,” the FAA “does not,” but provides instead in § 4 “that the basic jurisdictional question of 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate must be decided by the court”; although the Supreme Court has 
held that the “parties may contractually grant the arbitral tribunal the power to decide its own jurisdiction, 
such a contractual right  is not equivalent to a statutory grant of competence-competence”---which is why 
the  incorporation of the IACAC Rules in  the Panama Convention “is quite significant” and something 
“quite unique in U.S. arbitration law”); cf. also id. at 276 (“in direct contrast” to the FAA, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law “grants the arbitrators the power to make [the] determination” as to whether the parties agreed 
to arbitration). 
45
 See text accompanying nn. 5-6 supra. 
46
 See text accompanying nn. 13-25 supra. 
47
 Professor Bermann suggests that we can identify a “sharp contrast” between on the one hand “French 
law, which posits that arbitration’s attractiveness depends on its real and reputed efficacy,” and on the 
other, the “equilibrium” or “optimal balance” “that U.S. law pursues” between “efficiency and legitimacy,” 
see Bermann, supra n.4 at 49’ see also id. at 26 (the French and American approaches “part ways” in 
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recognize that---at whatever point this falls to be decided---our only task  is to discover 
what sort of process the parties have been willing to subject themselves to.  Some 
explicit indication would be nice---although in its inevitable absence, we are probably 
warranted in presuming that the parties would have wished to act in such a way as to 
reduce overall costs---thereby creating, and being able to redistribute, a joint surplus.48 
That is not a negligible insight---but here “efficiency” plays no greater role than as a 
handmaiden to, or as probative of, contractual intention. 
It is, then, a commonplace that “a party cannot be required to submit to 
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”49  And it is equally a 
commonplace--- “follow[ing] inexorably from the first,” “akin to a law of nature50---- that 
what is usually called this “question of arbitrability”51 is “undeniably an issue for judicial 
determination.”52  
That was but a single step which begins a long journey: For surely it is possible 
to characterize every objection to arbitration as implicating the jurisdiction of the 
arbitrators---in the sense that it potentially calls into question the presence of consent to 
submit to the process? 
 A party may well have "consented" to the arbitration of disputes relating to a 
contractual shipment of pork bellies--but he has not necessarily "consented" 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“delineating between gateway and non-gateway issues,” as under the former “all objections to the 
obligation to arbitrate are reserved . .. . for the arbitral tribunal itself”). This analysis requires us to revisit 
the quite distinct senses of the “gateway” metaphor that I tried to distinguish earlier; see text 
accompanying nn. 5-6 supra (distinguishing between (a) issues that are “ a logically prior prerequisite to 
arbitral jurisdiction” and so (whenever raised) “will condition the ultimate validity of an award, and (b) 
issues that merely must be resolved “chronologically prior to arbitral proceedings” (whoever is to have the 
final word on the subject)).  It is only with respect to the latter---and so with no bearing on the legal 
currency of the ultimate award---that it seems possible to articulate differing cost/benefit analyses that 
might well lead to divergent conclusions as to how the balance should be drawn. 
48
 The Court in Howsam concluded that the parties were “likely to have thought that they had agreed that 
an arbitrator would” decide the critical question of compliance with the NASD’s rules on “eligibility,” see 
Howsam, supra n.3 at 83; see also text accompanying nn. 61-64 & n.62 infra.  This rationale has been 
criticized for “purporting to read the minds of parties who assuredly had not been thinking about this 
matter at all,” Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in AKSEN, supra n.23 at 601, 615-17; see also 
Bermann, supra n.4 at 41 (for its conclusion the Court was “unable to summon anything more than 
intuition”).  But again, choosing the proper default rule hardly requires us to “read the minds of parties”--- 
it merely requires us to attribute to them---in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as a rough guess---
a mere starting point---the intention to act efficiently in the interest of maximizing mutual gains. 
49
  United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); see also Rau, 
“Separability,” at 4-8 ( (“A person is only bound to arbitrate a dispute if he has agreed to do so”). 
50
 Cf. Rau, “Arbitrability” at 311. 
51
 Alternative formulations---but to precisely the same effect---may ask,  
 whether there is “a duty for the parties to arbitrate” the dispute, or 
 “whether the parties have consented to a final arbitral judgment on the issues,” or 
 whether the arbitrators have been granted “jurisdiction” to decide the dispute. 
52
 AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643,  649 (1986).   
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thereby to arbitrate disputes arising out of an arguably distinct contract for the 
shipment of pig iron.53  
 
 A party may undoubtedly have "consented" to arbitrate the merits of a contractual 
dispute---but it need not follow that he has "consented" to arbitrate the claim 
where, say, the validity of the contract itself has been vitiated by fraud.54 Nor 
does it follow that he has necessarily “consented” to arbitrate any claim at all 
where the underlying contract is no longer in force---where it may have expired, 
or terminated, or been superseded or relinquished or repudiated or abandoned.   
 
 A party may undoubtedly have "agreed" to arbitrate timely claims: But it does not 
at all follow that there was any "agreement" to arbitrate claims not brought within 
contractual time limits:  If a contract provides that disputes are no longer “eligible” 
for arbitration after six years have elapsed, is it even possible to “speak of an 
‘arbitrator’ at all in the seventh year”?55 
 
 If A has agreed to arbitrate certain kinds of disputes with X, he has not 
necessarily “consented” to arbitrate with Y---even if the dispute with Y is closely 
intertwined with and rests on  the same factual and legal matrix as the dispute 
with X.56 
 
                                                          
53
 Cf.  Rau, “Separability,” at 110 (“an agreement’s limitations on the scope of ‘arbitrable’ issues” have 
often been taken, “ not as instructions to the arbitrators as to how they are to go about deciding the 
dispute, but as limits on their ability to entertain the case in the first place”); Howsam, supra n.3 at 83-84 
(a “gateway question . . . of arbitrability” includes “a disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a 
concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy”(Breyer, J.).  
54
 What is this but Prima Paint?  See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); 
Rau, “Separability” at 32 (courts resort to the slogan of ‘separability’ in order to treat an issue like ‘fraud in 
the inducement’ as just one more discrete controversy between the parties---that is, in precisely the same 
way as other issues going more conventionally to ‘the merits’”, and so benefiting from the same 
“presumption of arbitrability”). 
55
 William W. Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 75, 117 (2002). Typical 
of many older cases taking this line is Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v. Diversified 
Pharmaceutical Services, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 987 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ("In no event may the arbitration be 
initiated more than one year after the date one party gave written notice of the dispute to the other party"; 
held, "time constraints on arbitration proceedings are substantive and jurisdictional rather than 
procedural”; neither party agreed to arbitrate claims more than one year old,” and it would “violate” their 
“contractual rights to force them into arbitration”). These cases have of course been laid to rest by the 
Supreme Court in Howsam; see Rau, “Separability,” at 102 (“it seems infinitely more sensible to treat 
[contractual] time limits in a way that is consistent with functionally identical cases, in which similar 
assertions---that a claimant’s delay or missteps have caused the dispute to be no longer ‘arbitrable’---are 
made”). 
56
 See Alan Scott Rau and Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration 
Procedure, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 89, 108-118 (1995) (consolidation); Rau, “Trilogy,” at 436-87 (classwide 
proceedings). 
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 Examples could probably be multiplied indefinitely: Could someone possibly have 
agreed to arbitrate a dispute that had already been the subject of a prior and 
binding judgment? 57  Or a prior and binding arbitration?58  
 
In short, even an otherwise unexceptional arbitration agreement can be cabined 
about with limitations and conditions that may well be thought to go "to the power of the 
arbitrator to act."   Say a photographer licenses reproduction rights in a photograph to a 
publisher, for use in a high school textbook with a print run “limited to 40,000 copies”---
but the publisher has in fact reproduced over a million copies. Can the photographer 
now argue that the publisher has “assumed the legal status of a ‘stranger,’” “identical to 
one who pirates wholesale the work of a copyright holder, never having had a 
contractual relationship with him in the first place”? Surely the photographer has never 
consented to arbitrate with a mere “stranger”?59   
That last case---and indeed many of those that preceded it---might well appear to 
the informed reader as a reductio ad absurdum.60  A reductio is usually a cheap 
                                                          
57  See Rau, “Arbitrability,” at  341-42: 
 Such a challenge might be characterized as a "defense to the “arbitrability” of the underlying 
claim. But given a sufficiently broad mandate to the arbitrator, a court is [equally] likely to find this 
also constitutes a separate, arbitrable issue: "Because issue preclusion can be arbitrated, it must 
be arbitrated." The court would then send the challenge to the arbitrators for a ruling on the res 
judicata or collateral estoppel effect of the prior adjudication; an arbitrator who declines to find 
preclusion has then presumably found that the underlying claim can itself be arbitrated.  
58
 The claim that a prior arbitration can deprive subsequent arbitrators of their “jurisdiction” must seem 
particularly frivolous.  But---as every realtor can tell you---there is at least one buyer somewhere for even 
the most shabby and ramshackle structure, especially in the Deep South; see, e.g., Bryan County v. 
Yates Paving & Grading Co., Inc., 638 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 2006)(held, res judicata is not a claim “arising out 
of or relating to” the parties’ contract within the language of a generic arbitration clause, since it is  “a 
principle of law that does not arise out of the contract documents”; while it “eliminate[s] substantive 
claims,” “it does not do so by reaching the merits of those claims”; as a consequence, if a claim is barred 
by res judicata “no arbitrable claims remain to be submitted to an arbitrator”; a court must after all “fulfill its 
gatekeeping role [sic] to determine whether any arbitrable claim has been presented”). 
59
 See Maisel v. McDougal Littell, 2006 WL 1409019 (S.D.N.Y.)(held, though, that plaintiff’s argument---to 
the effect that the contractual limit of 40,000 copies “is a covenant and not a condition”--- is “plainly a 
question of the interpretation of the contract as regards the merits, and is for the arbitrator”). 
60
 A frequent problem with posing a reductio ad absurdum is that from time to time, the hypothetical 
unthinkable may in fact become reality.  While sensible results are usually reached in time, this can often 
be a near-run thing.  Consider the Gueyffier litigation in California:  Here a franchise agreement provided 
that the “franchisor shall not, and can not be held in breach of this Agreement” unless he had received 
detailed written notice specifying the alleged breach, and unless he had failed to cure the breach within a 
reasonable period of time. [Note the “can not.”]. However, finding that notice and an opportunity to cure 
would have been “idle”---and that the contract’s requirements were therefore “moot”---the arbitrator 
rendered an award against the franchisor. This was vacated in the lower court on the ground that the 
arbirator had “exceeded his powers”:  The defect in the award was jurisdictional, for under the franchise 
agreement, the arbitrator simply “had no power” to alter the contractual provisions relating to notice and 
cure. Gueyffier v. Ann Summers Ltd., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Cal. App. 2006).  Thankfully the California 
Supreme Court finally set things right---noting that these days, any limitation on actual arbitral authority 
has to be particularly explicit in order to give rise to vacatur; see 184 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2008)(arbitral power 
is usually presumed to include “the power to decide when particular clauses of the contract applied”). 
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rhetorical device, but here at least it induces us to articulate a subtler point:   To say that 
at some level of generality, all of these issues are somehow reserved  “for the court,” 
hardly means that a court must determine in every individual case whether the parties 
would have wanted the arbitrators to decide them. What courts have instead been 
about, over the years, is their familiar work of spinning out presumptions---most often in 
an honest attempt to prescribe majoritarian defaults aligned with “what rational parties 
would have agreed to;61 occasionally by deploying “conscious interpretive strategies” in 
the service of some wider social policy.62 The residue of this process is what we usually 
call “federal common law.”63  These presumptions can become so routine, so 
mechanical, so much a question of second nature to us, that we may not even notice 
the process we are going through---it is apparently easy enough for a casual observer 
to overlook the fact that we are talking about nothing more than the conscious choice of 
default rules rooted in probable intention.64  
                                                          
61
 See Rau, “Trilogy,” at 463-64 (“the most common tactic is to adopt a ‘mimicking’ principle which seeks 
to align what the court does with a hypothetical consent---hence  the phrase ‘implied terms’; “the search is 
for those terms the ‘parties would have agreed upon’ in a completely spelled-out agreement---or perhaps, 
for the bargain that most similarly situated parties would have chosen, or that it would be rational for such 
parties to have chosen ex ante”).  
62
 For example, the time-honored “presumption of arbitrability” is probably best viewed as a majoritarian 
default that was likely to have been desired by both parties ex ante, see n.47 supra; at the same time, 
though, it might be thought to reflect a federal policy preference in favor of directing disputed issues to 
alternative fora; see Rau, “Trilogy,” at 466 fn. 114.   
For other examples, see Alan Scott Rau, The UNCITRAL Model Law in State and Federal Courts:  
The Case of “Waiver,” 6  Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 223, 256 (1995)(“choosing [in the Mastrobuono case] to 
construe [a] choice-of-law clause as inapplicable to state restrictions on arbitral power was a means of 
furthering the time-honored ‘federal policy favoring arbitration’”; it was “also responsive to those consumer 
protection concerns behind the ‘common-law rule of contract interpretation’ that ambiguous language 
should be construed against the drafter”); Rau, “Arbitrability” at 300 (Justice Breyer’s account in First 
Options of “what might otherwise be thought equivocal behavior” on the part of the respondent was 
adopted “precisely in order to relieve [respondents who are contesting a duty to arbitrate] from being 
forced to select from the usual menu of wholly unpalatable choices”).   
Finally, see Howsam, supra n.3  at 85 (“it is reasonable to infer that the parties intended the 
agreement to reflect” the understanding that NASD arbitrators are “comparatively better able to interpret 
and to apply” their rules; in addition, “for the law to assume an expectation that aligns (1) decisionmaker 
with (2) comparative expertise will help better to secure a fair and expeditious resolution of the underlying 
controversy”). 
63
 “Default rules pervade so much of our law of arbitration.”  See Rau, “Trilogy,” at 481-82 fn. 168 
(pointing to multiple examples).  
64
 See, e.g., Rau & Sherman, supra n.55 at 113 (consolidation of related proceedings; “a blithe assertion 
that ‘if it had been the parties’ intention to submit their disputes to a multiparty arbitration setting, they 
would  have so provided in their contracts’ is nothing more than an extravagant form of question-
begging”); but see Note, Compulsory Consolidation of International Arbitral Proceedings: Effects on Pacta 
Sunt Servanda and the General Arbitration Process, 2 TULANE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 223, 251 (1994) (“If 
the parties to a multi-party dispute have not explicitly agreed to submit their disputes to a consolidated 
tribunal, then they have chosen to submit their disputes to separate arbitral tribunals .... Under the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the parties are only bound by what is in the contract”). 
The paradigm case, though, is presented by the presumption of “separability”. See Rau, 
“Separability,” at 37 (“to courts, attorneys, and academics alike, Prima Paint does not really seem to be 
just a ‘presumption’---still less does it seem to be an individualized factual inquiry---it rather has the feel of 
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In an earlier article I spelled out at some length some of the implications of this 
analysis:65  The critical question of “consent to arbitration,” I argued, is in all cases a 
matter of degree---an infinite series of points on a continuum.  The presence of 
“consent” might be tested, to change the metaphor, “in terms of a series of concentric 
circles, radiating outward.”  
So in the core, inner circle, one has to ask, “did the parties agree to arbitrate 
anything at all, at any time?” Here, insistence on evidence of the parties’ consent to a 
final arbitral determination must be rigorous indeed.66  After that hurdle is crossed---
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a ‘doctrine,’ a ‘rule of law’”).  For example, see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctine 
After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 Nev. L.J. 107, 123 fn. 107 (2007). Professor Ware 
writes here that the 
separability doctrine cannot be defended on the ground that it is a “default rule” . . . Rules about 
what constitutes an enforceable contract cannot be default rules because they are logically prior 
to the concept of a ‘default rule.’ . . . . Why should an unenforceable contract be sufficient to 
contract around the default rule that disputes are litigated rather than arbitrated, when the law 
ordinarily requires an enforceable contract to contract around other default rules? 
  The problem with all this, of course,  is that Prima Paint does not in the least purport to tell us “what 
constitutes an enforceable contract”; it is rather an “inquiry---to be  resolved by the terms of the contract, 
context, and policy---into what was the forum preferred by the parties to make this definitive determination 
of validity.” Rau, “Separability,” at 34 fn. 82.  Professor Ware poignantly concedes that if the parties “form 
two contracts a year apart,” then an arbitration clause in the first might possibly apply to a claim of 
fraudulent inducement with respect to the second.  Ware, supra at 123 fn. 107.  But he does not seem to 
perceive that his intuition about what must amount to “truly separate contracts,” (id.) is simple ipse dixit-
ism---and that any assumption to the effect that some undefined lapse of time---or perhaps some physical 
separation of the paperwork---must be decisive, is nothing but formalism: “It is just as facile to assume a 
priori that defects in the main agreement must  vitiate the arbitration clause, as to assume that they 
cannot.” Rau, “Separability,” at 27. 
Again:  Consider the problem posed by Howsam, see nn. 3, 61 supra.  The Court settled there on 
a sensible default rule allocating to the arbitrators the authority to interpret the NASD rules with respect to 
“eligibility,” see n.48 supra.  The hapless drafters of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act came up instead 
with a statutory provision to the effect that while 
  “the court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an 
agreement to arbitrate,” by contrast, 
 “an arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled.”  
UNIF. ARB. ACT § 6 (amended 2000).  Now I assume the drafters would have thought that the problem 
in Howsam itself was that of an arbitrable “condition precedent”---although I can’t understand why it could 
not as readily be characterized as posing the question whether the “controversy is [still] subject to an 
agreement to arbitrate.” On the other hand, some “condition precedent” challenges are unquestionably 
reserved for judicial determination, see Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 Nev. 
L.J. 169, 172-74 (2007); U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., ltd., 241 F.3d 135,149 
(shipowner argued that a putative charter party ”did not come into force due to the alleged failure on the 
part of [the charterer’s] board of directors to approve the charter party,” which was a “condition” to the 
charter; the court found that “the weight of the evidence demonstrated that [the charterer’s] board did 
approve the charter party within the agreed time period”).  But no matter:  While the UAA drafters appear 
to have been mesmerized by the obsolete taxonomy of 19
th
 century contract lore, all of that is perfectly 
useless here.  See Rau, supra at 170 (“codifying conceptualism”). 
65
 Rau, “Consent,” at 74-75.  
66
 See also PAULSSON, supra n. 5 (here “denial of judicial reviewability is practically hopeless; there 
cannot be evidence of what the parties ‘intended’ by their agreement when it is said that they have 
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once we are satisfied that arbitrators have been selected and entrusted with the power 
to do something---the relevant inquiry changes; it seems rather extreme to treat a 
putative arbitrator “entirely as an intermeddling officious stranger,”67 and the proper 
question becomes instead, “just how far were the parties willing to go in entrusting their 
affairs to ‘their’ arbitrators”---that is, just what was “the precise scope of the 
submission”? “And as we move from the core to the periphery, absolutism with respect 
to ‘consent’ may well be tempered”; insistence on anything other than a rough-and-
ready requirement of “consent”---and thus insistence on the presumption of a judicial 
determination---become progressively less appropriate.  The only question, then, 
becomes, “just what, in particular, are we to make of your undoubted, broad, generic, 
sweeping commitment to arbitrate disputes?”   
 
And if we venture out further---into the outer limits of the solar system--- the question 
becomes easier still: Take, for example, a challenge to arbitral “jurisdiction” grounded in 
the assertion that contractual or statutory time limits for initiating an arbitration 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
agreed to nothing”). On this principle challenges to a duty to arbitrate which call into question, not only the 
arbitration clause itself, but equally and also the rest of the contract as well, are necessarily for the court.  
The error of assuming that Prima Paint somehow mandates the contrary is manifest; see 
Rau,”Separability,” at 14-18 (“not remotely contestable”). But it is apparently uneradicable; cf. Neal R. 
Troum, Policy Preferences and Enumerated Powers under the Federal Arbitration Act, 35 Amer. J. of Trial 
Advocacy 263, 291 (2011)(application of Prima Paint “to the facts of First Options (claim of no signature 
on the contract) leads to a result in which the arbitrator gets to decide arbitrability. This is so because the 
Kaplan’s challenge . . . was a challenge to the enforceability of the contract as a whole and not to the 
arbitration provision”); see also id. at 282-83 (“a claim by a party that it never signed the contract 
containing the arbitration clause” “is one in which the threshold arbitrability question and the merits 
question are identical,” and in such circumstances “the arbitrator must make the threshold . .. call”).   
I despair; I really do. Here’s a daring proposal:  What if---in order to curb (Johnson’s phrase) the 
“epidemical conspiracy for the destruction of paper” that masquerades as “legal scholarship”---we 
expected “authors” not merely to cite, but actually to master and grapple with, the relevant literature? 
Within the gravitational field of this principle are the cases where the objecting party has in some 
sense agreed to “arbitration” in the abstract,  but has not necessarily agreed to be bound by a decision of  
the particular tribunal that  the proponent is seeking to invoke; e.g., PAULSSON,  supra (if the parties 
“agree to arbitration under the ABC Rules in city X to be conducted by arbitrator Y---and Y dies”); see 
also Rau, “Consent,” at 140 (“putative ‘arbitrators’ can have no power whatever to determine whether the 
parties wanted to submit to decision-makers chosen from the roster of the AAA, or alternatively, from the 
roster of the NASD”); cf. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, supra n. 25 (agreement required that 
each party select an arbitrator within 30 days after notice; the court determined whether one party’s 
arbitrator was named in a timely manner; since the observance of the  time limit goes to the “composition 
of the tribunal” rather than the right to initiate a proceeding, the case is presumably not within Howsam). 
67
 See Rau, Consent, at 95: 
Once they have agreed to arbitrate, the parties have an obvious incentive to monitor the behavior 
of arbitrators, minimizing the likelihood of a runaway tribunal, “outlier” awards, and unjustified 
assumptions of jurisdiction. 
I also wrote there that “parties who have agreed to arbitration cannot after all rationally claim to be wholly 
astonished when they find ‘their’ arbitrators have been tempted to expand their own jurisdiction through 
self-interest---nor is it unfair to charge them with the risk that this might sometimes occur.” This is perhaps 
one step too far---and to write something like this, I see now, could not have been more naïve; it is a 
remark that in the “real” world (that is, the world outside academia) has occasionally been thrown back in 
my face when sitting on a tribunal. 
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proceeding---or, what amounts to much the same thing, for asserting a claim---have not 
been observed. 68  Should such a challenge be successful, the inevitable result is that 
the claim will never be “heard at all”; it will not merely be barred in arbitration, but will be 
barred---finally disposed of---“in whatever  forum it may be asserted, arbitral or 
judicial.”69 It seems straightforward enough, then, to conclude that this does not 
constitute a challenge to arbitration “in particular” at all,70 and that the invocation of a 
time limit cannot be seen as calling into question a party’s “consent” to arbitration---for 
the simple reason that the time limit is just not relevant to the nature of the forum in 
which the claim will be heard.71 
 
Now we are all aware that it has been one of the great commonplaces of 
arbitration law to say that while disputes are readily presumed to be “arbitrable” where 
                                                          
68
 See text accompanying n. 55 supra.  
69
 See Paulsson, supra n.48 at 615-17 (“the purpose of the limitation was clearly to ensure that disputes 
would not linger”).  
 Cf. Rau, “Consent,” at 135-38 (warning nevertheless that “such an easy route to a decision may 
not be available across the board,” for example, with respect to arguments asserting “waiver of the right 
to arbitration”—for even these are arguments that are regularly left to arbitrators, even though the result 
of a successful challenge is that the party charged with “waiver” is not left without any remedy but is 
merely forced back into the courtroom).  
70
 But cf. Bermann, supra n. 3 at 41 (with respect to “limitation periods,” “strict application of separability 
would counsel a court to entertain that challenge as a threshold matter, since it is directed to the 
obligation to arbitrate in particular”; Professor Bermann nevertheless agrees that it would be proper to 
leave this to arbitrators in the interest of “balanc[ing] efficiency and legitimacy interests”). 
71
 See generally PAULSSON, supra n. 48 at 617 (in consequence the issue is “one of admissibility and 
the tribunal’s decision is final”); Rau, “Consent,” at 137 fn. 206 (the precise terminology shouldn’t matter, 
and it doesn’t seem particularly important whether we say that in consequence (1) the claim was 
“unhearable,” or instead (2) that, like a decision on “the merits,” “it was legally hopeless”; “the proper 
result is the same either way”---the parties presumably having preferred that any claim in any forum be 
dismissed once it is found to be untimely, with a res judicata effect being triggered by an arbitral 
determination).  
Cf.  Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 (3
rd
 Cir. 1997.  Here the court 
held that an employee’s challenge to an arbitration agreement “potentially depriv[ing]” her of the right to 
attorneys’ fees and punitive damages must be submitted to the arbitrator, for “the availability of punitive 
damages is not relevant to the nature of the forum in which the complaint will be heard” and thus “cannot 
enter into a decision to compel arbitration”; it is “separate and apart from the issue of whether an 
employee has agreed to an arbitral forum”). See also Rau, “Consent,” at 143-44 (any impermissible 
restriction of statutory rights “need not impair the validity of the submission to private adjudicators”; “if the 
process is not itself tainted, such defects say absolutely nothing about the unsuitability of the particular 
arbitral scheme”).  Cf. Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Production Co., [2005] EWCA Civ. 
1116 (C.A.) ¶ 9 (Ecuador argued, and tribunal agreed, that Occidental’s claim for expropriation “was on 
any view ‘inadmissible’ (i.e. evidently unfounded)”). 
 This distinction between [forum-specific] “jurisdictional” challenges, and [dispositive-with-res-
judicata-effect] “admissibility” challenges, seems to be lost on Professor Wong, who then naturally 
concludes that First Options [an example of the former] and Howsam [an example of the latter] are 
incompatible.  Jarrod Wong, Arbitrating in the Ether of Intent, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200196 
(forthcoming 2013), at p. 23 & fn. 66 (Howsam “significantly qualifies, if not reverses in part,” First 
Options; in Howsam the Court “disagreed with . . . itself in First Options”).  For the reasons given here, 
and at much greater length in the commentary cited here, they’re not.  
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the “scope of the clause” is in question, by contrast, where the very existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate is challenged, no thumb is to be placed on the scales.  This 
truism is hardly worth repeating---but then, after all, that is not quite what I have been 
saying here. The argument here is rather that this gradated view of “consent” is equally 
applicable to the choice of the appropriate decisionmaker who will determine the 
discrete issue of arbitral jurisdiction. Here too the claim is that once (or rather, to the 
extent) there has been shown some willingness to submit to private adjudication, the 
same comparative advantages---in interpretation of contract, practice of trade, and 
course of dealing---must come into play---as well as the same advantages of unitary 
adjudication that the parties should be understood to have preferred.72  Not only a more 
tolerate attitude with respect to the requisite showing of “consent,” but by the same 
token a greater deference to the arbitrators’ judgment on that very issue, seem 
warranted. 
 
Now I suppose there must persist at least an academic distinction between 
 a judicial determination that an arbitration clause is “clear enough” to render the 
underlying matters in dispute “arbitrable,”73  and  
 
                                                          
72
 See Rau, “Consent,” at 95-102 (“What, Then, Are We Entitled to Presume?”)(one preferred tactic is “to 
align presumed intent with ‘comparative expertise’”---the approach of the Court in Howsam, see n.62 
supra---while another move “is to presume intent on the basis of what will reduce overall costs, 
maximizing a joint surplus that the parties can in bargaining divide among themselves”; “it is not merely 
that what has been termed ‘one-stop adjudication’ is inevitably more economical, and thus likely to have 
been desired by both parties ex ante”; in addition, “questions of scope, and questions going 
conventionally ‘to the merits,’ are often so intertwined that we can expect similar arbitral competence to 
be relevant”). See also Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov, [2007] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 891, 900 (C.A. 
2007)(Longmore, L.J.):  
If business men go to the trouble of agreeing that their disputes be heard in the courts of a 
particular country or by a tribunal of their choice they do not expect … that time and expense will 
be taken in lengthy argument about … whether any particular cause of action comes within the 
meaning of the particular phrase they have chosen. 
Cf. Steven Walt, Decision by Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 369, 410 (1999) (“the marginal cost [of having an arbitrator determine] the scope of the arbitration 
clause is low,” while “[a]llocating the determination to a court, another decision maker, requires an 
additional transaction and an extra cost”). 
73
 That is, that the parties had entrusted the merits to the arbitrator, who thus had “jurisdiction to resolve 
them.”  I have referred to this elsewhere as a “level 2” determination, and it is exemplified by Prima Paint. 
In Prima Paint it was simply assumed without discussion that the work of allocating decisionmaking 
authority between judicial and arbitral tribunals fell unchallenged to the Court “acting at the threshold as a 
gatekeeper”; the Court then held that a defense of fraudulent inducement should be adjudicated by the 
arbitrators (that is, in the American parlance, that a defense of fraudulent inducement was “arbitrable”). 
See Rau, “Separability,” at 93, 99.  The court’s allocative decision was conclusive and final---as was the 
arbitrators’ decision, within their sphere of competence, on the issue whether rescission was warranted.  
To take another example, it would be a quite unexceptional application of the “presumption of arbitrability” 
to say that if a contract governing the sale of “fruit” contained an arbitration clause, that alone should be 
deemed to bring along with it the obligation to arbitrate future disputes over the sale of, say, pecans. 
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 a judicial determination that an arbitration clause is “clear enough” so that the 
very question whether the underlying matters in dispute are subject to arbitration 
is left for resolution by the arbitral tribunal.74   
 
The former conclusively resolves the question of arbitral jurisdiction and is presumably 
binding on the arbitrators themselves;75 the latter, by contrast, is a simple refusal to 
                                                          
74 That is, that the issue, whether “the merits were entrusted by the parties to the arbitrator for resolution,” 
was itself a matter for the arbitral tribunal---with the corollary that its affirmative finding on jurisdiction 
would command the deference commonly extended to arbitral awards. This is what I have called a “level 
3“ determination, see id., and is exemplified by the celebrated “dictum” of First Options to the effect that a 
contract may delegate “the arbitrability question itself”---the question whether they had the power to 
decide---to the arbitrators. See also Rau, “Arbitrability” at 294-95 (“a dispute over whether I have validly 
agreed to anything is a dispute like any other, which parties can presumably resolve as they wish”). 
To revert to the example just used, here one might say that it could be a legitimate exercise in 
contract construction for the arbitrators themselves to find that the word “fruit” was used in “in the 
botanical sense,” that is, to refer not only to apples and peaches but also to “the contents of any seed 
plan’s developed ovary,” including pecans.  Cf. William W. Park, The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine 
Jurisdiction, 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 55 (Kluwer Law International 2007). The only question, here 
as throughout, “is just whose decision the parties were willing to submit to, and just whose interpretation 
they had bargained, for,” Rau, “Consent,” at 99.  This is not of course to say that an arbitral determination 
assuming jurisdiction over the sale of, say, typewriters, would be immune from vacatur. Cf. William W. 
Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed 
the Atlantic?, 12 ARB. INT'L 137, 145-46 (1996).  The “critical distinction” then is between an “imperfect 
ability” to read a contract, “and a simple failure even to try,” cf. Alan Scott Rau, Contracting out of the 
Arbitration Act, 8 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 225, 238 (1997).  
Although this does not seem to have been generally recognized, the Court’s Pacificare decision 
was also made at “level 3”; see Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003). Here the 
question posed was whether a contractual provision barring the award of punitive damages should be 
understood to bar the recovery of treble damages under RICO.  Now it will rarely if ever be useful---or 
even coherent---to distinguish between (a) the assertion that the plaintiff “was not entitled to punitive 
damages,” and (b) the assertion that “the arbitrators had no power to award punitive damages”; the 
contractual bar here could readily be framed either way. And indeed, of the four arbitration agreements at 
issue in Pacificare, two were in fact phrased in terms of “arbitral authority,” and two were not.  See Rau, 
“Consent,” at 142-43 (“at best these are variants in style and emphasis”); cf. Restatement of the Law, 
Third, The U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration § 4-14 cmt. c. (tent. draft no. 2, April 16, 
2012)(such a provision will be “presumed” to be “a contractual limitation on remedies but not a specific 
restriction on the tribunal’s authority”). In any event the Court---after provocatively noting the critical “fact 
that the parties’ arbitration agreements may be construed to limit the arbitrators’ authority to award” treble 
damages---concluded that a court should nevertheless not take upon itself “to decide the antecedent 
question of how the ambiguity is to be resolved.”  (The question whether a bar on RICO damages would 
render the arbitration agreement unenforceable as in violation of “public policy” was thus “premature.”)  
The Court’s more  recent decision in Rent-A-Center, also written by Justice Scalia, equally raised “level 3” 
issues; see Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010)(arbitrators had been given the 
power to make “the arbitrability determination”---i.e., to resolve with finality any challenge to the arbitration 
clause on the ground of “unconscionability”). 
75
 See, e.g., Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Local 856, Int’l Union, 97 F.3d 155 (6
th
 Cir. 1996). Here the 
employer had sought a stay of arbitration on the ground that there was no agreement between the 
parties, but the court denied the motion, finding that “an interim agreement” existed that “included an 
agreement to arbitrate certain disputes.” The arbitrator, though, ultimately held that the grievance was 
“not arbitrable” because “neither the Company nor the Union intended to be contractually bound.” This 
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decide.  But this is a distinction that has clearly been oversubtle for some---and so 
slippage, muddle, and lack of rigor are inevitable; decisions may even be found that 
somehow manage to deploy both in the course of a single opinion.76  
And I suppose that to conflate the two must be in considerable tension with the 
conceptual purity of Justice Breyer’s analytic scheme in First Options---it does rather 
seem that his intention there was to insist on a distinction between them.77   But even 
so, we have moved on a bit since then: For the hallowed “presumption of arbitrability” 
has been so routinely compelling, and the process so perfunctory, that courts have 
naturally been led to collapse Justice Breyer’s carefully-drawn categories: Why, after all, 
climb up the hill only to immediately march straight down again?   The perfectly human 
desire to eschew unnecessary complexity is reinforced here by the general recognition 
that in almost every case, the purported “distinction” won’t make the slightest bit of 
difference.78   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
award was vacated as in “excess of authority”: “Were we to adopt [the employer’s] position, we would in 
effect be overruling a prior holding of this court.”  
76
 See e.g., Reliance Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Seismic Risk Ins. Services, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y 1997); 
compare id.. at 389 (“the arbitrators should determine the arbitrability of the issues surrounding the Profit 
Commission Agreement”) with id. at 390 (“disputes concerning profit commissions are encompassed 
within the ... arbitration clause” and so arbitration of the disputes should be compelled); WMA Securities, 
Inc. v. Ruppert, 80 F.Supp.2d 786 (S.D.Ohio 1999)(motion to enjoin arbitration denied; “while the issue of 
the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate is properly resolved by the federal court, issues related to 
the scope of that agreement are not”; at the same time, the plaintiff’s claims were found “related both to 
the business [of the defendant/securities dealer] and to the activities of its registered representatives” and 
therefore “are the proper subject of arbitration pursuant to NASD Rules”). 
77
 Justice Breyer’s often-cited theoretical construct in First Options would seem to require that the usual 
judicial presumption in favor of arbitral jurisdiction is “reversed” when the question raised is not the lower-
order question of “arbitrability,” but instead the logically-prior and higher-order---but “arcane”---question of 
whether this issue of jurisdiction is to be decided by the courts themselves or left entirely to the 
arbitrators. See text accompanying nn. 98-100 infra;  Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 307-16, 355-57. 
78 So when a clause is broadly drafted, and not particularly idiosyncratic, the judicial standard will as a 
practical matter be “so deferential that the scope issue is in effect assigned to arbitrators,” see Walt, 
supra n. 72 at  375; see also id. at 430 (the doctrine that “courts determine the ‘arbitrability of a dispute,” 
and the doctrine that “all doubts about an arbitration clause are to be resolved in favor of coverage,” taken 
together, “in combination, “effectively allocate the scope issue to the arbitrator”).   
See, e.g., JSC Surgutneftegas v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 167 Fed. Appx. 266 
(2nd Cir. 2006) (“the extremely broad terms of the Deposit Agreement’s arbitration clause plainly evince 
an intent to have the question of arbitrability decided by an arbitrator”; however, “even were we to believe 
that it was for the district court to decide arbitrability, we would still reach the same result,” as the 
plaintiff’s claims “plainly relate to” the shares of preferred stock as to which the plaintiff was alleging a 
wrongful failure to pay dividends, and hence, are subject to arbitration);  TC Arrowpoint, LP v. Choate 
Construction Co., 2006 WL 91767 (W.D.N.C) (defendant’s conduct “in disputing only whether” the claim 
was arbitrable, “but not raising the further question of who would decide arbitrability,” constitutes “clear 
and unmistakable evidence that the Defendant had agreed to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability”;  however, 
“even assuming arguendo that the Court were to conduct an independent review of the question of 
arbitrability, clearly,” given our ‘”healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,” the defendant 
was bound to arbitrate). 
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So what have American courts tended to do when faced with a party’s 
“undoubted, broad, generic, sweeping commitment to arbitrate disputes?”    As we shall 
see, it is not in the least unusual these days to hold that such standard clauses amount 
to nothing less than a presumptive grant to arbitrators of the power to determine with 
some finality the scope of their own jurisdiction: This is what may happen, for example, 
when the parties have merely provided for the arbitration (a) of “any dispute, 
controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to, this agreement”;79 or (b) of “any 
disagreement or dispute … arising out of or in connection with the Agreement”;80 or 
even (c) when they have provided, in the most banal fashion, that “the arbitrators shall 
be empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under this 
Code.”81 
 
                                                          
79  
E.g., Ryan, Beck & Co., LLC v. Fakih, 268 F. Supp. 2d 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“all disputes … arising out 
of or relating to [the investor’s] Accounts … or any construction, performance, or breach of this or any 
other agreement between [the parties]”; language “is sufficiently plain and sweeping to encompass 
disputes over the scope of the arbitration clause, and to manifest the parties’ intent to have the arbitrators 
decide that issue”); JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 167 Fed. Appx. 266 
(2d Cir. 2006) (“any controversy, claim or cause of action … arising out of or relating to” the agreement 
“or the breach hereof or thereof”; “the extremely broad terms of [the arbitration clause] plainly evince an 
intent to have the question of arbitrability decided by an arbitrator”); New Avex, Inc. v. Socata Aircraft Inc., 
2002 WL 1998193 (S.D.N.Y.)(same; “the broadly worded, inclusive terms of the arbitration provision of 
the Agreement constitute unambiguous evidence that the parties clearly and unmistakably intended to 
arbitrate questions of arbitrability”). 
80   
 E.g., Oriental Republic of Uruguay v. Chemical Overseas Holdings, Inc., 2006 WL 164967 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(“such broad language reflects the parties’ intent to arbitrate all disputes relating to the Agreement—
including whether the Arbitration Clause reaches a particular merits-related dispute”). Cf. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1000 (Cal. 1994) (contract provided for arbitration of 
“disagreements aris[ing] under this Agreement”; “our decisions teach that courts should generally defer to 
an arbitrator’s finding that determination of a particular question is within the scope of his or her 
contractual authority”). 
81   
 See the extremely suggestive case of Alliance Bernstein Investment Research & Management, Inc., v. 
Schaffran, 445 F.3d 121 (2
nd
 Cir. 2006).  Here the NASD Code provided that “a claim alleging 
employment discrimination . . . in violation of a statue is not required to be arbitrated.”  Did the plaintiff’s 
claim that he had been fired because he was a “whistleblower,”  have to go to arbitration? Or should this 
be equated with a claim of “discrimination”? “The threshold question . . . is who decides arbitrability,” and 
the court held that since “the crux of the dispute . . .  concerns the interpretation and applicability of a 
provision of the Code,” the parties had “unequivocally” agreed to submit that discrete dispute to 
arbitration. Not only had the parties agreed that the arbitrators would be “empowered” to interpret the rule, 
“they agreed further that any such determination would be final and binding.”  
 See also Susai v. Jagadeesh, 2007 WL 1742870 (N.D. Cal.)(“any and all disputes arising out of 
the terms of this Agreement, their interpretation, or any of the matters herein released”; held, “the parties 
effectively submitted any dispute between them to the arbitrator, including allegations of fraud in the 
inducement of agreement to the arbitration provisions”; “it is for the arbitrator, and not this Court, to 
determine the scope and validity of  the release clause, and by incorporation, the scope and validity of the 
arbitration provision”); Silec Cable S.A.S. v. Alcoa Fjardaal, SF, 2012 WL 5906535 (W.D.Pa.)(“any claim 
arising out of. . . the interpretation or performance of [the contract]”; “the plain meaning of the term 
‘interpretation’ is ‘the process to determine what something . . . means’” [citing Black’s Law Dictionary], 
and “determining the meaning of “any claims arising out” of the agreement “necessarily includes the 
scope of the claims and whether they are arbitrable”). 
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Who writes clauses that are much narrower than this? It is hard to imagine how the 
parties could have done much less.  
And so, as we make our way across this continuum, what is interesting is not so 
much the abstract proposition that at some level “it is for the court” to vet arbitral 
jurisdiction, 82 as it is the sharply restricted nature of the inquiry: Where resolution of this 
question hinges on the interpretation ultimately given the contract clause, it is natural to 
treat it as just one more discrete controversy between the parties—and then usually 
sensible to assume that the parties---merely by settling upon the language of the 
conventional, expansive arbitration clause----were willing to submit such questions, just 
as they entrusted every other interpretive question, to their chosen arbitrators.83 “No 
more is required to establish the arbitrability of the dispute”;84 no more is necessary to 
protect the role of the courts as the guardians of the temple---while reminding them to 
swear off the work of construction in favor of the designated readers of the parties’ 
contract.85   That anything more than this is misguided does not---even as one “trilogy” 
relentlessly succeeds another---seem to be generally appreciated.  
                                                          
82
 Howsam, supra n.3, 537 U.S. at 84 (“a disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a 
concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy is for the court”). 
83 The occasional assertion that such a contractual readjustment of the FAA's default allocation of 
authority between courts and arbitrators is somehow illegitimate -- that within the structure of the statute, 
the power to determine whether a duty to arbitrate exists remains a “nondelegable judicial function”---
need not detain us.  See Rau, “Trilogy,” at 496-97 (“how much in thrall to the ‘plain meaning’ fallacy does 
one have to be, in order to deny that a court might be appropriately ‘satisfied’ [within the meaning of § 4] 
not directly, but at an earlier stage and at one remove -- that is, after it has identified an agreement by 
which the parties were willing to entrust this determination to their agent? Can any conceivable purpose 
explain such a wooden result?”).  Cf.  Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties 65 (1798, Gregor 
trans. 1979)(“if a scriptural text . . . contains statements that contradict practical reason, it must be 
interpreted in the interests of practical reason”). 
84
 Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Posner, J.)(whether the “multiple opportunities” provision of a collective bargaining agreement 
superseded an earlier agreement with its “last chance language” is a matter of “interpretation of the 
agreement,” and “no more is required to establish the arbitrability of the dispute”); see also id. at 556 
(“when an arbitration clause is so broadly worded that it encompasses disputes over the scope or validity 
of the contract in which it is embedded, issues of the contract’s scope or validity are for the arbitrators”). 
85 I make no claim here to startling originality, for what I am saying does little more than track the proper 
reading of the seminal AT&T case, AT&T Technologies, Inc., v. Communications Workers of America  
475 U.S. 643 (1986): From the complex interrelation of a number of contractual provisions, the lower 
courts concluded that if they were really required to resolve the “arbitrability” question, they would 
necessarily become “entangled” in the actual consideration of the merits. (For under the agreement, it 
seemed, the arbitrators would only have jurisdiction if it were first found that the right to fire workers was 
not unconditionally a “management function,” and this---phrased otherwise, whether the right to terminate 
employees was unfettered or was in fact limited to cases where there was an actual “lack of work”---was 
the very issue in dispute). So the lower courts thought they had no other choice but to order “arbitration of 
the threshold issue of arbitrability”—for otherwise there would be nothing left for the arbitrator to decide. 
  A unanimous Supreme Court found this unacceptable: Any order to send “the arbitrability issue” 
itself to arbitration was necessarily improper---as it ignored the black letter principle that whether a 
arbitrate a particular dispute existed is “undeniably an issue for judicial determination” (unless of course 
the parties “clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise”!). But it is Justice Brennan's concurring opinion 
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IV. On the “Clear and Unmistakable”: “This Is All One Big Overblown 
Latke.”86 
 
In one recent federal case an employee was assumed to have agreed that 
the Arbitrator shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the 
interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement, including but not limited 
to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.
87
 
 
The court granted the defendant’s motion to compel---finding that this agreement 
“clearly and unmistakably provides an arbitrator with exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
issues of arbitrability.”  Its role, the court stressed, was strictly limited to “conducting a 
facial and limited review of the contract [to] “only [sic] decide whether the parties have in 
fact clearly and unmistakably agreed to commit” this question to arbitration.88  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that warrants far more attention---for he reminds us that in operation, this principle must have only the 
most marginal significance:  For the question of “consent” is to be severed from the question of which 
party, union or employer, was in fact correct in its reading of the agreement; instead, the judicial role was 
“much simpler,” “strictly confined” to the question “whether the parties agreed to submit disputes over the 
meaning” of the contract to arbitration, id. at 654; “we should interpret a collective-bargaining agreement 
only where there is some special reason to do so.” Understandably, Justice Brennan thought this 
determination to be made by the lower courts on remand would be “straightforward and will require little 
time or effort.” Id. at 655.  
The court’s task, in short, is no longer to discover whether the arbitrators “actually” had 
“jurisdiction” at all: It is, instead, far more cabined—the question is rather whether the agreement can be 
read so as to grant them this wider decisionmaking power, and then, perhaps, whether they have abused 
it.  Another, more recent illustration is  Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & 
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry, Local 38, 282 F.3d 746 (2002).  Here a General 
Contractor entered into an overall project agreement with several unions; the agreement entrusted “non-
jurisdictional” disputes to a project-wide “permanent arbitrator.” This “permanent arbitrator” concluded that 
a work assignment dispute between the parties was a “jurisdictional dispute” [in this context, a 
“jurisdictional dispute” is one involving a single employer caught between conflicting union demands]—
and he thus ordered the union to use the agreement's “jurisdictional dispute” resolution procedure, which 
required that the dispute be sent to the leadership of the adverse unions. His award was confirmed: “The 
text, structure and context” of the agreement “assign to [the arbitrator] the threshold determination 
whether or not a dispute is jurisdictional”; the proper inquiry for the court “is not whether the underlying 
dispute is arbitrable in and of itself; rather, we must [merely] ask whether the overall dispute, which 
encompasses the disagreement over the nature of the underlying dispute, is arbitrable.” Id. at 749 
(emphasis in original).  
86
 “’This is all one big overblown latke,’ Rabbi Levi Shemtov said of the fuss over the White House’s 
Hanukkah party,” “Washington Flap Over White House Hanukkah Party,” New York Times, Dec. 11, 
2009, at A23. 
87
 Anderson v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 2005 WL 1048700 (N.D. Cal.). 
 The court found that the employee’s signature of a “Voluntary Agreement” containing an 
arbitration clause “objectively manifest[ed] his intent to agree to arbitrate.” Id. at *3 fn.7. While the 
employee did claim that the “Agreement” was “unconscionable,” the court stressed that he did not, by 
contrast, contend “that the paragraph arguably giving the arbitrator the power to decide arbitrability” was 
itself “unconscionable”---a critical distinction that foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s later decision in 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2011). See 2005 WL 1048700 at *2 fn.4.  
88
 Id. at *4 (emphasis in original). 
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Now I’m not sure that I can make a great deal of sense of this last passage, either as 
a matter of psychology or of epistemology---nor even that I should try; if we are tasked 
with asking whether an expression is entirely free of ambiguity, it is not easy to grasp 
the notion of a restricted inquiry into the question that is itself prima facie and 
perfunctory.  But no matter: The case at least confirms my impression that this whole 
subject has been trivialized. So let me at the outset suggest one small experiment:  Can 
we try, in talking about this, simply to retire the shopworn notion of the “clear and 
unmistakable”---or at least to give it a well-deserved rest? And while we are at it, can we 
try to avoid all generalizations and abstractions of a similar nature---descending instead 
to the concrete, looking for what is actually at stake in the cases?89  We can after all do 
justice to everything the Supreme Court has done, and (a nice bonus) to common 
sense, without being held captive to facile verbal formulations.  
We begin, as we must, with First Options. Surely anyone trained in the law 
recognizes that anything contained in any judicial decision can only be understood in 
terms of the precise problem the court thought it was faced with---and in terms of the 
precise factual context in which the case arose?  So everything starts here: 
 
1.    An arbitral tribunal had rendered an award against Mr. Kaplan, holding him jointly 
and severally liable with the company of which he was the President and sole 
shareholder.  But had Mr. Kaplan ever consented to this exercise of arbitral authority?  
The only agreement that Kaplan had signed did not contain an arbitration clause:  Had 
he ever personally submitted to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators? The Third Circuit held 
that he had not, and the Supreme Court affirmed.  
 
 Whatever the claimant could point to in order to demonstrate consent—whether it 
was Kaplan's membership in the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the fact that the 
agreements signed respectively by him and by his company were “inextricably 
tied together as part of one transaction,” or some theory of piercing the corporate 
veil—all were held by the court to be without merit.90  
 
 A logically prior question, though, was whether this was in fact even a matter for 
judicial determination:  Had Kaplan perhaps “consented” at some higher 
conceptual level, by expressing his willingness to entrust the jurisdictional 
question itself to the arbitrators? Again, the holding was “no”:  For when he 
appeared before the tribunal, far from “waiving” or “surrendering” his defense, 
Kaplan had vigorously “asserted” and “reasserted” his objection to the tribunal’s 
                                                          
89 To particularize is the alone distinction of merit---general knowledges are those knowledges that idiots 
possess.” William Blake, Annotations to Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses, in 2 Works of William Blake 
323 (Edwin John Ellis & William Butler Yeats (eds.) 1893). 
90
 See Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1513 (3
rd
 Cir. 1994).  This was an 
“independent” de novo finding that arbitral jurisdiction did not actually “exist.” In the Supreme Court this 
question was held to be a “factbound issue” that was “beyond the scope of the questions we agreed to 
review.”  First Options of Chicago, Inc., supra n.31, 514 U.S. at 949.    
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taking jurisdiction over him personally. In those circumstances----since the 
respondent “cannot show that [Kaplan] clearly agreed to have the arbitrators 
decide (i.e., to arbitrate) the question of arbitrability”91---the tribunal’s decision to 
assume jurisdiction was entitled to no deference whatever.  
 
This is the precise holding in the Supreme Court: It is responsive to what I have 
called that “familiar, cruel dilemma,” that “exquisite form of torture,” faced by a 
respondent against whom an arbitration has been initiated, but who believes that he is 
not in fact subject to any arbitration agreement.  Such a respondent “is often confronted 
with a menu of wholly unpalatable choices: Simply boycotting the proceedings would 
entail the loss of his right to contest the claim on the merits; on the other hand, 
appearing before the arbitrators to argue that he had never consented to arbitral 
jurisdiction” has in the past often led to a finding that he had “submitted” the issue to 
them.92 In these circumstances an intention to leave to the arbitrators the question of 
the validity of his consent to arbitrate is sufficiently unusual, “sufficiently at odds with 
normal practice”93 that we should presume against it: It is perhaps not impossible.94  But 
it is damned unlikely.   
 
At the very least it should be clear that consent cannot be constructed out of a 
simple argument to the tribunal; before Kaplan could be bound, the claimant would have 
to point to something more than what he actually did.  First Options,  then, then, is 
nothing more than an insistence on clear statement, a “conscious interpretive strategy” 
aimed at giving a fair “account of what might otherwise be thought equivocal 
behavior,”95 one that at the same time allows a respondent to participate under protest 
while preserving a judicial forum for the determination of assent.  
 
And that’s all there is, really: While this, I think, is the proper domain of the “clear 
and unmistakable,” it is after all a rum way of saying that merely to show up and 
                                                          
91
 Id. at 946.  
92
 See Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 296-300; Rau, “Separability,” at 97.  See also Oral Argument in First Options 
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, March 22, 1995, 1995 WL 242250 at *22 (Justice Scalia)(“that's just not fair, it 
really isn't”). 
93
 Cf. Virginia Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int’l Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 117 (4
th
 Cir. 1993). 
94
 See Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 295: 
[Suppose that] Mr. Kaplan has told the putative “arbitrators” that while he really does not believe 
that he is bound to arbitrate, he recognizes that this remains a complex legal question: So, in 
order to avoid duplicative and costly litigation---and after lengthy discussions with his counsel---he 
thinks it best to entrust this issue to the panel for a final judgment, being willing to abide whatever 
the award may be. 
 Compare Steven H. Reisberg, The Rules Governing Who Decides Jurisdictional Issues: First 
Options v. Kaplan Revisited, 20 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 159, 181 (“Where the question is whether  there 
exists any binding arbitration agreement, there is no justification for asking whether this issue is one the 
parties agreed is to be submitted to arbitration. In fact, to attempt to do so is to ask for something that is 
logically impossible as it presumes its own premise”). 
95
 Rau, “Trilogy,” at 510.    
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complain is probative of precisely nothing.96  “The work done by the “clear and 
unmistakable” trope in the dialectic of First Options is in simple opposition to any claim 
of “implied consent.”97   
 
2.   Nevertheless there are aspects of the First Options decision that must give us 
pause.  It is striking that from first to last Justice Breyer’s discussion is repeatedly 
framed in terms of the notion of “arbitrability.” (“Did the parties agree to submit the 
arbitrability question itself to arbitration?”).   Use of this accordion term---a rough 
surrogate in American practice for “arbitral jurisdiction generally”---may lead us to 
believe that the scheme he is laying down for the allocation of authority between courts 
and arbitrators was intended to sweep quite broadly----to govern not only the question 
of whether someone like Mr. Kaplan is bound to arbitrate at all, but equally to govern the 
question whether a particular dispute is “within” (is “covered by”) an agreed-to 
arbitration clause. This is now in fact pretty generally assumed98---although the slippage 
                                                          
96
 For this reason it is error to assert that in First Options, “the Court held that a general and broad 
arbitration clause was not enough to satisfy the clear and unmistakable evidence requirement,” Schneider 
v. Kingdom of Thailand, 10 Civ. 2729 (S.D.N.Y. March 14, 2010), at *10; to the same effect, see Richard 
C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability:” Restoring Access to 
Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 S.M.U. L. Rev. 819, 847  (2003)(First Options “was 
decided in the context of the Court’s interpretation of a broad general arbitration provision,” and “the Court 
declined to find First Options’ broad arbitration clause sufficient to establish ‘clear and unmistakable’ 
intent to arbitrate the ‘who decides’ question”).  See also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric versus 
Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 129 137-38 (2012)(First Options  “departed from contract law” when it tested for “clear 
and unmistakable” intent by “concentrat[ing] not on the terms of the agreement, but on post-contractual 
conduct”). 
The flaws in all this should be clear enough:  Surely the whole question---the only question--in 
First Options was whether Kaplan, by his conduct, had “submitted” himself to arbitral jurisdiction in the 
first place; the “terms” of the agreement (“broad” or otherwise) to which he claimed to have been a 
complete stranger, is strictly irrelevant until our uncertainty with respect to this first, core, question had 
been answered.  And of course, it was ultimately answered in the negative. 
97
 Rau, “Trilogy,” at 510. More recent decisions to precisely the same effect are Radiant Systems, Inc. v. 
American Scheduling, Inc., 2005 WL 2105953 (N.D. Tex.)(“Radiant objected to its participation in the 
arbitration proceeding and filed an objection to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction”; this “does not rise to the level 
of a clear and unmistakable willingness to arbitrate the issue”); Roe v. Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. 
App.2010)(Ladymon argued to the arbitral tribunal that he had signed the contract “solely as a partner in 
a registered limited liability partnership and thus had no personal liability”; the claimant’s “argument that 
Ladymon waived his objection to the arbitrator’s power over him by objecting to the arbitrator is, of 
course, circular”). 
98
 See Howsam, supra n.3, 537 U.S. at 84 (Breyer, J.)(“a gateway dispute about whether the parties are 
bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court to decide,” and “[s]imilarly, 
a disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a 
particular type of controversy is for the court”); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 
(2003)(Breyer, J.)(“matters of a kind that contracting parties would likely have expected a court to decide” 
“include”  “whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy”); cf. 
Rent-A-Center, West, supra n.6, 130 S. Ct. at 2777 (“we have recognized that parties can agree to 
arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or 
whether their agreement covers a particular controversy”); First Team, Inc. v. Moto Photo, Inc., 1999 WL 
58561 (N.D. Ill.)(“if the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous on who decides arbitrability, we must 
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is discomforting, and all the resulting cackle with respect to “clear and unmistakable 
expression” has far outpaced, and put unnecessary pressure on, the fact pattern 
presented by First Options itself.  
That the First Options analysis is intended to apply also to disputes over “scope” 
is certainly suggested by Justice Breyer’s little riff on the “reversal of presumptions”:  
Because the question of “who should decide arbitrability” is itself “rather arcane,” he 
says, “the law” treats silence or ambiguity with respect to that issue “differently” from the 
way it treats silence or ambiguity with respect to the ultimate question----whether a 
particular dispute is truly “within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement.” So the 
canonical presumption in favor of arbitration---well-established for the latter inquiry---is, 
for the former, “reversed.”99 But we note immediately that in any case where the 
existence of a valid arbitration agreement is challenged, such an agreement is never 
“presumed” anyway---there is of course no “presumption” at all in favor of a party’s 
having given an initial consent to arbitrate something.  And so in such cases there 
would be little sense---when it comes to the question of “who should decide”--- in 
consciously crafting a rule designed to be the precise mirror image of the usual default. 
There is only a “presumption to reverse” when what is at stake is the coverage of an 
admitted agreement.    
 
But even so, whatever Justice Breyer says on this subject may still have very little 
purchase beyond the particular factual pattern faced by the Court.  Certainly nothing 
more is compelled or necessarily implied.100  Bear in mind that the only justification for 
requiring any “delegation” to the arbitral tribunal to be “clear and unmistakable” lies in 
the assistance it gives in construction:  It is the appropriate heuristic for the question 
whether language or behavior---whatever the parties have said or done touching on the 
identity of the preferred decisionmaker ---should be read in a particular way.101  Given 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
construe it as excluding arbitrability from the scope of arbitrable issues”; “are defendant's claims within 
the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement? The arbitration panel found that they were. We do not, 
however, owe the panel's finding deference”). Cf.  Reisberg, supra n. 94 at 176-77 (“a review of the 
Court’s dicta” in First Options “reveals that the Court is now using the term ‘arbitrability’ to refer only to 
disputes about the scope of the arbitration agreement”). 
In the confusing period immediately following First Options, a number of courts were led to 
conclude otherwise, e.g.,  Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 1996 WL 
137587 (S.D.N.Y.) at *8 (“First Options excludes scope arbitrability [sic] from the ‘clear and unmistakable’ 
standard---which encompasses formation issues only”); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Iveson, 913 F. 
Supp. 47, 49-50 (“timeliness issues . .  may be presented to the arbitrator and considered by him or her in 
determining the proper scope of arbitration”; Justice Breyer’s decision in First Options could hardly be 
clearer on this point”). 
99
 First Options of Chicago, Inc., supra n.31, 514 U.S. at 944-45.  
100
 See Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 293: “Only in the most self-indulgent opinions are “dicta” non-functional 
arabesques, self-contained and decorative. With a judge of any intellectual power, it makes considerably 
more sense to treat his ‘dicta’ as integral to the structure of the narrative—as they are here.” 
101
 Cf. General Motors Corp., supra n.25 at 250 (attorney’s use of the terms “arbitrator,” “respectfully 
submitted,” and “formally requests” in correspondence with the putative arbitrator “may reasonably be 
interpreted to be expressions of courtesy and respect toward [him] as one potential member of a three-
member arbitration panel,” but “does not constitute clear and unmistakable evidence of [respondent’s] 
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that background, we can concede that First Options does counsel reluctance to 
presume arbitral jurisdiction even with respect to the scope of consent---but still 
conclude that the reach of the principle does not extend much further than the holding, 
and the holding is simply this:  that “ample skepticism is justified with respect to whether 
a tribunal may assume jurisdiction over any issue merely by virtue of the fact a party 
has argued the matter before it.”   
 
After all, Justice Breyer can hardly be thought to have been unaware of the immense 
differences between the problems posed by an alleged lack of “core consent,” and the 
problems posed by a claim that consent did not go “so far as this.”102 And so, 
 
 To exclude “consent implied from mere conduct” is one thing.  We recall that this 
whole notion of requiring a somehow particularly explicit consent to arbitral 
jurisdiction was seized on by Justice Breyer largely as an interpretive device, a 
focused response to a particular dilemma faced by people like Mr. Kaplan who 
would otherwise have to steer at their peril between the twin dangers of default 
and of being inadvertently found to have “submitted.” 
 
 It is quite another thing to suggest that once we are satisfied that the parties have 
a valid agreement---once they have taken the trouble to actually say something 
about the arbitrators’ power to decide---they still must be deemed to have fallen 
short.103  Here the celebrated ‘dictum,” if pushed strenuously in the service of 
“plain meaning’ beyond the underlying concerns of the case itself, must seem 
unduly restrictive and meddling.  To understand where this “dictum” fairly came 
from is to understand its limited reach. 
 
And this leads us right to the most critical point: The principal flaw in the latter 
proposition is that we are now---not of course with respect to Mr. Kaplan’s challenge to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
agreement to grant [him] the authority to decide whether [respondent] waived the right to appoint [its own] 
arbitrator”). 
102 As one member of the Court---unfortunately unidentified-----suggested in oral argument, “[w]henever 
you submit issues to arbitration, in effect you're consenting to a kind of rough-and-ready disposition of 
whatever your claims or disputes may be, and therefore there's no reason to sort of draw fine lines as to 
what you were rough and ready about.” See Oral Argument, supra n. 92 at *43-*44. 
See generally the discussion at text accompanying nn. 66-67 & n. 67 supra; cf. Joshua Fairfield, 
The  Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 Emory L.J. 1401, 1424 
(2009)(“unpacking” “consent to be bound” and “consent to the terms of an agreement”; “consent to be 
bound to an agreement must still be surrounded by all the pomp and circumstance of contract law to 
inform parties that they are about to enter into binding legal relations,” “[b]ut that is quite different from the 
rules  regarding knowledge of the terms of an agreement”). 
103
 See Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 314 fn. 80: “[I]n determining the existence of an ‘arbitrable’ issue, it would 
be monstrous to deploy the same ‘presumption’ against both respondent A, who claims that he had never 
signed an agreement in his individual capacity—or that his signature was forged—and against 
respondent B, who claims that his consent to arbitrate disputes over the sale of pork bellies did not extent 
to the arbitration of disputes over the sale of pig iron.” 
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“core consent,” but only here, only now---squarely in the midst of the draftsman’s 
domain.  Ungenerous reading would seem to serve very little function other than, in 
Llewellyn’s words, to “invite the draftsman to recur to the attack”: 
 
 “Give him time, and he will make the grade.”104  
 
  When our inquiry is turned into a mere exercise in parsing the conventional pre-
dispute arbitration clause, it is hard to take it seriously as an attempt to discern 
contractual intent. It can only degenerate quickly into an oversubtle game--- an exercise 
that should be foreclosed in any event by Justice Brennan’s magisterial demonstration 
in AT&T.105 
 
a. This is why any requirement of “clear statement”-- even if in theory made 
necessary by Justice Breyer’s taxonomy--- is here so routinely and trivially 
satisfied.  As I have already suggested, in practice the supposed lessons of First 
Options have now become marginalized---have dwindled into insignificance---to 
the point that to invoke them begins increasingly to sound like mere bluster and 
bravado:106 Like the similarly quaint notion of “manifest disregard,” this now 
serves primarily as a ritual warning---or better, a therapeutic expression of 
internal reassurance---to the effect that the court is not entirely a potted plant.  
But it must equally and increasingly seem hollow and perfunctory.107 
 
b. And this is why our cabined view of First Options fits so neatly with later 
decisions of the Court, which have rounded out our understanding of its 
unguarded language. The world has not after all remained frozen in 1995, nor 
has the copious Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence: 
 
                                                          
104
 K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review [review of Prausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in 
English and Continental Law], 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703  (1939).  
105
 See generally text accompanying nn. 82-85 & n. 85 supra. 
106
 The oft-repeated presumption that courts, not arbitrators are to decide a particular arbitration-related 
matter has inevitably become little more than a “limited” and “narrow exception” to a more general 
imperative of arbitral competence. See Bazzle, supra n. 97, 539 U.S. at 452; see generally text 
accompanying nn. 77-85 supra.  
107
 To be sure, limited or idiosyncratic arbitration clauses might perhaps present a court with “sufficient 
ambiguity” as to require some actual demonstration that an issue of scope had been entrusted to the 
arbitrators. E.g., Davis v. Chevy Chase Financial Ltd., 667 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(clause provided that 
“the fair market value of the offered shares shall be determined by mutual agreement” and, in the 
absence of such an agreement, by arbitration; held, arbitrator exceeded his authority in ruling that 
respondent was contractually obliged to sell his shares; while  an arbitrator’s assumption of jurisdiction 
should be upheld “where the scope of arbitration is ‘fairly debatable’ or ‘reasonably in doubt,’” “where, as 
here, language is employed that suggests a limited scope of authority for the arbitrator, a more rational 
inference is that the parties themselves intended to determine if an arbitral dispute existed, with the 
assistance of the court if necessary.”). But in the run-of-the mill case, where the conventional “broad” form 
has not been distorted, this should be quite unnecessary. 
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 Pacificare.  As we remember, the question posed here was whether a 
contractual provision barring the award of punitive damages should be 
understood to bar the recovery of treble damages under RICO.108   Please 
note that if the arbitrators were to answer “no,” then they have necessarily 
answered “yes” to a question that is functionally equivalent: “Were the parties 
willing to submit claims for RICO treble damages to arbitration?” That is, they 
have answered “”yes” to the question, “did the parties entrust the arbitrators 
with jurisdiction to decide RICO treble damages claims?” The result of 
compelling arbitration in Pacificare, then, was that the coverage of the 
arbitration clause was made a matter for final determination by the arbitral 
tribunal. And---in a throwaway footnote that speaks volumes---the Court 
added that “given our presumption in favor of arbitration, we think the 
preliminary question whether [the contract prohibits an award of RICO treble 
damages] “is not a question of arbitrability.”109 
 
I would grateful indeed if someone could explain to me what the notion of 
“clear and unmistakable” could possibly mean today after Pacificare. Really: 
send me an e-mail.110 Which, I wonder, is more suggestive:  the inescapable 
                                                          
108
The district court had denied a motion to compel arbitration---concluding without discussion that the 
contract’s restriction on punitive damages served to bar the recovery of treble damages under RICO. [“Dr. 
Kelly alleges RlCO violations, which provide for treble damages. Treble damages are a form of punitive 
damages.” In re Managed Care Litigation, 132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001 (S.D. Fla. 2000), affirmed sub nom. 
In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation, 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002), reversed sub nom. Pacificare 
Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003)]. It then went on to find these limitations 
unenforceable because they prevented the plaintiffs from “obtaining any meaningful relief” for their 
statutory claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of the lower court’s opinion. See generally 
n.73 supra.  
109
 Pacificare Health Systems, supra n.3, 538 U.S. at 407 fn.2.  
Now of course there may still remain open questions as to the congruence of the agreement---
once it has been definitively interpreted by the arbitrators---with any external constraints of mandatory 
law. That is a separate matter, and the one that Justice Scalia thought “premature.” I have of course my 
own view as to the correct answer; see Rau, “Consent,” at 143-46 (can we suppose that the Court “is 
carefully laying a trap for the unwary arbitrator---prepared to pounce and spring should he get it wrong”?); 
Rau, “Trilogy,” at 451 fn.57.  But in any event all cackle about this arbitral decision being made “at an 
interlocutory stage” or  “in the first instance” is nothing but a reference to some potential subsequent 
judicial “second look” at this question---which readily explains the Court’s  reference to Vimar Seguros y 
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995). None of this has anything whatever to do with 
arbitral construction with respect to the “scope” of the agreement, which is something that cannot be 
reassessed in later proceedings. I am not sure that these senses are kept distinct in the discussion in 
BORN, supra n.7 at 929-30 & fns. 397-98.  
110
 When an officious visitor praised the merits of his own rather dull brother (“When we have sat together 
some time, you’ll find my brother grow very entertaining”), Johnson responded, “Sir, I can wait.” 2 James 
Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson 321 (Everyman’s Lib. Ed. 1992). I guess I can too.  
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implications of the holding with respect to the allocation of decisionmaking 
authority, or the fact that First Options was not even mentioned?111 
 Rent-A-Center. As we also remember, the parties’ agreement told us 
expressly that the arbitrator, “and not any [court],” “shall have exclusive 
authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, 
enforceability or formation of this [stand-alone arbitration] Agreement 
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is 
void or voidable.” 112 The claimant/employee conceded---as he really had to---
that this text was “clear and unmistakable” in the sense required by First 
Options.113 That made the claim of “unconscionability” simply irrelevant to the 
problem before the Court, and, for the Court, was abundantly adequate to 
send the claim to the tribunal. 
 
It is, however, the dissent’s misguided invocation of First Options that really 
underscores how inconsequential the case has become:  For Justice 
Stevens, the respondent’s claim that the arbitration agreement was 
“unconscionable” “undermines any suggestion that he ‘clearly and 
unmistakably’ assented to submit questions of arbitrability to  the arbitrator”; if 
the claim of “unconscionability” was accurate “it would contravene  the 
existence of clear and unmistakable assent to arbitrate the very question 
[respondent] now seeks to arbitrate.”114   
 
Now of course, a claim that a contract is invalid because “unconscionable” 
need not be in the slightest tension with a finding that the parties had 
delegated the power to decide this issue to their arbitrators---this after all is 
what Prima Paint is all about.  But more fundamentally: First Options, as we 
have seen, represents a heightened requirement of clarity to overcome the 
ambiguity of conduct.  It does not represent a heightened requirement of 
validity to overcome the usual contract-based defenses.  
                                                          
111 The Court does not cite First Options, nor (other than with respect to the exclusion of “punitive 
damages”) does the Court even find it necessary to refer to the drafting of the contract’s arbitration 
clause, or to its purported scope. 
Quite similar to Pacificare---although, as happens more often than not, Pacificare is not even 
mentioned---is Congress Construction Co. v. Geer Woods, Inc., 2005 WL 3657933 (D. Conn.)(“who 
decides the question of whether the parties intended to arbitrate consequential damage claims?”; held, 
this “threshold question of arbitrability” is for the arbitrators, “at least in the first instance”). In cases like 
this, “in the first instance” must of course mean, “subject to the usual § 10 standard of review.”  Pacificare 
is also not mentioned at all in Alliance Bernstein Investment Research & Management, Inc., supra n. 80 
(was a “whistleblower” claim equivalent to a claim for “discrimination” that was expressly excluded from 
arbitration by the NASD Rules?; held, this is a question for the arbitrator.) 
112
 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010).  
113
 Id. at 2776, 2778 fn. 1.  But cf. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 466 
(2011)(in Rent-A-Center the Court “declined to adopt the “clear and unmistakable” rule that it had 
previously endorsed in dicta”). 
114
 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., supra n. 112, 130 S. Ct. at 2784-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Of course, as an initial threshold matter “consent” to some form of arbitral 
jurisdiction is critical---that is what it means to be “satisfied” that we can  find a 
“contract” within the meaning of  § 2.115  But there is no occasion at all to go 
                                                          
115 Professor Bermann writes that in First Options, 
The Supreme Court held that parties may, if they do so clearly and unmistakably, delegate to 
arbitrators the question whether a contract binds a non-signatory. Thus, under First Options, even 
a party that steadfastly insists that it is a stranger to an agreement may by virtue of clear and 
unmistakable language in the contract, find itself having given a tribunal primary authority to 
answer that very question. 
George A. Bermann, The Supreme Court Trilogy and Its Impact on U.S. Arbitration Law, 22 Amer. Rev. 
Int’l Arb. 551, 557-58 (2011). 
The first sentence is conceded.  The second sentence, however, does not follow from it, and I 
doubt that I would venture so far. (Homer, too, nodded.)  See also George A. Bermann, Arbitrability 
Trouble, 23 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 367, 375 (2012)(First Options “is predicated on dubious logic,” for “it 
seems anomalous to base a jurisdictional determination on the wording of an agreement to arbitrate that 
allegedly never came into existence or too which the party sought to be bound asserts that it is a total 
stranger”); Karen Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 26 Ohio St. J. Disp. 
Resol. 1, 61 (2011)(if an arbitration clause both provides for a biased arbitrator and contains a delegation 
clause, “the implication” of First Options “is that any findings by the arbitrator as to whether the arbitration 
agreement is unconscionable must be accorded deference at the award enforcement stage”); Graves, 
supra n.44 at 281 (since the arbitrators’ authority to decide their own jurisdiction “is based solely on 
whether the parties agreed to arbitration in the first instance,” “any grant of such authority is arguably 
fundamentally flawed, as a matter of contractual consent, based on its inherent circularity”). 
I would hardly go so far because there is, after all, nothing whatever in First Options that can be 
read in any way to call into question the “Prime Directive” of arbitration----to the effect that no party can be 
bound to an arbitral award if he has not agreed to submit himself to the process. There is certainly no way 
to spin such a notion out of Justice Breyer’s opinion, with its repeated----indeed, almost hypnotic----
invocation of the concept of “agreement,”  “For one must enter into the system somewhere, and the 
notion of an arbitration clause that can be entirely self-validating---the product, apparently, of some 
curious process of autogenesis---is completely alien to our jurisprudence,” Rau, “Separability” at 5; cf. 
Roe, supra n. 96 at 517 (“the terms of the contracting parties’ agreement to arbitrate is not evidence that 
a non-contracting party . . . agreed to arbitrate”).  By contrast, however: 
 While we must not construe as “consent” the mere fact that Mr. Kaplan argued lack of jurisdiction 
to the “arbitrators,” it is certainly possible to imagine a future Mr. Kaplan who chooses to be 
somewhat more explicit---who tells them that while he does not believe he is bound, “he thinks it 
best to entrust this issue to the panel for a final judgment, being willing to abide whatever the 
award may be.”  See n. 94 supra.   
 Alternatively:  One can imagine the parties’ willingness to “delegate” to future arbitrators the 
power to decide whether even their arbitration agreement itself is unenforceable---despite 
challenges (say, for “unconscionability”) that do not call into question---do not “go to”---do not 
impair the legitimacy of---the very agreement to delegate. This of course is Rent-A-Center.  In 
such cases, of course, there must be a “real”---that is, contractually valid---“delegation” of 
decisionmaking power; see Rau, “Trilogy,” at 497; cf. id. at 503 (where a contractual provision 
requires a biased decision-maker a court will “[treat] a mere signature or any other indicia of ‘bare 
formal assent’ as simply irrelevant”); but cf. Bermann, supra n.4 at 48 (the Court in Rent-A-Center 
“did not indicate what the result would have been if Jackson had been found to challenge the 
delegation clause in particular”). 
These cases are perhaps as far as we can go---they are just this side of the permissible.  But note 
that in none of these imagined cases can the resisting party---who is legitimately bound to any award---
properly be considered a “stranger” to an agreement to arbitrate. 
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any further---that is, no “threshold” of enforceability that is higher, no burden 
of proof that is greater, than with respect to other contractual terms116---and 
thus no need to drag in First Options to frighten the horses.  
 
 
V. The Dilemma of Institutional Rules 
 
The U.S. has no developed concept of international arbitration and I'm afraid it will 
never acquire it.
117 
 
To review the bidding to this point: We began, with First Options, with the posited 
legitimacy of a contractual allocation of decisionmaking power;  we quickly moved to the 
more interesting question of just where the starting point should be---that is, what 
should be the appropriate default rule against which to judge whether any such 
allocation has taken place.  And soon, in the predictable way the common law operates, 
we find ourselves talking about just what degree of explicit contracting around is 
necessary to reverse the background rule. Appropriately, as we have seen, not much.  
This impression is reinforced by what we turn to next, the common practice of fleshing 
out agreement through the use of institutional rules.  
  Let us begin with what should really not be contested territory:  Shortly after the 
decision in First Options, the AAA responded to the hint dropped by Justice Breyer,118 
and revised its Commercial Arbitration Rules to take advantage of the space he had 
opened up:119  Rule 7(a), we are told, was expressly “designed to address” the Court's 
suggestion in First Options  that parties might wish “to submit the arbitrability question 
                                                          
116
 Cf. Lepera v. ITT Corp., 1997 WL 535165 at *4(E.D.Pa.)(citing First Options, “there must be clear and 
unmistakable evidence that a party agreed to arbitrate before they are bound to do so”). 
 Justice Scalia adequately cuts the ground out from under Justice Stevens on this point; see Rent-
A-Center, West, Inc., supra n. 112, 130 S. Ct. at 2777 fn.1 (§ 2 does not, “of course,” impose on a 
proponent the need to demonstrate that the validity of an agreement to arbitrate must be “clear and 
unmistakable”).  Still, I’d like to believe that I made precisely the same point over a decade ago, in the 
fond hope that someone might be listening; see Rau, “Separability,” at 95 fn. 241 (“it would obviously be 
contrary to federal policy to suggest that the proponent must carry a higher burden than is usual in civil 
cases .  . .with respect to other contractual terms”). 
117
 See, e.g., Sebastian Perry, Arbitration in the EU a “Nightmare”?, 5(4) GLOBAL ARB. REV. 32 (July 9, 
2010)(comments of Professor Mistelis). 
118
 If “ the parties agree[d] to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration,” “then the court's 
standard for reviewing the arbitrator's decision about that matter should not differ from the standard courts 
apply when they review any other matter that parties have agreed to arbitrate.” First Options, supra n. 31, 
514 U.S. at 943. 
119
 Rule 7(a) of the Commercial Arbitration Rules now provides that “the arbitrator shall have the power to 
rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity 
of the arbitration agreement.” (R. 15(1)  of the AAA’s International Arbitration Rules is identical, merely 
replacing “arbitrator” with “tribunal.”)  Five years later the AAA showed the same alacrity in exploiting the 
Supreme Court’s hint, in Bazzle, that the question of “what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties 
agreed to” could also be a matter for arbitral determination----the “Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitrations” seem a similarly self-aggrandizing move to expand the domain of arbitration in response to 
no particularly vocal consumer demand. 
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itself to arbitration”---and was thus intended to constitute party agreement to the 
arbitrability of “jurisdictional disputes.”120  
 
American courts have drawn the obvious inference, now routinely holding that 
merely choosing to arbitrate under these rules is itself a decision to take advantage of 
First Options’ celebrated “dictum.”121  
                                                          
120
 See American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules Revision Committee, Commentary 
on the Revisions to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, ADR CURRENTS, Dec. 1998, at 6, 7 
(“The committee believes that by adopting these rules, parties agree to the arbitrability of such 
jurisdictional disputes”). 
 In another publication, the AAA---this time without making the pointed reference to First Options--
- explained that the new rule was “designed to make explicit in the rules generally accepted principles of 
arbitral jurisdiction. By adopting these rules, parties agree to the arbitrability of such jurisdictional 
disputes.” AAA, Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures, Summary of Significant Changes, quoted in 
Richard W. Hulbert, Institutional Rules and Arbitral Jurisdiction:  When Party Intent is not “Clear and 
Unmistakable,” 17 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 545, 563 (2006).  Hulbert points to the first sentence of this 
excerpt as an indication “that nothing of substance was being added,” id. But this seems a clear case of 
overreaching:  Such a disingenuous gloss on the rule can hardly be squared with the second sentence. 
All that is being made “explicit” here is the “generally accepted principle” that parties may readily enter 
into an agreement to take advantage of the First Options dictum.  It seems fair, then, to conclude that the 
rule, “enacted in response to First Options,” was thus “specifically meant to satisfy the clear and 
unmistakable evidence standard,” Avue Technologies Corp. v. DCI Group, L.L.C., 2006 WL 1147662 
(D.D.C.) at *7. 
The “legislative history” of the CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration is almost as 
compelling: Rule 8.1 of these rules provides that “the Tribunal shall have the power to hear and determine 
challenges to its jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the 
arbitration agreement.” The official “Commentary” concludes that under this rule, challenges to arbitral 
jurisdiction “are decided, at least in the first instance, by the Tribunal consistent with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in [First Options].” See also n.111 supra (“in cases like this, ‘in the first instance’ must of 
course mean, ‘subject to the usual § 10 standard of review’”). 
121
 See, e.g., Avue Technologies Corp., supra n.120 at *5 (“here there is no ‘silence or ambiguity’ in the 
concededly valid arbitration agreement,” as the agreement “expressly incorporates the AAA rules, which 
designates . . . the arbitrator as the ‘who’ referred to in First Options”); Fallo v. High-Tech Institute, 559 
F.3d 8734 (8
th
 Cir. 2009)(arbitrator should determine “whether the students’ tort claims were within the 
scope of the arbitration provision in [their] enrollment agreements”; “the act of incorporating [the AAA 
Rules] provides even clearer evidence of the parties’ intent to leave the question of arbitrability to the 
arbitrator than does the act of incorporating [the NASD Code],” and incorporation of the AAA Rules 
“supersedes Missouri law regarding the question of arbitrability”). Cf. McLaughlin v. McCann, 942 A.2d 
616 (Del. Ch. 2008)(while there is a “heavy presumption” that by referencing the AAA Rules the parties 
agreed “ that the arbitrator, and a not a court, would resolve disputes about substantive arbitrability,” if the 
agreement contains at the same time substantial “carveouts and exceptions to committing disputes to 
arbitration”----such as authorizing injunctive relief and specific performance in the courts---the 
presumption is “overcome”).  Indeed as we have seen, courts are increasingly likely to attribute precisely 
the same effect to the canonical “broad clause” even in the absence of any institutional rule.  See text 
accompanying nn. 78-83 supra. 
See also Terminix Int'l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 432 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005).  
Here the claimant asserted that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable because they “illegally 
deprive [it] of statutory remedies” including punitive and treble damages.  The court held that while such a 
challenge would “ordinarily” be a matter for judicial decision because “it ultimately goes to the validity of 
the parties’ agreement to arbitrate,” here the incorporation of the AAA rules means that the parties 
instead “clearly and unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator should decide.” But in this case I doubt that 
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Now the current draft of the Restatement does take a different position, 
“reject[ing] those cases” and so rejecting the proposition that that the AAA Rules require 
judicial deference to determinations by arbitral tribunals of their own jurisdiction.122   But 
I find this somewhat puzzling: Just what after all should we suppose to have been the 
point of the AAA's revision of its rules? Presumably the rules were intended to mean 
something---and so surely we are expected to provide some account of the contractual 
effect they are to have.  If we can’t take at face value what the drafters told us they were 
trying to accomplish, what was the point of the exercise?  
  
 Were they perhaps trying to insure that arbitrators don't feel compelled to shut up 
shop as soon as a jurisdictional objection is made? (But what arbitrator has ever 
felt so compelled?)123 Surely there was, at the time, no felt pressing need to act 
merely in order to codify the so-called “positive effect” of the doctrine of 
compétence/compétence?  
 
 Or were they perhaps trying to create through contract a mechanism that would 
oblige a court to stay its hand, refraining from its usual course of adjudication, 
pending the ultimate award---at which time it would have the right to review any 
jurisdictional finding de novo? (Were they trying, that is, to incorporate into the 
Rules the French Code of Civil Procedure---and thereby restructure our entire 
system of judicial control so as to “mandate multiple stages of litigation”?)124 
 
Can we agree that both of these scenarios are implausible in the extreme?  But note 
that in the absence of some compelling alternative semantic account, there can simply 
be no First Options “ambiguity.” 
 
Or is the problem perhaps that the declared intentions of some AAA committee 
should not automatically be imputed to contracting parties, who may have chosen the 
rules without full awareness of their origin?125   Now: We know that by agreeing to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
such a move was even necessary; quaere whether such a challenge truly implicates arbitral jurisdiction or 
“arbitrability” in the first place anyway; see Rau, “Trilogy,” at 503-04 & fn. 235; Rau  “Consent,” at 143-45. 
122
 Restatement, supra n. 74, at § 4-14 Reporters' Notes note e. (“de novo review of tribunal’s scope 
rulings”; although “institutional arbitration rules” give arbitrators “the authority to determine their own 
jurisdiction, they do not expressly provide that the arbitrators have the final and unreviewable authority to 
determine” such issues”); see also id. at § 4-12 Reporters’ Notes note d. (same apparently with respect to 
the existence or invalidity of the arbitration agreement) 
123
 See n. 23 supra (“universal” agreement on the proposition that arbitrators “are not thought to be 
somehow obligated to pack up their papers and turn out the lights, as soon as one of the putative parties 
sends them a note objecting to their jurisdiction”); see also text accompanying n.41 supra. 
124
 See text accompanying n. 34 supra. 
125
 See Bermann, Arbitrability Trouble, supra n.115 at 377 (distinguishing between “clear and 
unmistakable evidence of the institution’s intention” and a “demonstrat[ion] that the parties clearly and 
unmistakably share that intention”). 
Cf. Lustfield v. Milne, 2008 WL 5544410 (Pa. Com. Pl.). Here the court found no “clear and 
unmistakable evidence” satisfying First Options in the mere incorporation by reference of the AAA rules---
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arbitrate under the AAA rules, the parties have consented to make these rules “part of” 
their contract.126  What do we take this to mean? Of course, as with any other Contracts 
question, the subjective intentions of the contracting parties---in any event unknowable--
-are inconclusive---as, taken alone, are the subjective intentions of the drafters. The 
only inquiry is into what the contracting parties could and should have made of the text, 
given their “framework of common understanding”127---that is, their linguistic 
sophistication, their constructive knowledge of the circumstances (always 
“surrounding”), the “legislative history,” the context, the jurisprudential back story---and 
then, of course, the preferences we are justified in ascribing to them in light of their 
presumed overriding desire to minimize their joint costs. 128  The result really shouldn’t 
be up for grabs, as it repeats the narrative of emerging case law that we have already 
observed, in federal courts at every level---in which the subject of jurisdiction is 
increasingly regarded as “just one more dispute between the parties.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
writing rather naively that “if a drafting party is seeking an agreement of the parties to an arbitration 
clause which provides for the arbitrator to decide arbitrability, it is a simple matter to expressly say so”; 
“the drafting party through one sentence can clearly state that the arbitrator shall decide arbitrability 
disputes.” I call this “naïve” because “you could easily have said so” is usually a pretty clear sign that a 
default rule has been imposed without any conscious choice or awareness; it is also “naïve” because the 
court seemed oblivious to the linguistic difficulties---to the minefield that references to “decide” and to 
“arbitrability” would invite courts to stumble into.  On the relative insignificance of drafting concerns, see 
text accompanying nn. 103-05 supra.   
In any event the court in Lustfield seemed relatively uninterested in the particular language of 
Rule 7(a)---and far more in the claim that the non-drafting party was not “aware of or even considered the 
possibility” that a reference to the AAA Rules “has anything to do with what is arbitrable”:  Since “what is 
arbitrable is a matter for the parties to decide,” “one would not anticipate that it would be addressed in the 
rules of an entity that will serve as the arbitrator.” Whatever that last sentence could possibly mean, it 
suggests that cases like Lustfield must be cabined in the growing body of “arbitration-in-contracts-of-
adhesion law”---and thus must have little purchase with respect to the transactions between sophisticated 
commercial parties that we are mostly concerned with here.    
126
 “The parties shall be deemed to have made these rules a part of their arbitration agreement whenever 
they have provided for arbitration by the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter AAA) under its 
Commercial Arbitration Rules or for arbitration by the AAA of a domestic commercial dispute without 
specifying particular rules.” AAA, Commercial Arbitration Rules, R.1(a). 
127
 Cf. UCC  § 1-303 cmt. 3. 
128
 See the discussion at n.72 supra.  So an interpretive exercise on the part of the tribunal with respect to 
the meaning of “fruit,” see nn. 73-74 supra, or of “punitive damages,” see text accompanying nn. 108-09 
supra, will naturally be entitled to considerable deference. But note that this is not merely a question of 
acknowledging the comparative competence in contract construction for which arbitrators were 
presumably chosen:   It is also to recognize that arbitrators will often be in a far better position than courts 
to appreciate the submissions actually made by the parties in the course of the proceedings----
submissions which if properly understood can define---or alter or expand---the scope of actual consent.  
E.g., Hollern v. Wachovia Securities, Inc., 458 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2006) (although the agreement did not 
expressly permit an award of attorneys’ fees, the parties “in their submissions’” “may extend” the authority 
granted to the arbitrators; here both parties requested attorneys’ fees in their submissions, and “in 
accordance with the parties’ request, the arbitrators decided the issues of attorneys’ fees”); American 
Postal Workers Union v. Runyon, 185 F.3d 832, 835–36 (7th Cir. 1999) (in interest arbitration, “the 
arbitrator interpreted the issue framed by the parties as encompassing more than a choice between 
[adopting one party’s proposal in its entirety] and doing nothing”; “we give great deference to the 
arbitrator’s understanding of the parameters of the issues presented for arbitration”) 
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This common way of reading the AAA Rules has now become something of a 
meta-default rule---treating a contractual reference to the Rules as a simple “term of 
art”129 that denotes the choice of a particular scheme for the allocation of power.  Once 
the principle of reallocation has been admitted, much more should not be expected.  In 
an analysis made familiar by Lon Fuller, to arbitrate under the Rules is now to adopt a 
ready-to-hand “form”---useful to a court for the “facilitation of judicial diagnosis,” and 
useful, too, to contracting parties as a “legal framework” into which they may fit their 
actions; by offering them convenient “channels for the legally effective expression of 
intention,” it thus serves as “a device for separating the legal wheat from the legally 
irrelevant chaff.”130 Like any default rule it is subject to contractual expression of a 
contrary intention by parties who find it unsuited to their needs---but the fact that it is 
never reversed in practice cannot be attributed entirely to inattention or inertia.131 
 So it is rather hard to discern just what we would gain by setting busily to work at 
parsing solemnly the text of marginally, trivially, variant formulations----ascribing 
importance, perhaps, to a clause that tells us that the arbitrators shall have the 
                                                          
129
 Willie Gary LLC v. James & Jackson LLC, 2006 WL 75309 at *7–8 (Del.Ch.). At the same time the 
court noted that this would also “arguably be economically efficient as a general policy rule.” And that in 
turn reminds us that the choice of a default rule will often be made, not exclusively in an attempt to 
reconstruct the tacit assumption so the contracting parties, but often, too, “in the interest of handicapping 
a contention that happens to be socially disfavored” or privileging a contention that is thought to be 
normatively desirable, see Rau, “Trilogy,” at 466 & fns. 113-14; Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, 
Sales Law: Domestic and International 12-13 (2
nd
 ed. 2009)(“we might state a rule as a default rule to 
indicate a social preference, or to call special attention to the options presented by the default rule and 
ensure that parties who bargain away from that rule incur significant costs that might lead them to think 
seriously about the appropriateness of their actions”). 
130
 Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 801-04 (1941).  Cf. Paulsson, supra n.48 
at 612 fn.27 (“intended to save the parties ink---or perhaps mental energy”). 
Professor Bermann argues that if the parties’ adoption of rules like the AAA’s should really be 
deemed to constitute “clear and unmistakable evidence” of their intention to allow arbitral tribunals to 
determine their own jurisdiction, “then, by the same reasoning, so too would the parties’ selection in their 
agreement of a place of arbitration whose lex arbitri contains such language”---an unacceptable result 
because the First Options presumption should not “be overcome so easily,”  Bermann, Arbitrability 
Trouble, supra n. 115 at 377 (referring to the UNCITRAL Model Law). But even if the choice of a seat can 
be viewed as instrumental behavior in Fuller’s sense, we must not of course lose sight of this:  that an 
agreement to arbitrate “in, or under the law of,” Germany can only ever have the effect that is attributed to 
it by the law of that state.  It is not apparent how an American judge could presume to read it otherwise---
no matter what he or she would otherwise take First Options to mean.  With respect to the general 
assumption that Germany’s adoption of the Model Law actually had the effect of barring contracting 
parties from making even an explicit grant to arbitrators of final decisionmaking power with respect to their 
own jurisdiction, see Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 349 (citing German authorities, but “I confess I am hard put to 
understand why the Model Law should be thought to have any bearing whatever on this question”); 1 
BORN, supra n.7 at 899, 908. 
131
 Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise: Contract Is Consent, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 647, 660 
(2012)(“so far as freedom of contract is concerned, it sometimes does not matter what the ‘gap filling’ 
default rule is, so long as the parties had access to it”; “by remaining silent, they have consented to 
whatever term the law supplies,” and “parties who do not contract around these default rules can 
realistically be said to have objectively manifested their consent to them”). 
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“exclusive authority to resolve” disputes over the “applicability, enforceability, or 
formation” of the agreement,132  or even that arbitration “shall be the exclusive dispute 
resolution procedure for Disputes under this Agreement and no Party shall bring 
Disputes before any court, except as appeals to arbitration awards are permitted . . .”133  
One would  have to attribute to drafting parties a considerably higher level of awareness 
and attentiveness and self-consciousness than I am willing to do, to draw legal 
consequences from what are merely stylistic flourishes.   
What the Restatement seems in particular to find lacking in the AAA Rules is that 
they do not go on to “prescribe any particular standard of review or measure of 
deference to the tribunal” should the question  “[come] subsequently before a court.”134 
But of course it is not common---nor is it even particularly seemly---for contracting 
parties to presume to craft “standards of review” or to tell courts with any specificity how 
they should go about their business.135 
If none of this is particularly problematic, what has by contrast proven globally 
troublesome to American courts and commentators, is the uncomfortable tension 
between 
 our pre-existing backdrop of domestic law, and  
 an understandable if insidious desire to align ourselves with sophisticated 
Continental models.   
 
Under any model, what is critical is the interplay between any given system of civil 
procedure and the agreement of the parties.  And now we get to the real problem---
which, of course, is that while the intent of the AAA Rules is clear, no one could have 
had anything like that in mind when the facially quite-similar rules of other arbitral 
institutions were drafted. 
Certainly other familiar sets of international rules---like those of the ICC and of 
UNCITRAL---read as if they were intended to have an effect equivalent to those of the 
                                                          
132
 E.g., Anderson v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., n. 87 supra. 
133 E.g., Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 2011 WL 1348438 (Del. Ch.) at *16 
(also relying on the AAA Rules).   Since this language may not in any event be taken literally [is a motion 
to compel under § 4 excluded? A motion to appoint arbitrators under § 5? A request for interim relief 
pending the formation of the tribunal?], it is not clear how [other than as an example of excess lawyerly 
caution] this could be thought to advance the ball much beyond what we would get in any event from a 
generic arbitration clause. See also Systems Research & Applications Corp., supra n.120 at 944 (in 
addition to the AAA rules, the court relied on a clause to the effect that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically 
provided in this provision, neither party shall institute any action or proceeding against the other party in 
any court of law or equity with respect to any dispute which is or could be the subject of a claim or 
proceeding pursuant to this provision”). 
134
 Restatement, supra n. 74 at Reporters’ Notes note e.  
135
 See 1 BORN, supra n.7 at 934 (“This misconceives what is required under First Options, which is 
evidence of an agreement to arbitrate jurisdictional issues, not a waiver of judicial review of arbitral 
decisions”---and in fact express waivers of this type “have sometimes been held unenforceable under the 
FAA”). 
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AAA when it comes to the matter of compétence/compétence.  There are trivial textual 
differences that will inevitably be seized on--- that will then give rise to the usual arid 
semantic quibbles---but that ought not detain us.136  Of course, it would betray 
remarkable linguistic naiveté to assume that words or collocations of words must always 
carry precisely the same significance without regard to context:137  It seems obvious that 
the rules of the ICC, for example, were merely meant to restate party agreement to the 
arbitrators' compétence/compétence---at most a matter of chronological priority:  That 
is,  deeply rooted as they are in the premises and presuppositions of French procedural 
law, they were not intended in any way to amount to a final allocation of decisionmaking 
authority.138  The arbitrati of other states -- precisely because they lack the First Options 
                                                          
136 See, e.g., Telenor Mobile Communications AS, supra n. 35, 524 F.Supp.2d at 350-51. En route to his 
conclusion that the UNCITRAL Rules were “insufficient” to constitute submission to “arbitral resolution on 
the issue of arbitrability,” Judge Lynch parsed them exquisitely:   
 The UNCITRAL language, he wrote (“[t]he arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on 
objections that it has no jurisdiction”), was “clearly [less] sweeping” than the ICC Rules (“[a]ny 
decision as to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be taken by the Arbitral Tribunal itself”).  
I guess one can barely glimpse the point being made here, although one remains underwhelmed.  
 And then Judge Lynch went on to note a contrast with the rules of the AAA:  While the former 
provide arbitrators with the authority “to rule on [their] jurisdiction,” by contrast, the UNCITRAL 
rules “only” [sic] “allow arbitrators to rule on objections to that authority.” Emphasis in original. At 
that point one has to throw up one’s hands.   
In any event this restrictive view of the UNCITRAL rules has not been carried forward into later more 
authoritative Second Circuit jurisprudence; see Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand, 688 F.3d 68, 73-74 
(2
nd
 Cir. 2012)(adoption of the UNCITRAL rules “is clear and unmistakable evidence of [the parties’] intent 
to arbitrate issues of arbitrability,” so that a district court “must review the arbitrators’ resolution of such 
questions with deference”); Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Government of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, 2011 WL 3516154 (S.D.N.Y.) at *18 fn. 10, aff’d, 2012 WL 2866275 (2
nd
 Cir.)(in this 
respect Telenor was “abrogated” by subsequent Second Circuit decisions). 
137
 See n. 44 supra (“Despite the patent ambiguity of the word ‘decide,’ confusion of these two very 
different senses of the word is common and fatal to intelligent argument”). 
138
 See text accompanying nn. 8-22 supra; see also Yves Derains & Eric A. Schwartz, A Guide to the ICC 
Rules of Arbitration 77 fn.78 (2005) (“Ultimately, the Arbitral Tribunal's determination will usually be the 
subject of judicial control once the tribunal has rendered its Award ....”); W. Laurence Craig et al., 
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration § 11.03, at 162 (2000)(“The effect [of the ICC Rules], 
subject to a posteriori control by national courts, is that the arbitrators rule on jurisdictional questions”). 
See generally Hulbert, supra n.119 at 557-60 (a conclusive demonstration to the effect that these rules 
could never have been intended to constitute party agreement to any final determination by an arbitral 
tribunal with respect to its own jurisdiction----a determination that would be entitled to the usual deference 
extended to all awards).    
Similarly, with respect to the UNCITRAL Rules, see id. at 570-71; David D. Caron et al., The 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary 445 (2006)(Rule 21 of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that 
the arbitral tribunal “shall  have the power to rule on objections that it has no jurisdiction,” but the “sole 
substantive concern” of the drafters was that this “could mislead parties, because questions as to the 
competence and jurisdiction of arbitrators were ultimately a matter for the courts to settle in accordance 
with the lex fori”).  The LCIA Arbitration Rules swim in the same current; art. 23.1 confers on the arbitral 
tribunal “the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objection to the initial or continuing 
existence, validity or effectiveness of the Arbitration Agreement,” and art. 23.4 warns that “by agreeing to 
arbitration under these Rules, the parties shall be treated as having agreed not to apply to any state court 
or other judicial authority for any relief regarding the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction or authority”---but with 
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backstory -- are likely to find even the possibility of such a reallocation illegitimate and 
heretical---“exorbitant,”139 and  “neither logical or acceptable.”140  (That an arbitral 
tribunal could possibly be the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction may even be a 
result that is claimed---with a characteristic solipsism---to be “accepted nowhere.”).141 
Their experience, however, is simply not ours.142  
My guess then is that the Restatement position143 must be understood as an 
attempt to bridge -- by fiat if necessary -- the wide gap between the quite different 
preconceptions of U.S. and of foreign practice.   But of course, it is in the nature of a 
bridge, that traffic may proceed in either direction:  In an alien legal environment— 
 seeing arbitration primarily as an emanation of the law of Contracts144--- 
 having only the backstory of First Options to look to—and  
 indulging their increasingly frequent reticence to venture beyond apparent “plain 
meaning”145--- 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the exception---and this alone of course speaks volumes---of possible recourse “following the [tribunal’s] 
award ruling on the objection to its jurisdiction or authority.” 
139
 See, e.g., PHILIPPE FOUCHARD ET AL., TRAITÉ DE L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL 
INTERNATIONAL 410 (1996). 
140
 Id. at 414-15.  Other authors reluctantly admit this into the realm of pure theory, but---so axiomatic is 
the regime of de novo judicial control, and so alien the notion of any contractual variation---that it is 
deemed suspect and disfavored to the extent that they “practically never” manage to actually “come 
across it,” see Pierre Mayer, L'Autonomie de l'arbitre international dans l'appréciation de sa proper 
compétence, [1989] 5 REC. DES COURS 319, 340-41.  
141
 Emmanuel Gaillard, Note [to Société Coprodag v. Bohin, Cour de Cassation, May 10, 1995], in [1995] 
Rev. de l’Arb. 618, 621 (“une telle consequence n’est admise ni dans ce pays, ni ailleurs”).  
142
 The notion of compétence/compétence was first introduced into the ICC rules in 1931, when the rules 
were amended to provide that “in case the parties are in disagreement as to whether or not they are 
bound by an arbitration clause, the Court of Arbitration shall decide the issue.” The delegation was 
originally to the Court of Arbitration because “it was not then considered that such a question could validly 
be submitted to an arbitrator” (the view was that this “involves a decision which necessarily must be taken 
before the Arbitrator can commence to have any jurisdiction at all”). Nevertheless it was feared that if 
parties were always required to await the decision of a national state court when arbitral jurisdiction was 
challenged, the entire arbitral process could be undermined:  That the driving engine was thus the familiar 
calculus of procedural efficiency is made clear by the general recognition that there was, after all, “always 
the possibility of the court of law [ultimately] rendering the results of arbitration nugatory.”  See generally 
Derains & Schwartz, supra n. 138 at 77; Hulbert, supra n. 120 at 557-59. 
143
 That is, the Restatement position with respect to what it means for the parties to incorporate into their 
contract the rules of the AAA; see text accompanying nn. 122-135 supra. 
144
 See, e.g., Perry, supra n. 117 (comments of Professor Mistelis)(“the average educated American 
lawyer sees arbitration as nothing more than an extension of contract law, without getting into a 
discussion of the fact that arbitration is effectively a jurisdictional agreement”; “there is a fundamental 
cultural difference when it comes to arbitration on the two sides of the Atlantic”);  Rau, “Trilogy,” at 502-03 
(but to say that “the only serious inquiry ought to be one into the understanding and underlying 
assumptions of the contracting parties” does seem to be “most congruent with our usual view of the 
arbitration process as an integral part of a system of private ordering and self-determination”); Alan Scott 
Rau & Catherine Pedamon, La contractualisation de l’arbitrage:  le modèle américain, [2001] Rev. Arb. 
451.   
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American courts regularly overlook the difference in context that properly informs 
construction of a text.  And so they have tended to view both the rules of the ICC146 
and those of UNCITRAL147 as a sufficient grant to arbitrators-- similar in effect to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
145
 See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Evidence and Discovery in American Arbitration:  The Problem of “Third 
Parties,” 19 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 1, 9-16 (2008)(“the persistent fallacy of ‘plain meaning’” in construing 
§ 7 of the FAA; in addition to an “unimaginative and impoverished view of the capacity of language,” 
“another feature these cases share, perhaps, is a certain sheepishness about continued adherence to 
American practice in the face of contrary sophisticated Continental models”). 
146
 E.g., Burnham Enterprises, LLC v. DACC Co. Ltd., 2013 WL 68923 (M.D. Ala.)(claimant argued that 
the arbitration clause in the “long-term purchase agreement” did not apply to the dispute, which arose 
solely under a separate “confidentiality agreement” not containing such a clause; held, the agreement’s 
adoption of the ICC rules “provide[s] clear and unmistakable evidence that [the parties] agreed to have 
questions of arbitrability settled in arbitration, not in court,” citing First Options); Shaw Group Inc. v. 
Triplefine Int'l Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 118, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2003) (an agreement calling for ICC arbitration 
“clearly and unmistakably” evidences the parties' intention that “the arbitrability of . . . [a] contract claim for 
attorneys' fees and costs was a question for the arbitrator”).  It is piquant that this same reading of the 
rules of  the ICC---deeming them to be at one with those of the AAA in constituting a delegation to the 
arbitrators of the power to determine their own jurisdiction---was apparently shared by Justice Breyer 
himself before his elevation to the Supreme Court; see Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. 
Raytheon European Mgmt. & Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 869 (1st Cir. 1981) (Breyer, J.) (“whether [the 
respondent] is correct in contending that the testing of missiles is so different from their transport that 
Change Order No. 8 . . . was meant to be outside the scope of the arbitrability clause is itself a matter for 
the [ICC] arbitrators”). 
 It is routine of course to include “jurisdictional” objections among the issues contained in the 
Terms of Reference for ICC tribunals:  Might this too constitute a submission to the arbitrators, 
empowering them to make a final determination on the matter?  See CBS Corp. v. WAK Orient Power & 
Light Ltd., 168 F.Supp.2d 403 (E.D. Pa. 2001)(yes; respondent “agreed to submit to arbitration the 
question of whether the [tribunal] had jurisdiction to join [the successor to the parent company of a 
signatory] as a party”; significantly, the court also relied on the “broad arbitration clause” originally 
incorporating the ICC Rules, but somehow avoided any mention of First Options at all); cf. Republic of 
Serbia v. Imagesat International NV, [2009] EWHC 2853 (Q.B.D. Comm.) at ¶¶ 99, 106 (yes; “Serbia’s 
challenge is precluded by its submission to jurisdiction in the Terms of Reference in terms which gave  
the arbitrator substantive jurisdiction”; had Serbia wanted to acknowledge only a provisional kompetenz-
kompetenz jurisdiction this could have been clearly stated”). 
147
 E.g.,  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. PT Multipolar Corp., 202 F.3d 280 (9
th
 Cir. 1999)(similar holding under 
Article 21(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules; “the district court did not err in holding that the parties agreed to 
abide by a system in which . . . the arbitrator, rather than the district court, should decide whether the 
parties' disputes are arbitrable”).  See also Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 395 (2
nd
 
Cir. 2011)(BIT “incorporated by reference the UNCITRAL rule delegating questions of arbitrability to the 
arbitral panel through language nearly identical to the AAA [Rules]”; this constituted “clear and 
unmistakable evidence that the parties intended these issued to be decided by the arbitral panel in the 
first instance”). 
I know this is highly fraught---and much beyond my pay grade---but I am convinced that the 
celebrated BG Group case need not in any way be read to the contrary. In fact, the highly unusual terms 
of Argentina’s “consent” to arbitration here suggests a limited and sensible qualification of the general 
assumptions underlying Chevron.  As we know, the UK-Argentina BIT provides that treaty disputes “shall 
be submitted” to the courts of the host country, and then only to UNCITRAL arbitration if, “after a period of 
eighteen months has elapsed” from the time of such submission, the competent court “has not given its 
final decision.”  That the stipulated “gateway provision” itself makes mandatory recourse to a court, 
suggests---all the obligatory cackle about “procedural arbitrability” aside---that the challenge to arbitration 
should be deemed “jurisdictional” in the sense that it is forum-dependent:  Phrased otherwise, there has 
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AAA Rules--of the power to make a binding determination of their own jurisdiction.  
 
 The tendency to believe that this is exactly what the parties contracted to do in 
their choice of institutional rules is exemplified by two very recent decisions of our 
increasingly benighted Second Circuit:   
 
 Thai-Lao Lignite148 
A Thai company and its Laotian subsidiary initiated an arbitration against the 
Government of Laos; under the terms of the “Project Development Agreement” the 
arbitration was to be held in Malaysia under UNCITRAL Rules. Before the tribunal the 
Government attempted to whipsaw the claimants in the familiar fashion---urging that 
the parent “lacked standing” because all its rights had been assigned to the subsidiary, 
and that the subsidiary “lacked standing” because it was not an original signatory to the 
Agreement.149  But the arbitral tribunal ruled against it (holding that the parent was after 
all a signatory, and that the subsidiary was an “intended beneficiary”).  And the award 
was confirmed, the court rebuffing a challenge to the effect that the tribunal had 
“exercised jurisdiction beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement”; “deference” to 
the tribunal’s conclusions on “questions of arbitrability” was required because the 
parties had “delegated decision on these issues” to the arbitrators.150   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“not yet” been consent to arbitration as opposed to the judicial forum which would normally otherwise be 
competent. See text accompanying n.71 & n.71 supra.  It also suggests that despite the reference to the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the parties will hardly “have been surprised to have a court, and not an arbitrator, 
decide whether the gateway provision should be followed.” Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 665 
F.3d 1363, 1371(D.C. Cir. 2012). This does not strike me as an “oddity” but rather quite sane:  If an 
arbitrator were empowered to rule definitively on whether the prior duty to seize a court was satisfied or 
excused, the entire point of requiring that a court first be seized is eluded.  Cf. Bjorklund, supra n.6 at p. 
5. 
148
 Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 2011 
WL 3516154 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 2012 WL 2866275 (2
nd
 Cir.).  
149
 Id. at 2011 WL 3516154 *5. Cf. Rau, “Consent,” at 129 & fn. 180 (but “presumably the obligor in such 
cases will be expected to arbitrate with someone”).  
150
 Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd., supra n. 148, 2011 WL 3516154 at *12, *15, *17. 
 A separate challenge to  the award was based on the fact that the tribunal had compensated 
claimants for “investment costs” actually incurred on “related contracts” by “related entities” under the 
same ownership----thereby, the respondent alleged, “”wrongfully exercis[ing] jurisdiction over” those 
entities. The court found it easy enough to rebuff this challenge on the simple ground that the tribunal had 
in fact exercised no such “jurisdiction” at all--- it had done nothing more than to “interpret the scope of a 
term” [“total investment costs’”] in the Agreement; ‘”the court must defer to an arbitrator’s conclusions on 
contract interpretation and calculation of damages.” Id. at *15-*16:  It is indeed hard to understand why  
properly-appointed arbitrators should not be thought empowered to determine what damages “fall under” 
a particular contract---or whether all these transactions were intended to be “one scheme from the outset” 
or, as the respondent argued, “separate contractual schemes,” cf. Reply Brief of Appellant, 2012 WL 
990188 (March 15, 2012) at *2. Inherent in arbitral jurisdiction, surely, is the power to be wrong. 
 There is, I concede, authority to the contrary---which I am, then obligated to consider, in 
straightforward fashion, as “erroneous:”  I am, for example, highly doubtful about the result in the recent 
English case of Peterson Farms Inc. v. C & M Farming Ltd., [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm.), [2004] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 603. Here the single signatory defendant was an Arkansas seller of poultry; an Indian company (C & 
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Now to begin with, we note here---once again---the same First Options-centric 
misunderstanding of the purport of the Rules.  But we also note how closely Thai-Lao 
swims in the same current as similar cases in which no need was ever perceived to 
refer to institutional rules at all. I have demonstrated this elsewhere at length, to pretty 
universal indifference, but this is in fact how virtually all the decided cases can be 
rationalized: 151   
 
If an attempt is made to bind---against his will---someone who claims to be a “non-
signatory,” then we must of course ask the question asked of Mr. Kaplan:  “Did you ever 
consent to arbitrate?”---and we must be fully satisfied with the answer before allowing 
things to go any further.152 With respect to a signatory to the agreement, by contrast, 
such a question is simply “not presented.”153 We ask instead, “”Just what are the 
boundaries of your contractual undertaking?” “What are we to make of your undoubted, 
broad, generic, sweeping commitment to arbitrate disputes?”  “Is this the sort of thing 
you agreed to entrust to the arbitrators?” When you think about it, we pose much the 
same sort of question (“what are the boundaries of your contractual undertaking?”) 
when we ask someone who has undoubtedly agreed to arbitrate disputes over the sale 
of “fruit,” whether his consent encompassed a willingness to arbitrate disputes over the 
sale of pecans.154 Yes, that is admittedly a live question---for concededly an agreement 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
M) bought live poultry (“grandparent birds”) from it in an agreement containing a provision for ICC 
arbitration in London.  C & M mated the birds to produce “parent” males, which were then sold on to other 
entities in the C & M group; these other entities in turn used the “parent” males to breed and produce 
broiler chicks. But the poultry turned out to be infected with avian flu. The arbitral tribunal awarded 
damages to C & M based not only on its own lost sales, but also based on losses (in the form of lost sales 
and lost market share) suffered by other C & M group entities; it found that C & M’s right to make claims 
on behalf of the entire group was “a question of interpretation of the arbitration agreement ... including the 
intention of the parties”:  The seller “clearly understood” the “integrated nature of the poultry business” 
and that C & M was contracting “as agent” for the entire C & M group.  In that posture of the case, the 
question whether the affiliated C & M entities were themselves entitled to seek arbitration of their claims, 
naturally did not arise; the total recovery to plaintiff was a way of consolidating all related claims arising 
out of the breach. Treating this as a matter of clause construction strikes me as an eminently sensible 
way to proceed. Nevertheless the court set aside “for want of substantive jurisdiction” that part of the 
award which covered the losses of the affiliated companies: But its decision seemed in no way to hinge 
on the scope of authority given to the tribunal, but instead on what appears to be a de novo review of the 
tribunal’s legal conclusions: Under either Arkansas or English law (deemed identical) there was “no 
evidence to support” a finding of either of agency or estoppel “and the evidence there is contradicts it.”    
151
 See generally the discussion in Rau, “Consent,” at 102-135.  
152
 See text accompanying nn. 49, 66, 115 supra. 
153
 Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd., supra n. 148, 2011 WL 3516154 at *20. 
154
 See Rau, “Consent,” at  98-99; cf. id. at 111 (“it has become a characteristic move in the development 
of American arbitration law, to (1) assimilate the question of a signatory’s obligation to arbitrate to (2) the 
overall question of the scope or coverage of the arbitration clause, and to (3) presumptively allocate 
power over both decisions to the arbitrators themselves”), 125-27 (providing examples).  See also 
PAULSSON,  supra n.5 (“it may be that parties do not so much agree to arbitrate with a person as with 
respect to a transaction or a venture”). 
 For a recent, anodyne example, see Erichsen v. RBC Capital Markets, LLC, 883 F.Supp.2d 562 
(E.D.N.C. 2012). Here the plaintiff had signed “risk disclosure statements” containing an arbitration 
clause; the defendant, an assignee, was held entitled to compel arbitration “even as a nonsignatory.” 
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to arbitrate with X is not necessarily an agreement to arbitrate with Y155 ----but by the 
same token, an “agreement to arbitrate disputes asserted within six years” is not 
necessarily an “agreement to arbitrate stale claims,” either.156  
 
So when it comes to interpreting manifestations of consent we are very close to 
the core competence of the arbitrator, who is not for that reason entirely an “officious 
intermeddler”---nor does the attempt to bind someone who has already agreed to 
arbitrate something clearly implicate the existence of his consent in the same way that 
Mr. Kaplan’s consent was contested. Nor can I identify much of a policy aimed at 
punishing free riders. The only question then is what sort of disputes a party has 
entrusted to “his” arbitrator. 157    So we are in the same ballpark---within spitting 
distance so to speak---of the increasingly routine tendency of U.S. courts to deem this 
something that may fairly be left to the arbitrators themselves.158 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Apparently it was not even argued that this question fell to be determined by the arbitral tribunal rather 
than by the court. But what does it mean for the court to say (as it did) that the motion to compel 
arbitration should be granted “taking into consideration . . . the strong presumption in favor of arbitration,” 
883 F.Supp.2d at 573----other than that this question is treated by the court precisely as a commonplace 
issue of “scope” and not one of the “existence of consent”? 
155
Cf. Rau, “Consent,” at 127 (“but precisely that same rhetorical device can be used” with respect to 
cases like Howsam and Pacificare; “this is all, always, just a question of framing.  Just as in Howsam and 
Pacificare, an initial agreement to submit to arbitration permits us to temper somewhat the absolutism of 
our insistence on the usual understanding of consent---and to shift the burden on the parties to the 
agreement to draft in advance around any default rule”).   
But see Petition for Rehearing, supra n. 34 at *11, in which the respondent/Government of Laos 
argued that the arbitral tribunal’s joinder of a non-signatory on a “third party beneficiary basis” was simply 
“not a decision of contract interpretation” [sed quaere: why not?], and did not involve a dispute over a “so-
called ‘what’ question,” but rather a dispute over “the ‘who’ question,” a question “of fundamental 
consent.”   Note, though, that when Justice Breyer distinguished between the “ ‘who’ question” and the 
“what” question in First Options, he, of course, was getting at something completely different---he was 
distinguishing between the level #2 question of what is deemed to be arbitrable, and the level #3 question 
of who is to make the determination of arbitrability. First Options of Chicago, Inc, supra n. 31, 514 U.S. at  
943. 
156
 “It is questionable whether one can speak of an ‘arbitrator’ at all in the seventh year,” William W. Park, 
Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 75, 117 (2002). 
157
 See Rau, “Consent,” at 121 (“the critical inquiry now becomes the [signatory’s] ‘expectation and intent 
when binding itself’ to the agreement---and ‘the most important indicator' of this is the scope of the issues 
that [it] had originally confided to ‘its’ arbitrator for decision”).  
E.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co. Ltd., 398 F.3d 205 (2
nd
 Cir. 2005)(claimant’s “ability as 
a non-signatory to enforce the arbitration clause is, in the terms of the AAA rules, an issue pertaining to 
the ‘existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement’ between respondent and claimant’s 
predecessor; as a signatory to the contract incorporating these rules, respondent “cannot now disown its 
agreed-to obligation to arbitrate all disputes, including the question of arbitrability”---“even if, in the end, 
an arbitrator were to determine [with finality] that the [underlying] dispute itself is not arbitrable” because 
the claimant cannot assert rights under the agreement); see also Oehme, van Sweden & Associates, Inc. 
v. Maypaul Trading & Services Ltd., 2012 WL 5396394 (D.D.C.) (“A signatory to a contract has clearly 
and unmistakably agreed to its terms, [although] that is not necessarily true of a nonsignatory”). 
158
 A recent decision by another panel of the Second Circuit, on similar facts, does seem to look in a 
different direction. In a 1996 agreement between the UN and the BNP, the BNP agreed to open an 
escrow account to receive Iraqi oil proceeds, and to issue payments for the UN”s “Oil for Food” 
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There is one final feature of the Thai Lao problem that seems to have been 
largely ignored, both by the courts and by counsel---it arises from the inconvenient fact 
that the seat of the arbitration had been in Malaysia.  Just about the only reference to 
that subject in the district court was this oblique discussion in a footnote:  While the 
Government of Laos had argued that enforcement should be refused on the basis of art. 
V(1)(a) of the Convention, the court noted that perhaps the challenge “would seem to fit 
more comfortably” within art. V(1)(c).  But 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
humanitarian aid program. The contract contained an arbitration provision incorporating the UNCITRAL 
rules.  But  in Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 769 F.Supp.2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub. nom. Republic 
of Iraq v. BNP Paribas USA, 2012 WL 1021032 (2
nd
 Cir.)----a decision not cited in Thai Lao and virtually 
nowhere else---the court held that Iraq could not avail itself of the arbitration provision as a third-party 
beneficiary.  
The case arose on competing motions to compel and enjoin arbitration and so, unlike Thai Lao, 
the specter of imposing wasted effort from an abortive proceeding was missing.  The decision may also 
have hinged in part on what the court found to be the “plain language” of the arbitration clause, restricted 
to allowing only the “parties” (defined as the UN and the BNP alone) to invoke the process.  But there are 
multiple and disturbing analytical problems:   
 The district court found that despite incorporation of the UNCITRAL Rules, there was “simply no 
‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ that [Iraq] and BNP agreed to arbitrate the issue of whether 
their dispute is arbitrable for the simple reason that there is no contract between them”, 769 
F.Supp.2d at 610 (emphasis added).  If this is a feint towards relevance, it fails dismally; it is a 
blatant misreading of First Options---which at most merely requires some “clear and 
unmistakable” evidence of the intent of the resisting party:  Why should we require more? 
 The district court also stressed the absence of any “sufficient relationship” between Iraq and the 
UN or the BNP, 769 F.Supp.2d at 612.  But in the third-party beneficiary context this seems to me 
to come dangerously close to an assessment of the TPB issue itself on the merits:  All that should  
really be necessary is that “the arbitrators arguably, plausibly, colorably had jurisdiction to decide 
the case; and that the arbitration clause was drafted with sufficient breadth and generality so as 
to leave the final word on the matter” to the tribunal.  See Rau, “Consent,” at 135 fn. 200 (“the 
appropriate gateway inquiry for the judiciary”).  
 In pursuing this “sufficient relationship” line, the district court stressed that Iraq was “not a 
corporate successor to the [UN] nor does it otherwise stand in the [UN’s] shoes,” 769 F.Supp.2d 
at 611; see also 2012 WL 1021032 at *2 (“unlike Contec Corporation, Iraq has no claim to be in 
any sense a ‘party’)”:  That points to considerations which might just possibly be relevant in 
“successorship” or “estoppel” cases like Contec, supra n. 157---but which (as the court failed to  
recognize) are wholly beside the point in a third party beneficiary situation----where such a “test” 
can never, by definition, be satisfied. For a similarly blinkered view, see also QPro Inc. v. RTF 
Quality Services USA, Inc., 761 F.Supp.2d 492, 498 (S.D. Tex. 2011)(ICC arbitration; to allow a 
“nonsignatory to compel a signatory to arbitrate issues of arbitrability” is limited to cases where 
the nonsignatory “essentially stood in the shoes of a signatory to the arbitration agreement when 
defending the suit”).  
 As I said above, this is concededly a “live question”:  As the court warned in Contec, “just because a 
signatory has agreed to arbitrate issues of arbitrability with another party does not mean that it must 
arbitrate with any non-signatory,” Contec, supra n. 157, 398 F.3d at 209 (emphasis added)---and so some 
screening function is necessary (something, by the way, that is usually furnished by a rebuttable 
presumption of arbitrability).  But I very much doubt whether an arbitral award that purported to construe 
the contract and to grant Iraq arbitral standing as a TPB could have been annulled. 
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in any event, given that courts review arbitrability issues even though arbitrability 
is not specifically mentioned in Article V, the fact that Respondent’s jurisdiction 
objections are not grounded in the text of Article V does not foreclose its 
arguments.159 
 
Now this is an obvious error, because we know that the obligation of a U.S. court 
to recognize and enforce Convention awards is limited only by the grounds for refusal 
specified in art. V---and that these grounds are “exclusive.”160  There is thus a need for 
some textual hook, and a proper search should lead us to both the sections mentioned.  
And since these are most sensibly read together, I would conclude that the scope of the 
signatory’s obligation [what is “within the terms of the submission to arbitration”]161 
must---equally with the “validity” of any agreement to which he may be bound162--- be 
viewed through the lenses of the law of the seat that he has chosen.163 Indeed the 
former should be true a fortiori.   
                                                          
159
 Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd., supra n. 148, 2011 WL 3516154 at *15 fn.8.   On appeal the 
Second Circuit made no reference to the Convention at all. 
160
 See Alan Scott Rau, The Errors of Comity: Forum Non Conveniens Returns to the Second Circuit, 23 
Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 1, 12 (2012)(“it is usually, and authoritatively, and properly, assumed” that the Art. V 
grounds for the refusal of recognition and enforcement of awards are “exclusive”); 2 BORN, supra n.7 at 
2337, 2721-22(“exclusive and exhaustive”). 
161
 This is art. V(1)(c). 
162
 This is art. V(1)(a).  
163
 See Rau, “Jurisdiction,” at 168-69 (as the choice of a seat is properly viewed as “an exercise of 
autonomy,” the law of that state is “a plausible candidate, and in fact considerably more plausible than its 
many competitors”); more recently, see Sulamérica Cia. Nacional de Seguros SA v. Enesa Engelharia 
SA, [2012] EWCA Civ. 4638 (C.A.)(concluding, after an exhaustive review of authority and the display of 
some shrewd good sense on the subject of what “it would be very surprising if the parties had intended,” 
that English law as the chosen law of the seat was the “proper law of the arbitration agreement,” 
“notwithstanding the express choice of Brazilian law as the law governing the policies”).  
This particularly ought to inform results in the many cases (similar to Thai-Lao) where a challenge 
“implicates the ‘consent’ of the contracting parties in only the most tenuous way,” for example,  
 where it is sought to bind an undoubted party to submit to arbitration with a non-signatory.  Cf. 1 
BORN, supra n.7 at  1214-18 (“issues of consent and assumption [as well as issues of “third party 
beneficiary status”] are questions directly concerning formation of the arbitration agreement, and 
would therefore be governed by the law applicable to the arbitration agreement under most 
conflicts systems”);  Felman Production Inc. v. Bannai,  476 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) 
(agreement called for arbitration in London [and was also to be governed by English law]; the 
court denied a motion by the defendant/nonsignatory to compel arbitration; “federal law” does not 
govern here, and “it is a general principle of [English] arbitration law that the agreement only 
binds the parties to the agreement to arbitration”). 
 Or where the legal challenge involves the scope of the arbitration agreement.  Cf.  Yavuz v. 61 
MM Ltd, 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006) (Swiss choice-of-law clause and “place of courts is 
Fribourg”; “it is hardly obvious what claims” are governed by the clause; since “the words may 
take on different meanings depending on the law used to interpret them,” “a court can effectuate 
the parties' agreement concerning the forum only if it interprets the forum clause under the 
chosen law”).  Yes, I know there is abundant authority to the contrary; see, e.g., Chloe Z Fishing 
Co., Inc. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (S.D. Cal. 2000), holding that  
“federal substantive law” as “the supreme law of  the land” governs whether the arbitration clause 
“encompasse[s] the subject of the parties’ present dispute” (although “admittedly, “there is a 
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 In Thai-Lao the choice of the applicable law was apparently uncontested, and 
the content of Malaysian arbitration law unexplored---and so in the absence of any 
curiosity about the question, it would be natural to fall back on U.S. law as filtered 
through First Options.164  Or course things will not always be so easy:  An agreement to 
arbitrate under the AAA’s Commercial Rules in France---if one can imagine anything so 
grotesque---would clearly require a U.S. court, when asked to compel arbitration, to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
colorable argument that either the choice-of-law provision governing the P & I policies or the 
reference of disputes to ‘arbitration in London’ . . . subjects the scope of the arbitration clause to 
English law,” id. at 1252).  But note that Chloe Z, like most other cases with similar holdings, 
arose in the context of a motion to compel---and there seems to be a common and unfortunate 
failure here to appreciate that the choice-of-law analysis expressly mandated for awards by art. 
V(1)(a) “equally governs the enforceability of arbitration agreements,” see Rau, ”Jurisdiction,” at 
168 fn. 307. 
 The Restatement would at least seem to agree that federal law (whether the “supreme law of the 
land” or not) should have no role ex proprio vigore in a case like Thai Lao---although the fact that the 
parties happened to have chosen New York law to govern the Project Development Agreement might be 
deemed significant.  It presumes, though, that for the purposes of art. V(1)(a)—and in the usual absence 
of anything more explicit---“the law to which the parties have subjected” their agreement to arbitrate is the 
contract's general substantive choice-of-law clause; it is only where “the parties have neither selected any 
law to govern the arbitration agreement, nor included in the contract a general choice-of-law clause,” that 
the law of the seat “govern[s] the issue.” Restatement, supra n. 73 at § 4-12(c) & cmt. c.  An identical rule 
is laid down for the purposes of art. V(1)(c); see id. at  § 4-14(b) & cmt. b.  I express some hesitation 
about this in Rau, “Jurisdiction,” at 169 fn. 311 (“after all [the contractual choice of substantive law] is 
largely just a surrogate for a conflict-of-laws analysis which would have proceeded in its absence”; “I also 
wonder whether the suggested default takes adequate account of the usual abstraction of the arbitral 
process from the actual place of performance of the underlying transaction” “or, for that matter,” of “the 
obvious need to read Article V(1)(a) as congruent with the consecrated readings of Article V(1)(e).” 
Finally: Is it possible that a fundamentally different analysis is called for when a court is asked (as 
in the cases we are dealing with) to determine the scope of an arbitrator’s authority under a BIT? To say 
that the agreement in such cases should be subject to no national body of law at all---but rather to some 
autonomous floating body of “public international law”--would not seem to me to advance the ball very far. 
[To that effect, though, see Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Production Co., [2005] 
EWHC 774 (Q.B.D. Comm.) at ¶¶ 62-63 (as “there is no doubt” that the BIT is “governed by public 
international law,” “it would be logical” that the jurisdiction of the arbitrators (“i.e., the scope of the 
arbitration agreement”),  was “governed by the same law”),  aff’d, [2005] EWCA Civ. 1116 (C.A.) at ¶ 13 
(“although neither side suggests that the answer is crucial to its own case”).] The very least one can say 
is that in the context of the Convention, such a view hardly eliminates the task of giving meaning to art. V-
--nor, certainly, does it render any more sensible the invocation by the court in Thai-Lao of First Options.  
In any event the Convention was not directly implicated in Occidental Exploration--- since what was at 
stake there was not recognition of a foreign award, but merely the question whether Ecuador’s annulment 
motion was a matter “justiciable in an English court.”  It might also be noted that the choice of a seat in 
Occidental had been made, not in the treaty or even by the parties, but by the arbitrators themselves---
something that might be significant if (for whatever reason) one takes the view that any law put forward to 
govern the agreement must have been “capable of identification at the moment that the agreement is 
made,” [2005] EWHC 774 at ¶ 62. 
164
  Cf. Al-Salamah Arabian Agencies Co., Ltd. v. Reece, 673 F. Supp. 748 (M.D. N.C. 1987)(“arbitration in 
Riyadh”; “the parties have not briefed the court on the issue of whether an unsigned written contract may 
be binding under Saudi Arabian law,” but “given the policy of the [FAA] in favor of arbitration, the court will 
assume that the contract is binding”). 
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adjust its usual expectations with respect to how the contract should be read.165  And 
faced with an ultimate French award, could a U.S. court possibly defer to an arbitral 
ruling on jurisdiction by giving the Rules greater currency than they would have under 
the chosen law? I suspect not, although vacatur there----under the lex arbitri to which 
the parties had subjected their proceeding---on the ground that the tribunal had 
“wrongfully  taken jurisdiction,”166 would obviously and conveniently short-circuit the 
inquiry. 
 
 
 
Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand167 
  
Thai-Lao was followed just a month later by another Second Circuit decision: The 
judgment of a different panel, Schneider equally dealt with a motion to confirm a foreign 
award rendered in an arbitration arising under a BIT and conducted under the 
UNCITRAL Rules.  A German company had been a “promoter,” investor, and participant 
in a tollway project to which the Government of Thailand had granted a concession; it 
alleged that its investment had been “thwarted” by the wrongful act of the Government 
in not properly fixing the levels of tolls for the highway.  The relevant treaty between 
Thailand and Germany only protects (and only grants the right to arbitrate to) investors 
who have made “approved investments.”  An arbitral tribunal in Geneva “agreed to 
consider issues of jurisdiction at the outset,” first found that the claimant was a 
“protected investor” because it had made an “approved investment,” and later issued an 
award in its favor.168 
 
 The district court granted a motion to confirm.  It found First Options “inapposite” 
and “inapplicable” for the reason that Justice Breyer’s opinion had “only 
considered” “the question of agreement formation”---that is, it had only 
addressed the case where a respondent is arguing that he was “never party to 
an agreement to arbitrate,” and had never “agreed to arbitrate disputes at all.”169 
But here, by contrast, the issue was supposedly one of “scope”: 
                                                          
165
 While it may be “unclear what the effect under French law is of an arbitration agreement that confers 
on the arbitral tribunal the power finally to decide jurisdictional disputes,” 1 BORN, supra n.7 at 903, it is 
at least certain that under that law, the presumption against construing any agreement to give it such a 
meaning will be irresistible.  See text accompanying nn. 138-41 supra. 
166
 See Decree of January 13, 2011, art. 1520(1)(“s’est déclaré à tort compétent”). 
167
 Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand, 10 Civ. 2729 (S.D.N..Y. March 14, 2010), aff’d, 688 F.3d 68 (2
nd
 Cir. 
2012).  
168
 Art. 2(2) of the 2002 BIT provides that the treaty “shall apply only to investments that have been 
specifically approved in writing by the competent authority” of the host state.  The arbitral tribunal rejected 
a claim under the treaty for “creeping expropriation,” but  found that Thailand  had violated art. 2(3) by 
failing to “accord such investments” “fair and equitable treatment and full protection.” See Award of July 1, 
2009, in http://italaw.com/documents/WalterBauThailandAward.pdf. 
169
 10 Civ. 2729 at *12-*13.  
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 So in these circumstances, the court concluded, the “standard to apply” 
was the canonical “strong presumption of arbitrability.” (This familiar 
reference might suggest that the court thought that it was, itself, 
independently making the final determination that the arbitrators “in fact 
had jurisdiction”).170   
 Almost in the same breath, though, Judge Batts wrote that she thought it 
inappropriate to “conduct a de novo review” of the award. (This by 
contrast might suggest that the jurisdictional determination was 
presumed to be a matter best left to the arbitrators themselves, subject 
only to some unspecified level of deferential review).171  
The conceptual confusion here is stark and, as we have already seen, not 
uncommon.172  And the latter proposition, as have also already seen, is as a 
purported reading of First Options plainly and simply wrong.173   
 
 A far better tack to have taken, a far better route to the same result, might have 
been to find First Options beside the point for a different reason---for the reason 
that the Government’s challenge was not even to the tribunal’s “jurisdiction” (or if 
you prefer, to “arbitrability”) in the first place.  An analogy might be drawn here to 
the question (discussed earlier) whether a given dispute can “still” be heard by 
arbitrators after contractual time limits have elapsed:174  Note, at least, that in 
                                                          
170
 This of course is what such a “presumption” is usually taken to mean:  The Second Circuit, however, 
sensibly did not read the district court opinion in that sense, assuming instead that the lower court had 
“declined to determine independently” the question of jurisdiction and had simply deferred to the tribunal. 
688 F.3d at 71-72.  
171
 This notion, I suppose, would involve some other sort of presumption---not one of actual jurisdiction---
but rather of a “presumption of jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction,” see 10 Civ. 2729 at *13 fn. 6 (because 
First Options is inapplicable, “the court does not need to reach the question of whether there was clear 
and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended that the question of arbitrability be decided by the 
Arbitrators”). 
172
 See text accompanying nn. 73-76 supra (on this point “slippage, muddle, and lack of rigor are 
inevitable”). 
173
 See text accompanying nn. 77, 98-100 supra;  see generally Rau, “Arbitrability,” at 309-313 (“a hasty 
reading, or wishful thinking, on the part of some lower courts has led them to conclude . . . that once we 
can find some ‘valid arbitration agreement,’ to which a respondent has assented, [First Options] no longer 
comes into play at all”; this represents “a misapprehension of Justice Breyer’s account of default rules in 
arbitration,” a distortion of his careful analytical scheme, for “whenever the authority of an arbitrator to 
decide is in question, the presumptions laid down in [First Options] must come into play”).   
Cf.  Dimolitsa, supra n.16 at 322-24. The author, relying on First Options, asserts that in the 
United States the notion of compétence-compétence “is apparently not accepted” when there is a 
question as to who is bound by the arbitration clause “[la portée ratione personae]” but it is, on the 
contrary, with respect to determining the “la portée ratione materiae” of the clause. This is the common 
error I’ve just referred to---compounded with the poignant belief that Latin tags can actually contribute to 
moving an argument forward. 
174
 See text accompanying nn. 68-71 supra; see also generally Rau, “Consent,” at 135-40 (“not yet” or “no 
longer” any “consent to arbitrate”; “[t]he parties should not have to run the risk of seeing a rule of liability 
converted into a rule of ‘arbitrability’”). 
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both cases the challenge goes not to the appropriate forum, but to the “validity of 
the claim,” not to the authority of this particular tribunal, but to whether recovery 
is hopeless---that is, whether in any forum the claimant is precluded from 
pursuing any cause of action at all. We can therefore conclude that in both 
cases, any reference to First Options or to “arbitrability” would be a simple 
category mistake:  As the absence of an “approved investment” will definitively 
doom the claim--as the claimant has no recourse to any alternative forum for a 
treaty violation175---as the impugned conduct of the state is simply irrelevant if 
the investor cannot get in the door---the parties’ expectation was presumably 
that this “gateway” question should be, at the outset, entrusted for a final 
decision to the tribunal itself.176 
 
 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment of confirmation---but in 
doing so came up with still yet another rationale justifying deference to the 
award:  First Options, it held, did indeed provide the governing standard---
because the existence of an “approved investment” was a question of 
“arbitrability”---and so, before making the decision itself, it was the job of the 
district court to first determine whether there had been “clear and unmistakable 
evidence of the parties’ intent to submit the question to the arbitral tribunal.”177  
But nevertheless the First Options standard was satisfied by the decision of the 
parties to arbitrate under a body of rules having precisely that effect. 
 
Analogies are always a risky business, and while the court did not say so, it is 
quite possible that it was in thrall to a competing one:  It is, for example, generally 
taken as a given in securities cases that whether a claimant is a “customer” of a 
                                                          
175
 See Award of July 1, 2009, supra n. 168 at ¶ 12.30 (“Whatever contractual or company law remedies 
[the Claimant] may have had are irrelevant in the present case which is strictly one based on the 
international law rights granted to the Claimant as an “investor” by the 2002 Treaty”). 
176
 It would probably be kinder to pass over the rest of Judge Batts’ opinion in relative silence.  After 
dismissing the challenge to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, she then went on to consider whether the 
award should be “vacated” under § 10 of the FAA (or under the fugitive common-law standard of 
“manifest disregard”). She noted that Thailand “has not filed a formal motion to vacate the award” [what, I 
wonder, could possibly be the explanation for that?]; she then nevertheless decided sua sponte to treat 
Thailand’s opposition to the claimant’s motion to confirm as in any event equivalent to a motion to vacate. 
10 Civ. 2729 at *13 fn. 7.  [Did I mention that the seat of the arbitration was Geneva?]  
And after “a thorough review,” the court was “satisfied that the Arbitrators’ award meets the light 
burden imposed by section 10(a) and the ‘Manifest Disregard Standard.’” Given this “analysis,” it is 
perhaps not surprising that art. V was never even referred to. And a fortiori, the notion that a Swiss lex 
arbitri might be relevant did not rise to the level of anyone’s consciousness---although here, unlike the 
case of Malaysia, we might be able to make some pretty shrewd guesses as to the content of the relevant 
law, see 1 BORN, supra n.7 at 904-07 (that non-Swiss parties may waive the right to seek annulment, or 
exclude some of the otherwise-applicable grounds for annulment, suggests that Swiss law would “allow 
the arbitral tribunal to make a final decision on its own jurisdiction in at least some cases”).  
Arbitration is not for dabblers. But why---why, at this late date---do some of our federal courts 
have such difficulty even in coming to terms with the very existence of the Convention?  
177
 Schneider, supra n. 167, 688 F.3d at 71. 
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brokerage house---something that alone allows him to trigger FINRA arbitration---
is to be deemed a “jurisdictional” matter for the court.  (That is equally the case, 
for that matter, with respect to the question whether a party to a contract for the 
sale of apples is obligated to arbitrate a dispute involving the sale of oranges.) 178   
Schneider too could perhaps similarly be characterized as a question of “scope” 
if the inquiry is framed in this way---becoming, that is, an inquiry into whether this 
“arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to [this] particular 
type of controversy.”179     
But even if such a frame---such a characterization---is accepted, we are merely 
returned to the qualifications imposed by everything that has gone before:  As I 
suggested earlier, once we are satisfied that there has been in these 
circumstances some “core consent” to the arbitration process, then---whatever 
sort of “threshold” First Options is taken to have imposed---it makes sense for 
any “jurisdictional” requirement to be considerably relaxed.  We recall, in other 
words, that the generic broad clause, or some institutional rule of 
compétence/compétence, can readily be taken---and has commonly been taken--
-to constitute the necessary grant of authority to the tribunal to “arbitrate 
arbitrability”---subject only to the limited review provided in an applicable 
statute.180   It was on this basis, then, that the Second Circuit was able to craft an 
alternative ground for confirmation in finding that “that is precisely what occurred 
here.”181  
 
                                                          
178 For FINRA cases, see, e.g., Bensadoun, supra n.7;  Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Drzayick, 2011 WL 
5403031 (D.Idaho)(the “threshold question of whether [claimants] are ‘customers’ [is] a legal matter that 
should be resolved by the court”; “it does not appear [claimants] can establish that some brokerage or 
investment relationship existed” with the respondent, and while the respondent “may have provided 
information on the Funds for the initial public offerings, [claimants] did not purchase their shares in the 
Funds during the initial public offerings, so it would be unfair to create a customer relationship” on that 
basis). To the same effect is UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 324 fn. 2 (4
th
 
Cir. 2013), holding that “whether a person requesting arbitration is a customer must be resolved [by the 
court] to determine the existence of a contract to arbitrate, not the scope of an arbitration agreement”: 
“Consequently” we address the question “without considering the presumption in favor of arbitration.” 
[Note that any proposed distinction between “existence” and “scope” in this context rests, as I have 
argued throughout, on a misreading of First Options; “what is interesting is not so much the abstract 
proposition that at some level ‘it is for the court’ to vet arbitral jurisdiction,
 
as it is the sharply restricted 
nature of the inquiry”; see text accompanying nn. 77, 82, 98-100 supra. 
Of course this analogy, if it is was at all in play here, would be deeply flawed, as the challenges in 
these cases--- true “jurisdictional” challenges---seem entirely forum-dependent: The 
purchasers/investors/claimants there---even if the FINRA rules did not apply to them, and the FINRA 
arbitration mechanism unavailable to  them---always had open the possibility of pursuing the same 
statutory and common law causes of action (in the usual litany, for “breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Exchange Act”)  in a court of law. This is true however 
the challenge is framed.  Same thing, of course, for the party to the sale of oranges. 
179
 See text accompanying n. 53 & n. 53 supra (quoting from Justice Breyer’s opinion in Howsam). 
180
 See generally the discussion in the text accompanying nn. 72-85 supra. 
181
 Schneider, supra n. 167, 688 F.3d at 72. 
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I suppose that all in all, this does constitute a somewhat less satisfying rationale 
than what has gone before---but the important point, of course, is that as it leads 
to the same result, it doesn’t much matter.182  
 
As you can tell, then, confirmation of the award in Schneider was truly 
“overdetermined.” 
If this seems at all plausible, it returns us to the thrust of earlier sections of this 
paper and summarizes the whole narrative neatly:  It is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
in a case where U.S. arbitration law appropriately governs the agreement, the rules of 
arbitral institutions---however they are construed---are as likely as not to amount to a 
makeweight; and it does no great harm to assume that they may be properly treated in 
the end as tangential to any actual decision.183     
Among all the advantages we have canvassed for this state of affairs, another 
must be that it contributes further to the marginalization of First Options as something to 
be reckoned with---a process, as we have seen, that has been well under way for some 
time. (Of course the case will continue to evoke the obligatory, all-purpose citation, 
before one passes in short order to something more interesting.). I would be hesitant to 
claim much more---but perhaps we could also mention the advantage of drawing our 
particular attention to the existence of competing default rules that arise out of different 
legal cultures---something that will properly enter into our calculus with respect to the 
choice of a seat. A corollary would see even transnational cases remaining within the 
framework of the present complex structure of our common law---notwithstanding the 
blandishments and siren calls of “international consensus.”  Once again, the interest is 
                                                          
182
 The same lesson is to be drawn from Republic of Ecuador, supra n. 147 at 395. Here Ecuador 
asserted that Chevron was “estopped” from asserting, or had “waived,” its right to arbitration under the 
U.S.-Ecuador BIT. The court noted that “waiver and estoppel generally fall into” the category of issues 
that would always, in any event, be “presumptively for the arbitrator”---relying on Moses Cone and in 
particular, Howsam. But “even assuming” that Ecuador’s arguments instead “go to Chevron’s ability to 
initiate arbitration, and thus are fairly characterized as ‘questions of arbitrability,’ there is ‘clear and 
unmistakable evidence’ that the parties intended these issued to be decided by the arbitral panel in the 
first instance”:  For the BIT incorporated the UNCITRAL rules, which “delegat[ed] questions of arbitrability 
to the arbitral panel through language nearly identical” to the rules of the AAA.  
183
 See, e.g., Silec Cable S.A.S., supra n. 81. The agreement there called for ICC arbitration to be held in 
Pittsburgh. An action to enjoin the arbitration was dismissed on the ground that it was for the arbitrators to 
determine whether the “claims set forth in [the] arbitration demand are arbitrable.” There was indeed 
“clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties had intended” this:  To begin with, the principles 
derived from the cases interpreting the AAA rules were in fact “even stronger in reference to an arbitration 
agreement incorporating ICC Rules, given that ICC Rules require the arbitrators to determine whether a 
claim is arbitrable if that issue is raised by one of the parties,” 2012 WL 5906535 at *18 (emphasis in 
original). But what is more---“in addition”---the “broad, unlimited and unambiguous language” used in the 
arbitration clause “clearly and unmistakably convinces the Court that the parties intended that the 
arbitrator decide the scope of any claims.” Id. at *19. 
 See also Congress Construction Co., supra n.111 (incorporation of AAA Rules “gives the 
arbitrators the power to decide questions of arbitrability,” but “second, and in any event,” the broad 
language of the arbitration clause “is itself sufficient to permit the Court to conclude that it is for the 
arbitrators to decide” such questions). 
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less in exercises that purport to call for the interpretation of language, and rather more 
in the identification of appropriate default rules of construction; conscious choice on this 
subject should always track our particular preconceptions with respect to the primacy 
and contours of party expectation---and above all, with respect to the kind of process we 
want to encourage. 
